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Preface 
 
In 2001 I published an article on the “Long Peace of ASEAN” in the Journal of Peace 
Research. I focused on the fact that despite endless discussions on the problems of 
Southeast Asian conflict-resolution capacity, the lack of regional pooling of 
sovereignty, the weakness of crisis management institutions, etc., the members of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have so far remained very peaceful. I 
noted that many of the Europe/West-centric approaches to security and conflict failed to 
explain the relative peace of East Asia. The fact that one does not recognize the 
characteristics that were associated to peace of Western Europe does not mean that 
Southeast Asia could not be peaceful. Southeast Asia did not have many wars and its 
conflicts tended to be much less intensive in the area of the ASEAN, even if the 
Southeast Asian approach to peace does not correspond to the approach of Western 
Europe, which has become the “default approach” to peace in the literature of 
international relations theory and peace and conflict studies. Over the years I have 
developed my ideas on the reasons for the relative peace in Southeast Asia. I also came 
to realize that even if pacification of Northeast Asia, including China has taken place 
with a slightly different timetable, the recipes are rather similar to the ones found in 
Southeast Asia. It seems that the entire East Asia defies many of the assumptions 
regarding to the “causes of peace”. This is why I thought that studying the recipes of 
peace in East Asia could be interesting not only for the sake of understanding of East 
Asia, but for the enrichment of the theory of international relations and the study of 
peace and conflicts. For me the project to understand the Long Peace of East Asia 
proved that I was right: East Asian experience can emancipate us from many of the 
Europe-centric biases of our thinking of peace. At the same time it gives many new 
tools to the toolbox of peacemaking. I hope that this book convinces the reader of this.  
I owe a great debt to many people who were helpful to my research. I have been 
impressed and influenced by the great names of East Asian studies, who have also 
commented and/or encouraged my work. Amitav Acharya, Robert Ross, Surpong Peou, 
David Kang, Kevin Clements, Chung-in Moon, Jong Kun Choi, Keyuan Zou, Emilian 
Kavalski, Zhang Tiejun and Kim Beng Phar deserve my deepest gratitude.  
Furthermore, I would like to thank some great international relations theorists 
and peace-and conflict scholars, foremost Heikki Patomäki, Ole Waever, Liisa Laakso, 
Teivo Teivainen, Raimo Väyrynen, Peter Wallensteen, Matilda Lindgren, Isak Svensson 
and Erik Melander, for their help, encouragement and constructive criticism during the 
process of research for this book.  
Academic and practical specialists of particular conflict situations also helped 
me with their special insights to some of the problems that I had to deal with in this 
research project. Djohermansyah Djohan, Delsy Ronnie, Saifuddin Bantasyam, Santos 
Winarso and Geir Helgesen among a number of others deserve my special thanks.   
I am very grateful for my current employer, Department of Political and 
Economic Studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Helsinki for the 
encouragement, academic freedom and facilitation of my writing process at the very end 
of the writing. The administrative framework and scholarly atmosphere have been 
positive and encouraging. To some extent it has returned my faith in academic 
institutions as allies, rather than enemies of scholarly innovation.  
I would like to thank my language editor, Leena Höskuldsson, who did a great 
service to my readers in straightening out not only my language but often also my 
thoughts related to the difficult issues of peace and war. Thanks are also due to the great 
editorial team of Ashgate. This is the third singe-authored book I have written with 
Ashgate; if it is up to me, it will not be the last.  
  
Chapter 1 
Aim, Concepts and Approach 
 
 
Objectives 
East Asia has become peaceful without scholars generally even realizing this. When recipes for 
peace are sought, we often look at Western-European experiences of integration, lower borders 
and turning of historical enemies into friends. However, the  long peace period in Western 
Europe is not unique: similar periods have also been experienced elsewhere, but these have not 
portrayed strongly in the creation of generalizations on peace. Instead, Europe has largely 
dominated the field. However, during the past three decades, East Asia has been more peaceful 
than Europe, Americas or any continent, in terms of the numbers of battle deaths per capita. 
Like Europe, East Asia used to be the most belligerent area in the world, just before its dramatic 
change. Since East Asia is a spectacular case of pacification, and since it has not much affected 
our theorization of peace and conflict, it is a very useful case to study. Perhaps peace in East 
Asia can be sustained? Perhaps it can be deepened? Perhaps the East Asian peace model can be 
emulated elsewhere? 
The present book starts from the pragmatic interest of peace research as a tool of 
reducing suffering caused by war. Its ultimate objective is to contribute to the reduction of the 
number of people killed by conflicts and political violence by offering understanding that can 
help remove causes of war, criticize the knowledge that constitutes the legitimate forms of 
violence, deconstruct social realities within which war is a rational strategy, and construct 
interpretations and social realities that help create peace. Later in this chapter, I shall explain the 
general approach of neo-pragmatist study of the long peace of East Asia and its contribution to 
the current understanding of East Asian security. Furthermore, I shall substantiate my 
arguments on the long peace of East Asia. But before all of that, though, I shall define the two 
main concepts of the topic of this book, “peace” and “East Asia”. 
Security and Peace 
The question of what can be included in the concept of peace and what not depends at least on 
three things. Firstly, it is a practical question of what one wants to focus on, what kind of 
clusters of issues one can analyse and which issues make an interesting totality.  
Secondly, the question is of the analytical relevance that the different issues under focus 
have for each other. There are analytical ways to study all of the various kinds of threats and 
how their “inclusion into the security realm” affects the way they are being dealt with (on 
securitization theory, see for example Waever 1995). However, if one wants to find ways to 
prevent threats to peace, the roots of environmental threats and threats to people emanating from 
authoritarian violence, it is not analytically possible to find coherent analytical approaches for 
the venture. The study of the source of environmental threats requires understanding of biology, 
environmental studies, etc., while the study of intentional threats by enemies (conflict studies) 
requires a very different approach.  
Thirdly, focus and framing of what belongs together and what does not, is a political 
matter as associations and dissociations are social realities.  
In traditional East Asian security studies and research in international relations, 
association between people’s security and national security has been seen as weak while the 
association between regime survival and security has been very strong. Peace is stability of 
order, and lack of uncontrolled change (Leifer 1989; Mearsheimer 2001; Ikenberry and 
Mastanudo 2003; Christensen 1999; Goh 2008. This characteristic in old Malaysian security 
thinking is analysed by Shamsul 2007). Opening up to broader concepts of peace and security – 
such as human and non-traditional securities – has lately promoted the political importance of 
human survival in security and peace studies in East Asia (Peou 2009; Strategic Peace and 
International Affairs Research Institute 2007; Caballero-Anthony, Emmers and Acharya 2006; 
Acharya 2004) even if nations are still considered as crucial instruments of the security of 
citizens even in the East Asian human security literature (Dan 2007; Enoki 2007). Concepts of 
non-traditional security and human security are tolerated in the debate as long as it is clear that 
the security of human beings cannot be in contradiction with the security of the state (Peou 
2009; Caballero-Anthony, Emmers and Acharya 2006). This is why more radical concepts of 
human security that incorporate authoritarian violence in the phenomenon of security threats 
(Booth 2007; Krause 2007) are viewed with suspicion.  
Since the objective of this book is to look at the long peace of East Asia as a 
phenomenon positive for people (peace as a concept needs normative relevance), it cannot 
consider Pol Pot’s stable rule in Cambodia as peace regardless of how safe it was for the state. 
The starting point of this study is the security of people, while the security of states for the long 
peace of East Asia is seen in the instrumental value of the states to their citizens. The security of 
Pol Pot’s Cambodia had a more distant association to peace than, for example, today’s Japan, 
Indonesia or South Korea have. From this human-centered political point of view, I have to take 
a ruling different from that of the mainstream East Asia literature, in favor of including 
repressive authoritarian violence into the conceptual category of threats to peace. In an analysis 
that aims at grasping the big picture of developments it is difficult, though, to include violence 
against civilians (either by governments or by terrorist groups) consistently, because reliable 
numeric data on this type of violence is missing for periods before 1989. I have nevertheless 
assessed the impact of this problem to my conclusions in Chapter 2. Furthermore, I have made 
qualitative references to authoritarian violence as a threat to peace also later, in the analysis of 
the sources of such a peace.  
Since my intention is to try to explain and understand how the long peace of East Asia 
has been developed and constituted, I cannot simultaneously consider non-human threats to 
security as threats to peace. When looking at the sources of conflicts, I shall be operating with 
intentional threats to people and states, and thus, the modelling will involve interaction. 
However, there is no intentionality or interaction between casualties and an earthquake, and thus 
the modelling of such a threat would need to be very different from that of genuine conflict 
threats. Thus I define threats to peace as man-made, intentional, and a threat to human life. I use 
the indicator of battle deaths as one of the most useful proxies for the analysis of the kind of 
peace that I want to study. While some others (Goldsmith 2007; Chich-Mao 2011) use 
militarized interstate disputes as their indicator of conflicts, I feel that a definition that values 
human lives and focuses on violence against people is better indicated by the number of people 
who have died as a direct consequence of conflict.  
In East Asian peace studies conflicts are often seen as violent disputes between several 
states or between a state and intrastate groups. Analysis of intra- and interstate conflicts is often 
kept separate as the explanations of these could require very different theoretical apparatuses. 
Existing literature shows often in intuition that while interstate warfare has declined in East 
Asia, intrastate warfare has increased. This is claimed explicitly at least in Narine (2002: 195) 
and Vatikiotis (2006). This, of course is not the case if the amount of conflicts is measured by 
the number of casualties. As I shall show in Chapter 3, conflict violence has declined drastically 
after the 1970s.  
Yet in some of the existing literature intra- and interstate violences are treated in a 
single explanation. Lee Jones (2010; 2012), however, sees Southeast Asian conflicts as 
reflections of social struggle between classes, and thus denies the strict differentiation of intra- 
and interstate conflicts. According to Jones, ruling elites of ASEAN frame peace and security in 
class-terms, while the national framing with strict norms of non-interference is just the 
technology of hegemonic ideological power for the elites: it is useful for the elites if people and 
external powers perceive East Asia as strict with the norm of sovereignty because it helps the 
elites in their management of elite–people relations.  
The fact that battle deaths in East Asia have disappeared simultaneously in intra- and 
interstate relations suggests that it could be possible to find common sources to intra- and 
interstate peace. However, the much more drastic decline in interstate conflict suggests that 
there are also independent sources of interstate peace that do not affect, or affect less, intrastate 
conflicts. Due to the fact that my analysis concludes that many of the intra- and interstate 
conflicts have similar roots, and due to the fact that my argument of the sources of conflict 
suggests that  intra- and interstate conflicts are parts of the same conflict dynamics, I shall try to 
cover both intra- and interstate peace in this book. Internal conflicts are often at the core of wars 
in East Asia, but mostly they escalate only once external powers get engaged in the originally 
domestic conflicts. Furthermore, development orientation that became the prominent approach 
to governance once East Asia became pacific, affects both intra- and interstate warfare. Once 
states tackle the economic grievances of potential rebel constituencies, they no longer need to 
divert the attention of dissatisfied populations by demonizing external enemies. In this way, the 
developmentalist approach to security has contributed simultaneously to peace within and 
between states. Thus it seems that the sources of the two types of conflicts are so intertwined 
that an analysis of one also reveals most of the sources of the other one. In this respect I have to 
conclude with Jones (2012), that the distinction between intra- and interstate dynamics is not as 
real as it is presented.  
While my conceptual apparatus considers violent disputes between any groups as 
relevant threats to peace, my quantitative mapping of the reality of East Asia peace is limited by 
the fact that there is no reliable data that pre-dates the year 1989 on the extent of conflicts that 
do not involve states. I have made estimates of the impact of this problem on my conclusions in 
Chapter 2 and treated non-state conflicts as conflicts in my qualitative analysis.  
The concept of peace in this book is undeniably negative. The absence of political 
violence and fatalities of such violence is the narrow meaning of peace in this book. That 
positive peace – cooperation for the removal of structural violence, or disarmament for the more 
productive use of resources and more trusting cooperation between potential conflicting parties 
– is left out of the main analysis of this book is due to the fact that East Asia has not yet 
expanded its peace to the more positive structural and cooperative problem-solving directions. 
As will be shown in Chapter 2, the small and declining number of fatalities of traditional 
conflicts between two or more armed groups is at the core of the long peace of East Asia. The 
negative nature of the long peace of East Asia will be revealed in the empirical exploration of 
the peace in chapter 2, and the potential for moving from negative to positive peace will be 
speculated in Chapter 8. 
East Asia as a Region to be Focused on 
What is a relevant region for the study of peace and conflict is, again, a practical, an analytical 
and a political issue. A region is created by interpretations, and the association of some localites 
with some other localities, the ruling of someone out and someone else in a region is about as 
political an issue as is possible in world politics. Defining regions is political gerrymandering. 
In East Asia, the basic setting has been that China, the mightiest regional power, has promoted 
regionalism that excludes non-Asian powers (mainly the US, but also Australia and New 
Zealand). This is understandable as these powers could tilt the otherwise favorable power 
balance in the region. The countries most concerned about the rise of Chinese power, such as 
Japan, would be eager to be more inclusive in the definition of the region. The central role of 
ASEAN in East Asian exclusive regionalism has been an interest for many ASEAN countries to 
support the Chinese concept of regionalism, while those ASEAN countries most threatened by 
China, especially the Philippines and Vietnam, also have a motive to support the Japanese, 
inclusive concept of region (Malik 2006).  
Analytically, the more inclusive concept of ‘Asia-Pacific’ has been promoted by 
theorists that are convinced of the influence of the global superpower on East Asia’s security 
(Goh 2008; Leifer 1989; Ikenberry and Mastanduno 2003; Duffield 2001; Yahuda 2011; 
Ikenberry and Tsuchiyama 2002). If the US influence in East Asia is dominant, it makes no 
sense to analyse regional dynamics without considering the Pacific aspect of Asia.  
Alternatively, scholars sometimes also perceive broader Asian regionalism with the 
strong role of the US so dominant that the difference between South and East Asia matters only 
little. Such scholars analyse Asian politics in the global context of US hegemony (Shambaugh 
and Yahuda 2007). Some scholars also see the difference between South Asia and East Asia so 
small that the entire area can be seen as a region (Goldsmith 2005, 2007; Alagappa 2003).  
Scholars who see East Asia as a region, based on the group of countries active in 
ASEAN + Three (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Burma/Myanmar, Laos, 
Cambodia, Brunei, Vietnam, the Philippines, China, South Korea and Japan), but including also 
East Timor, North Korea, Mongolia and Taiwan and perhaps the easternmost part of Russia in 
the region, often emphasize the importance of China in the regional power dynamics and the 
role of ASEAN in the regional institution building. These scholars rarely emphasize the 
dominance of the US in the regional peace and conflict issues (Kang 2007 and 2010; Beeson 
2009; Pempel 2005; Mahbubane 2008; Weissmann 2011; Suh and Katzenstein 2004).  
Finally, scholars who focus on regions as ‘regional security complexes’
1
 tend to be 
hesitant to extend the concept of region very much. They would like to analyse Northeast and 
Southeast Asia separately. As Jong Kun Choi and Chung-in Moon (2010) suggest events in 
Thailand are very pertinent for any of the ASEAN members, while they are not so important for 
the security of North Korea. Similarly, referring to interdependence, one can say that 
                                                          
1 The starting point of the analysis of security complexes is the materiality-based realization that “[s]ince most threats 
travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, security interdependence is normally patterned into 
regionally based clusters” (Buzan and Waever 2003: 4). Regional security complex requires that the regional level 
can be distinguished from the global; only the superpowers are truly relevant for each region, while the regional level 
is at least as important as the global level for the security of a region. 
developments in Taiwan are less important for Indonesia than they are, for example for South 
Korea. This is why East Asian region is not an analytically useful concept for these scholars.  
On this issue I have to disagree with Moon and Choi. Since I do not believe that one 
could find exogenous objective causes to war and peace, generalizations on war and peace do 
not need to be sought in regions that have similarities in their objective conditions. This is why 
physical distance and other objective differences between Southeast and Northeast Asia do not 
matter that much. However, according to Moon and Choi, it is the lack of critical 
interdependence that makes it impossible to study the entire East Asia as one region. While I 
admit that physical interdependence can be important in the creation of a region, I think that the 
commonness of approaches to security and the commonness of security identity, as 
demonstrated by the fact that East Asia has sought security cooperation in the framework of 
ASEAN + Three as well as East Asian Summit, are more important reasons for treating East 
Asia as one. If one wants to study regional dynamics of security as such, interdependence is 
crucial, while if one is interested in understanding how peace emerges and is sustained, it is 
more relevant to study regions with optimally similar conditions, identities, norms and 
approaches that could explain or help understand security developments than to study 
interdependent regions.  
The fact is that most of East Asia has started to cherish economic development and to 
respect sovereignty and military non-interference simultaneously and stopped focusing on 
divisive issues aiming instead at face-saving in their diplomacy. These similarities, which do not 
extend beyond East Asia (certainly not to the Pacific or to South Asia), make East Asia 
analytically more relevant as a region than areas that are more interdependent. This is why the 
focus in this book is on East Asia, rather than Asia Pacific, Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia 
separately, or the entire Asia. I will focus on East Asia, including the current ASEAN area, 
China (and Taiwan), the Koreas, Mongolia and Japan, even if it were true that security 
dynamics of Northeast and Southeast Asia are somewhat independent of each other. The region 
focused in this book will exclude Eastern parts of Russia, as Russia does not identify itself 
primarily as an East Asian nation, and it does not subscribe to the East Asian approaches to 
conflict prevention.  
A Pragmatist Research Program 
In order to develop a consistent theory of East Asian security and peace, and in order to 
understand existing conclusions on the topic, it is necessary to define what the developed 
theory will be used for, and to analyse what others have used their theories for. In this section 
I shall first discuss the expectations to this book in relation to the theory it develops. Then I 
shall show how the neo-pragmatic research programme relates to other “theories of theory”.  
This study views the long peace of East Asia from the perspective of pragmatic interests 
common to peace research. An analysis of this period of peace aims at finding ways to sustain 
it, improve it and emulate it elsewhere. As such this study could be called pragmatist. However, 
while my pragmatism borrows from the work of the classical pragmatists Charles Sanders 
Pierce, William James and John Dewey, it also borrows from Erich Fromm’s notion of the 
activist theory of knowledge, as well as the post-modernist work on knowledge and practice by 
Richard Rorty.  
This pragmatic study aims at producing knowledge that advices us on how to adjust to 
the social and material realities that surround us and on how to change conflict-prone structures 
and processes. Knowledge must be able to put various actors in conflict prevention “on top” of 
the complex structures and processes of the East Asian conflicts. It will have to help them with 
their conflict prevention. The intention is not to produce a mirror image of reality, or to claim a 
correspondence between sentences that explain and analyse the reality, and the reality itself. The 
intention of pragmatic studies is not to be truthful in this sense. Nor is it to produce a description 
that would maximize coherence with a worldview or some more general understandings. Both 
of these objectives have often been in the minds of scholars who have designed criteria of truth 
in science.
2
 The present book does not seek explanations that reduce complex conflict processes 
and structures to their logical atoms as was the intention of Bertrand Russell (1984/1919) in his 
theory of explanation. In fact, such a purpose is viewed with suspicion as it seems very 
pragmatic to focus on systemic levels of reality, instead of assuming that the explanation could 
be built atomistically from elements, For example in the chapter on the norm of non-
interference as a source of East Asia’s ability to prevent conflict escalation (Chapter 5), I try to 
show how pragmatic it is for the prevention of conflict escalation to consider the entire 
interactive game of escalation and the meanings it gives to individual move/choices, instead of 
considering each move atomistically as something that then jointly builds up the reality of 
conflict escalation. The ultimate aim of this analysis is to produce explanations that help the 
controlling and manipulating of conflict developments, and this sometimes requires not only the 
understanding of the parts or the totality but also the interaction between the two.  
Thus, knowledge – the aim of this study – is an adaptation strategy towards “the world 
out there”. At the same time the knowledge and consciousness of those of us involved in the 
conflict are part of the construction of the conflict reality. If we believe, as political realists do, 
that norms do not belong to world politics, we will verify this belief in our action. Similarly if 
we consider sovereign states as the main actors of international relations, our belief in states 
make them real and important in world politics.  
The objectives of my study do not give their meanings themselves, and their meanings 
and properties are not natural as such; the process of knowing what they are involves our 
interests and is more active on the part of the observer than scientific realists would like to 
admit. Truth is not a picture of a reality or a correspondence with it; reality is reality, whilst 
                                                          
2 Hempel for example, suggests that it would be possible to construct sentences by using only observational terms that 
directly mirror the reality (Hempel 1965). However, for classics of the correspondence model of truth, see Russell 
(Russell 1984).  For the coherence view, see Putnam (Putnam 1981). 
truth and knowledge of reality are approaches and active orientations towards the reality.
3
 
Erich Fromm (1973), for example, claims that any relationship between thought and reality is 
characterized by continuous intentional purposive activity on the part of the mind, rather than 
“knowing” being passive sensory receptivity. Instead, knowing is activity that is guided by 
the purposes we have for the reality around us. As Georg Herbert Mead has said, we relate to 
the reality around us by giving it meanings that depends on how we intend to use it (Mead 
1934). Pragmatic peace research could claim with William James that consciousness is 
teleological in nature: that the understanding of all mental activity and its products must include 
reference to the agent’s purposes and interests.  
In order not to lose some of the opportunities of conflict prevention, we should also 
see knowledge as a creator of social realities, not just as something that adapts us to existing 
material realities. “A concept or theory should be evaluated by how effectively it explains and 
predicts phenomena, as opposed to how accurately it describes objective reality”. True beliefs 
are “those that prove useful to the believer” (Margolis 2005). This applies to material as well as 
ideational realities. Thus the question related to both socially and materially created realities 
is not what the truth is (as a mirror image of reality), but what should be regarded as true and 
as reality. We should not think that we can conquer an army of two million men with the 
military force of an army of ten thousand men. Practice will prove us wrong if we do. Similar 
logic applies to socially created, ideational realities. Whether we should consider states a reality 
of life in world politics depends only on whether they serve a purpose. Thus a pragmatic theory 
will not ask whether our previous action suggests that states are real, important and immoral, 
                                                          
3According to Charles Sanders Pierce, human beings are so completely hemmed in by the bounds of their possible 
practical experience, their minds are so restricted to being instruments of their needs and desires that they cannot in 
the least mean anything transcending those bounds (Colapietro 2005). According to William James “everything real 
must be experienceable somewhere, and every kind of thing experienced must somewhere be real” (James 1912: 81; 
see also James 1977: 279, and Suckiel 2009). 
but whether we should consider them as such and continue to act as if that was the only way 
world politics could function. This book, therefore, does not simply look at the power of 
norms and constructions of realities for their existence; it goes further than that. It assesses the 
utility of various social constructs and interpretations by conflicting parties of the social 
reality and seeks opportunities for the deconstruction of interpretations and social constructs 
that are harmful for peace and opportunities for the construction of social realities useful for 
peace. As Charon says about symbolic interactionalism, this research does not just analyse 
which constructs, created by symbolic interaction, exist; it is also interested in studying the 
actual “symboling”, the manipulation of symbols by active persons, defining and redefining 
their social realities (Charon 1995: 63). 
Peace research puts the event of battle death at the center of its attention and gives it a 
negative normative value and defines the prevention of such an event as the pragmatic purpose 
of its scholarship. As such our pragmatic peace research does indeed recognize the existence of 
material realities that are independent of our consciousness. One also needs to share with 
Charles Sanders Peirce the recognition of law-like forces that objective realities are driven by 
(Shook and Margolis 2009). Regardless of our consciousness and our meaning-giving about 
shooting and dying, a bullet that penetrates someone’s heart causes a death. Yet, it is very 
pragmatic to make a distinction between objective and socially created realities. The difference 
between the material realities that we create meanings for in our thinking, and the truths and 
realities that only exist in our minds, is pragmatically important. The strategic difference is 
that social will has total control over the latter, while the bullet will always be hard and it will 
always penetrate our bodies no matter how much we believe in amulets and spells that make 
the enemy’s bullets soft. The great majority of conflict realities, such as the existence of 
politically relevant international actors, let alone rules that we construct for politics and conflict, 
are of the nature that they would not exist without our knowledge of them. The reason why this 
is useful to recognize is that it allows us one more opportunity for the prevention of conflict 
violence.  
On the one hand, we can manipulate material realities by exerting material influence 
(for instance, mutually disarming nations in order to make the capacity of killing smaller). On 
the other hand, together with the individuals relevant to the reproduction of a social construct 
we can deconstruct a conflict-inducing social construct without having to do anything to the 
material realities. The usefulness of this distinction can be revealed by imagining strategies of 
stopping a bullet by changing social constructs, or strategies that always attempt to change 
realities through the manipulation of the material parameters of these realities. Treating 
rebellious conflict violence, for example, as an objective response to grievant economic realities 
allows rebel constituencies to blackmail benefits by expressing new demands as grievances that 
objectively result in acts of violence.  
Another strategic, pragmatic benefit in not trying to reduce material junctures to the 
discursive and the socially constructed, or not trying to explain the socially constructed as 
material is related to the differences in strategies of blocking or rerouting objective and 
discursive junctures of conflict. If we assume that all junctures are material and objective, our 
conclusion will be that we have to destroy the objective prerequisites of war. In a partisan 
setting this means destroying the enemy. But by doing this we might create new discursive 
normative prerequisites of war. The terrorists who attacked bars popular among western people 
on Bali in 2003 and in 2007 were objectivists who considered western power as something 
objectively founded and as a material prerequisite of the perceived spread of western values, 
and the western aggression against Muslims in the Middle East. However, by hitting innocent 
civilians on Bali, these terrorists disregarded the fact that they were also strengthening the very 
normative prerequisite of the violence that they were fighting against. By attaching an appalling 
normative precedence to their own side, they managed to create, in the minds of many Western 
leaders and voters, a lot of support and legitimacy for force against radical Muslims. Ignoring 
the non-material realities their effort to weaken the West actually strengthened their enemy 
tremendously. After the Bali attack, the 9/11 incident, and all the main terrorist strikes ‘against 
the West’ the world was lined up behind the US, and it took many violent and illegitimate 
strategies by the US to gradually erode that support. 
For a pragmatic study it makes a lot of sense to build the analysis on top of the already 
existing research, so that we need not reinvent the wheel again. This means that neo-pragmatism 
can use theories that aim at different objectives, just as long as it is clear how to use theories 
with different missions. Thus the next step in this study will be an analysis of how to use the 
existing theories of East Asian security in a pragmatic manner.  
Some scholars of East Asian security and peace want to theorize the regularities and 
determinants of security dynamics in East Asia (positivist theories), while some want to theorize 
what is made real in interpretations, social practices and language and what could be possible 
(constructivist theories), how things should be – morally or rationally (normative theories), and 
how people should interpret the security realm around themselves in order to pragmatically 
serve the interests of peace (pragmatist theories, the choice of this book). If we study the 
regularities of the empirically observable dynamics, the theory can offer a tool for explanation 
and even prediction of what is going to happen to the long peace of East Asia. At the same time 
if we look at what would be possible, new understanding can open our eyes to strategic choices 
in East Asian security that have not been considered possible in the past. The third type of a 
theory aims at prescriptions based on a moral code or a calculation of rationality. The usefulness 
of a prescriptive theory for pragmatist research is equally obvious: in fact pragmatism is a 
normative theory, only with a pragmatic criterion related to the reduction of violence.  
Theories that aim at revealing general regularities, often of causal nature, between 
analytically independent conditions (inequality and conflict, for example) are useful for a 
pragmatic study as they reveal correlative relationships between conditions that are relevant for 
practical efforts to make peace. While Chi-Mao (2011), Goldsmith (2005, 2007), Svensson and 
Lindgren (Svensson 2011; Svensson and Lindgren 2011), seek explanations to peace and war 
from exogenous conditions, most other explanations represent some kind of soft causality 
(Weissman 2011; Mearsheimer 2001; Kim 1997). Regularities  are useful for peace making, 
even if they are not hard and even if they do not create perfectly accurate predictions. If we, for 
example, find out correlative regularities between dyadic democratic liberalism and peace, this 
regularity motivates our search for the possible causal mechanisms that involve the two. Once 
we can identify the causal relationship, and perhaps manipulate it, it would be possible for us to 
block or redirect some of the parts in the path to conflict not only in one conflict but in all those 
conflicts that the regularity somehow touches. This does not require, as claimed by many 
opponents of the study of correlative relationships and regularities in social sciences (Suganami 
1996; Dessler 1991; Patomäki and Wight 2000; Kurki 2008; Lebow 2009b), an ontology in 
which social realities are regulated by social laws. We can still study the specific causal and 
constitutive paths to conflicts, and we can still believe in the power of purposive, 
underdetermined individual and collective action, but if we find similarities, generalizations and 
regularities, they do have pragmatic value. If, instead of finding singular causal chain, we find 
causal paths that is similar in many places either in one historical or cultural context, or in 
several contexts, then our ability to block and redirect that causal path to conflicts can help us 
prevent more than just one conflict.  
Even weaker correlative associations and regularities have a great pragmatic value in 
peace research as even weak associations between structures, events or conditions on the one 
hand and war on the other, can have an impact on many lives. Even weakly significant 
correlations expose relationship between war and some conditions that are with high probability 
not accidental but very real. Suganami suggests, that the dyadic regularity of liberal 
democracies not fighting one could just as well be a coincidence, and undermines the regularity 
on those grounds (Suganami 1996 83). This is of course possible but extremely improbable.  
Russett has shown that the the random probability of the absence of wars between liberal 
democracies between 1816 and 1980 is 0.0000000000000000002% (Russett 1996: 85). Even 
correlations that are just barely “significant” are pragmatic for peace. If there was a way to 
prevent a risk that with 95% probability is associated with war, then surely one should not 
ignore it. Furthermore, Suganami tries to downplay the findings by Rudolph Rummel by saying 
that his studies of the regression coefficients between state properties and conflicts were all 
below 0.35. For Suganami, those correlations were useless. However, such correlations 
nevertheless suggest that the conditions explain over 10% of the variation in conflict 
propensity. If we then assume that we could change state properties to reduce the likelihood 
of wars in general in a way that would reduce the likelihood or intensity of wars by more than 
10%, then we would have been able to rescue more than 3.9 million lives last century, taken 
that wars killed about 39 million people during the 100 years of the 20th century. For the 3.9 
million people and their friends, Rummels findings would not have been meaningless even if 
they were weak as correlations. Thus regularities are practical, even if we do not assume that 
our social life is regulated by them, and even if we do not assume that our collective and 
individual freedom is totally non-existent because of them. It seems that in some core issues 
related to the theory of East Asian security, such as the future peacefulness of China, theories 
that aim at regularities and predictions tend to have illusory disagreements caused by unclarity 
of purposes of theorizing. Some theories aim at generalizing conflict realities from inductive 
empirical observation, while others deduce from great historical generalizations to specific cases 
in East Asia and then predict the future of East Asia on the basis of such deductions. Very often 
the historical focus of these studies is different and thus the predictions or generalizations are 
incomparable.  
For example, Measheimer’s analysis belongs to the deductive category of research 
when he predicts the unavoidable conflict between the US and China once the quality and 
quantity of China’s material power resources overtake those of the US (Mearsheimer 2001; see 
also Kim 1997). According to Mearsheimer, the structural setting where a new hegemonic 
challenger overtakes the old hegemon, is inherently instable, and that a power battle between the 
old and the new hegemon (the battle of titans) is almost inevitable. This prediction deducts from 
the experiences of hegemonic transition and follows the history of world politics over several 
centuries.  
However, much of the criticism of Mearsheimer’s ideas focuses on the current situation 
and claims that there are no signs of China growing more aggressive – quite on the contrary: 
China has assumed a more positive attitude towards responsible international cooperation and 
multilaterialism (Zheng Bijiang 2005; Johnston 2003). The contradiction between this claim and 
that of Mearsheimer is illusory, since also Mearsheimer predicts that China will demonstrate 
good behavior until it gets closer to the material requisites of global leadership. While 
Mearsheimer analyses the future his critics analyse the present and the past.  
The focus on observable and measurable realities (rather than for example, 
interpretations and peace, or social constructs and conflict) in the first type of theories is a 
limitation, but clearly not something that would make this type of theorizing useless for 
pragmatic research. However, the deterministic interpretation of causal regularities is often 
problematic as it rules out free (underdetermined, “uncaused”) individual action outside the 
focus. As Fromm writes, in such explanation a human being is assumed to be exclusively 
determined by conditions outside himself. “He has no part in his own life, no responsibility, and 
not even a trace of freedom. Man is a puppet, controlled by strings – instincts or conditioning” 
(Fromm 1973: 71). Obviously the whole idea of pragmatic research is based on the possiblity of 
someone to select strategies in order to maximize chances of peace, and if such voluntarism 
does not exist in the explanation of the security dynamism, pragmatism becomes impossible. In 
this study I do assume causality roughly in the sense presented by positivists, but only for 
materially caused structures and events. In order to be “on top of things”, able to work for peace 
one needs to be able to know the causal regularities, but also the causal mechanisms of material 
structures. If we think that spells can make us invulnerable we exaggerate the creative power of 
the ideas and that makes us careless about the dangers of war. Even some unreflexive (Ricoeur 
1981), rigid (Harsanyi 1956) behaviour can be treated as mechanistically determined, 
exogenously caused and predictable.  
Yet pragmatic explanation cannot explain everything as mechanistically deterministic, 
since we will have to leave space for the pragmatic action. Instead, pragmatic research can study 
the interplay, dialogue between purposive, at least partially undetermined collective or 
individual action and material and social structures. On the one hand, that purposive action 
creates new social structures and changes material conditions, and on the other it is conditioned 
by them.  
In my explanation of the long peace of East Asia, I will look at three purposive social 
approaches, or cultures and how they interact with the ideational and material structures of 
peace and conflict. This research strategy draws from Wendt’s analysis (Wendt 1998) of 
cultures of anarchy, but identifies very different cultures than the ones Wendt identifies.  
I will look at an approach or a culture where the state identity is interpreted in a 
revolutionary and in a developmentalist manner, assuming that the purpose of the state is either 
revolution or counter revolution or economic purpose. While revolutionism and 
developmentalism are purposive approaches they also create a culture that defines the purposes 
of states, and this clearly affects the ways in which states manage to stay out of conflicts. It is 
possible to look at the material consequences of the revolutionary and developmentalism 
cultures by looking at how much conflict the two strategies produce. Furthermore, I will also 
look at purposive action (on a meta-level), where people struggle to change the culture from 
revolutionary to developmentalism. In this historical process existing revolutionary social and 
materialized structures (such as jails for those who do not cherish the revolutionary culture) 
resist the change despite the fact that these cultures are largely man-made and exist mostly in 
the minds of people.  
In addition to the interplay of revolutionary and developmentalist purposive collective 
and individual actions on the one hand and social and material structures of peace and war on 
the other, I will also look at the cultures of internationalist solidarity/interference and the culture 
of sovereignty and non-interference. Here too, I will study how these cultures interact and 
constitute conflict relevant effects and how purposive collective and individual action changes 
the former type of a culture into the latter type. Instead of again looking at how these cultures 
affect conflict onset, I will analyse their constitutive powers on the escalation of conflicts, once 
conflicts have already started.  
Finally, I will look at the cultures of conflict termination and their interaction with the 
ending of wars, conflicts and disputes.  
In my analysis of the ways in which East Asian states, leaders and people construct their 
social realities and create approaches or cultures to reality, I will not be able to study observable 
things only. I will need to study interpretations and norms in order to identify conflict 
cultures/approaches. The rejection of meanings and non-observable social realities has lead 
positivist scholarship into assumptions that observable regularities are always necessary. 
China’s growing assertiveness is a necessity as its position vis-á-vis the US improves, simply 
since there is empirical evidence of an observable correlation between hegemonic transitions 
and hegemonic wars. Yet, social regularities do not need to be as fixed as physical regularities 
(water boils at 100 degrees Celsius) and to know this can be very important for pragmatic peace 
research. Anarchy may be what states make of it, but if state leaders think that there is just one, 
objectively determined way for the international system to work, they might work within that 
system, and the system survives only because its actors do not understand the availability of 
alternative ways of conducting and interpreting world politics. This is also why it is practical 
that constructivists reveal what is possible (rather than just what is actual). As Roy Bhaskar 
(Bhaskar 1997) has suggested opportunities for different paths are part of the existing realities. 
Thus the analysis in this book of the paths that lead to the adoption of developmentalism, the 
norm of non-intervention and the approach of allowing a face saving for one’s enemies takes the 
availability of alternative routes into account and speculates the optional routes to peace and war 
(Lebow 2009a). 
The relation between the positivist and constructivist theorists is not always 
constructive. A lot of unproductive debates take place due to the fact that there is no clarity 
about when the intention of a theory is to explore opportunities and what could be possible, and 
when it is to find determinants of causal regularities. While many of the realist and liberalist 
theories of peace and war aim at revealing regularities in the relationship between power and 
economy on the one hand and conflict probabilities on the other (see, for example, Leifer 1989; 
Goldsmith 2007), much of the constructivist discussion of Acharya (2000), Cho (2011) and Ba 
(2009), for example, is about what could be possible, not what exists as a reality. The intention 
of the latter kind of scholarship is not just to identify realities, but to show the nature of these 
realities, and to show how they are dependent on the social practices that the actors use for 
reproducing them. Realists and liberalists often judge constructivist theories by assuming that 
they, too, aim at mapping realities and can thus be judged by testing the influence in East Asian 
politics of norms, identities, practices, languages and consciousness (Narine 2002; Jetschke and 
Rüland 2009). However, constructivist theory aims at dissolving realities as given determinants. 
Empirical evidence about norms not mattering in a specific instance is not a proof that they 
could not matter. In this way theory makes it possible for societies to emancipate themselves 
from some of the realities.  
Constructivist theory could be used, for example, to show that actions of states are not 
determined by their histories, power political settings or economic structures. Instead, the 
realities they face are at least partly constructed by their own practices, language and thinking, 
all of which states can change without any change in any material ‘realities’. Thus the debate, 
for example of the role of norms in East Asian security between realists and constructivists is 
illusory, at least in part: even if evidence tells us that states have not applied any coherent norms 
in some security-political conditions, this does not rule out the opportunity that states might 
have had if they had adhered to some norms.  
The neo-pragmatist theory of theory in this book subscribes to the constructivist 
ontology that emphasizes the existence of socially constructed realities and processes relevant 
for peace researchers. In this analysis important opportunities for action for peace can be 
designed by understanding the ways in which people create peaceful realities by reinterpreting 
social categories, and reinventing political and security identities (generative causality and 
constitution of realities). This is an extension to the pragmatist positivist thinking of limiting 
research only on material realities, and causal regularities between material, mutually 
analytically separate variables.  
One of the constructivist ways of revealing the potential of emancipation from some of 
the “realities as perceived by realists” is through critique of naturalized social constructs (Booth 
2005; Booth 1991; Krause and Williams 1997). Here the contribution of a theory is that it 
reveals naturalized ‘realities’ that conflicting parties no longer see as something they have 
power over. For example, actors of ethnic conflict often consider ethnic identity as given, and in 
their political language, the naturality of such a perception could hide the opportunities for 
alternative identities and for the transformation of the agent structure of conflict. While such use 
of a theory is rare in East Asian conflict studies it is not entirely extinct. Hamilton-Hart (2009), 
for example, criticizes the naturality of conflict definitions by revealing that violence in an 
orderly situation claims more lives than conflicts as they are defined in the East Asian autocratic 
tradition. Similarily, Jennifer Mustapha (2012) criticizes the post-9/11 hegemonic narrative that 
naturalizes the division in the world between “those who are with us and those who are with the 
terrorists”. Sometimes efforts to reinterpret the rules of international relations clearly 
denaturalize realities that we have taken for granted. The understanding of ASEAN principles of 
non-interference as rational interstate approach to conflict prevention and the naturalization of 
state actors has been criticized in the class-based analysis of Lee Jones (2012). Jones reveals 
that important parts of international relations in ASEAN function as class relations rather than 
nations being somehow natural actors of ASEAN politics. Similarly, the naturality of states as 
sole actors of East Asian relations has been criticized in various theories of human security 
(Matsumae and Chen 1995; Dupond 2001).  
In order to map the opportunities available for the deconstruction of social constructs 
harmful for peace, and the construction of more peaceful realities, critical use of the theory is 
sometimes necessary for pragmatic research. If denaturalization of harmful constructs is needed 
to reveal that there are alternative ways of interpreting social realities, then this type of 
theoretical mission also belongs to the neo-pragmatic research that this book subscribes to.  
In addition to using a theory to reveal how things are and how they could be, normative 
research on East Asian conflicts and peace also uses a theory to reveal how things should be 
(see for example, Alagappa 2003). The discussion on normative realities has been intensive on 
the question of the alternative concepts of security in East Asia. The main questions in that 
debate have been whether human welfare should be brought into the framing of security (that is, 
should it be securitized) or whether military security of states should be a completely isolated 
phenomenon with highest priority. Should non-military threats to people, non-traditional 
security and human security also be constructed in the same realm of security as military 
security of states (Caballero-Anthony, Emmers and Acharya 2006)?  
A related issue is whether, then, non-traditional and human-security concerns justify 
military action just as the security of states does (Fukushima and Tow 2009; Enoki 2007; Dan 
2007). These questions clearly use the theory as a vehicle to investigate how things should be. 
According to the progressive input of the Commission for a New Asia, a group of 16 respected 
Asian intellectuals, humanitarian concerns can justify intervention, but only as a last resort, for 
purely humanitarian purposes, under a UN mandate, with the acceptance of the population of 
the country, and only if there is an extreme threat to human security and legality (Mohamed 
Jawhar bin Hassan 1995; for the same basic conclusion, see Fukushima and Tow 2009). Some 
writings (Nishikawa 2007; Booth 2005; also Peou 2009a, to some extent) construct human 
security so totally on par with the military security of states (which in East Asian discussion is 
undeniably seen as an important part and an instrument of human security) that it is difficult not 
to suspect that these writings reveal a preference to an even more intrusive concept of human 
security (Hamilton-Hart 2009). At the same time, those writings that return the issue back to the 
question of what is, rather than what should be, construct human security as empirically alien to 
East Asia and deny especially the intrusive interpretations of the concept by referring to the fact 
that this kind of thinking has not traditionally been prominent in Asia (Dan 2007; Enoki 2007).  
In some cases the quest for how things should be is guided by pragmatism. According 
to Peou (2009: 3–4) for example, “if human security is to stay analytically useful as a concept 
that can be operationalized and relevant in policy terms, we need to prioritize policy 
commitment, motivate policy action, and assess policy outcomes”.  Thus Peou sees the truth of 
human security as crucially dependent on the pragmatic consequences of it as an adaptation 
strategy to reality, or even as a conceptual construct of social reality. Furthermore, he also 
assesses the concept of human security from the point of view of whether or not it can be “sold” 
to the policy community: “My hope is that the concept … can be better accepted and applied if 
we succeed in building a concept that is neither too elastic nor too restrictive, combining 
theoretical insights into one that is neither too parochial nor too eclectic” (Peou 2009: 7). In his 
analysis of security community studies (2005) Peou blends political pragmatism into his 
assessment of analytical merits of such studies, clearly showing his commitment to the neo-
pragmatic thinking. This leads us to a new way of using theory to expose which social 
constructs are practical to be considered as real. The leading question here is not how things are, 
how they could be or how they should be (in some moral normative sense), but how it would be 
practical for us to believe them to be.  
It is clear that pragmatic research on peace and war has to be sensitive to any material 
realities, just as it needs to understand the options offered for the change of social constructions 
by means of denaturalization of ‘realities’ that have been taken as granted or natural. Pragmatic 
research has to be sensitive about the possibility that realists, liberalists and constructivists all 
are in the right in their empirical positions; only their theoretical objectives are different. 
Pragmatic research needs to be sensitive to the opportunities of using theories to reveal both 
what is and what could be. It is practical not to ignore material realities (say, by challenging an 
army hundred times greater than one’s own), while it is useful to judge what kind of social 
constructs should be considered  as real/useful in order to know what kind of realities could 
exist. 
Quantitative and qualitative evidence on peace and war in East Asia 
While different theorists of the security of East Asia place different expectations for their 
theorizing, they also accept different types of evidence for their theories. This section will 
explicate the perhaps unorthodox approach to the substantiation of claims on peace and conflict 
in this book and relate this approach to the ways in which East Asian security studies so far 
have tried to substantiate their arguments.  
Substantiating claims made on peace and conflict in East Asia have to navigate between 
the Scylla and Charybdis of quantitative and qualitative schools. On the one hand it is important 
that one does not only settle for such questions and such models that can be elegantly studied by 
using the latest quantitative methodologies. Too often identities, interpretations and norms, for 
example, are ignored by scholars who might very well pay much attention to these things in 
their private lives, simply because they are difficult to measure. For the same reason scholarship 
sometimes rules out generative causality or processes of mutual construction. One cannot 
measure social realities either that are largely created in the process of interpretation.  Yet 
scholars might, in their private lives, be masters of critical sense-making in the mutual 
constitution of identities and policies. They may for example encourage their children to do 
their homework by considering them intelligent and diligent and thereby slyly creating an 
expectation that pushes the children to work hard. Literature of East Asian conflict studies has 
been affected by the traditionalism that the maxims of quantitative methodology have pushed 
main stream scholarship despite the fact that East Asian peace research has hardly ever been 
very quantitative (with the exception of Goldman 2007, Chih-Mao 2011, Svensson and 
Lindgren 2011 and Svensson 2011). This offers this volume some opportunities for the re-
interpretation of East Asian security and conflict by using some of the insights of symbolic 
interactionalism and constructivist interpretative scholarship.  
At the same time scholarship that acknowledges the importance of socially constructed 
realities, processes of mutual constitution, and other things that are difficult to measure by 
counting quantities of something material, sometimes rejects quantitative methods of 
substantiating claims even if the scholarship does not fully mobilize the theoretical possibilities 
of constructivist theory. In the recent theorizing on peace and war this allergy towards numbers 
has occasionally expressed itself in rather amateurish critique of some of the research results of 
the findings of quantitative peace research. Very often small reliability issues are seen as 
fundamental issues that render research results useless as was discussed above in relation to the 
question of correlative regularities.
4
 General conditions and regularities that reveal risks of war 
                                                          
4 See for example Suganami’s treatment of the differences in Wallace’s and Diehl’s analysis of arms race (Wallace 
1979; Diehl 1983; Suganami 1996). While Wallace and Diehl have very differing methodological choice and while 
they produce very different conclusions on the correlative relationship between arms races and conflicts, they both 
clearly conclude that the frequence of wars is much greater for powers who are in an arms race than for powers that 
are not. This way, while the comparison of the two studies my be embarrassing as it reveals differences in 
approaches, from the pragmatic point of view the prescription of both studies is that an arms race is a warning sign 
for a conflict.   
are important for peace research even if the regularities were weak and the correlative 
relationships were of low statistical significance.  
The allergy towards numbers is clear also in the constructivist study of East Asian peace 
and conflicts even if that research rarely utilized the opportunities constructivist research offers. 
One can, in fact, very seldom read literature on East Asian conflicts and peace that fully utilizes 
the options offered by the analysis of the social realm of security-related realities, Acharya 
2001, Peou 2009, Ba 2009, Busse 1999, and a few others being exceptions. Thus the antipathy 
that East Asian scholarship on peace and conflict has to substantiating claims by means of 
quantification is difficult to understand especially since generalizations are made on trends and 
patterns that are geographically and historically so huge that they cannot possibly be grasped 
without generalizing the methods of analysis. As a result scholars often maintain that something 
is general or typical (claiming something about the frequency of occurrences), or that some 
peaceful or conflict-prone outcomes are generally associated with some conditions, approaches, 
or discourses (claiming a correlative relationship) and yet substantiating their claims by 
references to singular cases.  
Due to this, theoretical debate often gets bogged down to disputes about the 
representativeness of various contradictory examples. There is no consensus on the things that 
are being explained and understood, such as the trends in peacefulness. For example, Vatikiotis’ 
claim (2006) that both the number of conflicts and the number of conflict fatalities are 
increasing, while for example, Svensson and Lindgren (2011) show that there is a downward 
trend for both. Statistics of battle deaths (Kivimäki 2011) and the number of more severe 
conflicts (Kivimäki 2008) seem to suggest that the East Asian trend towards reduction of 
violence is uniform almost without exceptions.  
There is not full consensus on the trends related to conditions either that are mobilized 
for the explanation of peace or conflict. Some claim that East Asia did not get any more 
democratic while it became more peaceful (Kivimäki 2001), while the general impression of 
others is that democracy is progressing in the region (Rüland 2009; Acharya 2010). Similarly, 
there is an almost unanimous view that ASEAN developmental attitude was associated with 
actual development and interdependence from the very beginning of the organization, while 
statistical evidence shows that interdependence and development generally regressed during the 
first decade of ASEAN.  
Somehow, despite the problems of quantitative data and the shortcomings of 
quantitative methods, let alone the problematic assumptions (objectivism, mechanistic 
materialism, blindness towards non-quantifiable “invisible meanings”, and social realities) that 
are often associated with much of quantitative research, we cannot avoid using quantitative 
indicators and proxies for making all these claims that are ultimately quantitative in nature. This 
is one of the starting points in the attitude towards the ways of substantiating the postulates of 
this book. 
One of the main contributions of this book is related to the above mentioned process of 
navigating between Scylla and Charybdis. Instead of hitting both, as I fear much of East Asian 
peace-studies scholarship does, this study tries to avoid them. This will be done by trying not to 
neglect social structures, the articulation of social realities, and the processes of mutual 
constitution. For these the study of historical contexts and careful analysis of discourses will be 
conducted. At the same time this study will try to avoid the temptation of making quantitative 
claims without engaging statistical data and methods for the substantiation of them. In short the 
present book mobilizes numbers without neglecting interpretations and discourses.  
While trying to mobilize quantitative sources in a study that does not see determinants 
of peace as material, one needs to take into account a few precautions, though. If this study 
believed in mechanistic causation of peace by material conditions, it would be easy to measure 
material conditions and peace, and the quantitative analysis could produce reliable conclusion 
on correlative relations. However, since I study approaches and cultures, and yet try to quantify 
them in order to understand the generality of some approaches, I will have to choose proxies for 
my investigation of these cultures as well as for my treatment of peace.  
Peace is not just absence of fatalities. It would be difficult to imagine peace in a 
situation where a stronger military power imposes its terms on weaker powers, and the weaker 
powers, despite the intolerable nature of the terms, cannot protest due to the superiority of the 
stronger power. Yet, the absence of fatalities does indicate that there are not as intolerable 
conditions as there are in situations where people are actually willing to risk their lives to 
change the conditions. This is why in my analysis of peace, I will measure general trends by 
using conflict statistics and statistics of battle deaths. I will go deeper into the critique of this 
proxy indicator in Chapter 2, but already at this stage it is important to remember that battle 
deaths is just an observable proxy of the peace I try to study.  
The use of quantitative sources in the study of the causal chains that lead to peace in 
East Asia, I need to use proxies that too, are not entirely satisfactory as indications of the largely 
immaterial, ideational realities, approaches and cultures that I see as causally powerful in the 
generation of the long peace of East Asia. If I claim that the emergence of a developmentalist 
state identity contributed to a culture that was better at preventing the onset of conflicts I will 
have to identify developmentalist state identity by assuming proxies, such as the frequency of 
the concept of “economic development” in texts that define the role and tasks of the state. This 
does not mean that the concept as such causes peace, but instead, that the developmentalist 
identity that can be found by looking at texts that define the roles and purposes of the state did. 
Since one cannot observe state identities or other important junctures in the generative chain to 
peace, and since one nevertheless has to substantiate one’s claims about the role and identity of 
states, one does need to use proxies that indicate something that cannot be measured directly. 
Thus the correlative relationship between certain words in texts and peace is treated as 
something that indicates the relationship between certain state identity and peace. Using proxies 
instead of measuring the social realities that I claim as responsible for some changes in the 
peacefulness of the region is something that affects the reliability of my conclusions. However, 
to remedy this, I have also looked at the specific historical path of the transformation from 
revolutionist to developmentalist culture and tried to link peace with the developmentalist state 
culture within the historical context of the pacification of East Asia. This way, the use of 
proxies in quantitative investigation is not the only method of establishing the mechanism in 
which developmentalism produces the decline in the probability of an onset of conflicts. 
Similarly, the measurement of the norm of non-interference (and face-saving) uses proxies in 
administrative texts and identifies a new culture of non-interference (or face-saving) by means 
of identifying correlative relationships between proxies and the de-escalation of conflicts (or 
termination of wars). But again, the use of proxies in numerical treatment is complemented by 
historical analysis of processes and a quantitative treatment of the concrete relationship between 
number of conflict fatalities and intervention before the peaceful period. This way, even though 
opting for some of the positivistic methodologies, this study does not rely on them.  
  
 
Structure of the book 
After this introduction to the main concepts and to the research approach, I shall proceed to 
uncover the phenomenon to be explained (the dependent variable, if one wants to borrow 
terminology from natural sciences) by sketching the profile of the long peace of East Asia. This 
will be done in Chapter 2, which shows how dramatically East Asia has changed, what kind of 
“peace” one can speak about in the region and what the main exceptions of such a peace are. 
Chapter 3 will then present the main argument of this book in brief and show the correlative 
evidence to it. This chapter will walk the reader through the overall evidence about the change 
in the East Asian approach to security, and the associations between that approach and the 
dramatic change in the security situation. Three elements of the so-called ‘ASEAN way’ 
approach to the interpretation of the world and regulating it with norms have contributed most 
to the creation of a peaceful East Asia. These elements are  
a) developmentalism  
b) non-interference, and  
c) face-saving.  
It seems that the different elements of the ‘ASEAN Way’ approach tackle different phases of 
the conflict process. This fact will be used in the structuring of the book: the analysis moves 
from the prevention of the onset of conflict (Chapter 4) to the prevention of the escalation of 
conflicts (Chapter 5) into wars once the prevention of the onset of conflict has failed (Chapter 
6).  
The identity of East Asian states as “developmentalist”, with an excessive focus and 
interest in the promotion of economic growth seems to be associated with the fact that violent 
disputes and conflicts do not erupt so easily any more. This will be established in Chapter 4.  
The fact that East Asia has turned its back to the military interference in each other’s 
domestic conflicts, the second ASEAN pillar of peace, has meant that if conflicts emerge, they 
will not escalate into wars. This will be shown in Chapter 5. This second element seems to 
contribute more than any other of the elements of the ASEAN Way, to the peacefulness of East 
Asia.  
The final element of the ASEAN Way, the intent at saving face and seeking for a 
solution dignified for all, tackles the issue of the termination of conflicts if such still occur. The 
ASEAN Way of terminating conflicts, now common in the entire East Asia, will be studied in 
Chapter 6.  
After the presentation of the strategic elements that have contributed to the pacification 
of East Asia, I will take a step further to the roots of the long peace of East Asia, by 
investigating how the ASEAN Way approach was generated in East Asia. The establishment of 
the ASEAN, and the great transformation in Chinese approach to security in the 1960s and the 
1970s will be examined. Instead of presenting exogenous causal conditions for the emergence 
of the ASEAN Way, Chapter 7 will reveal the narratives that legitimized the new approach and 
generated the ideas of the elements of the ASEAN Way. In this way, the explanation of the long 
peace of East Asia will be based on the revelation of the successful strategy/approach/discourse 
that brought about the peace, and on the revelation of the historical context that generated this 
approach.  
In Chapter 8 I shall look into the future, and seek to estimate the durability of the long 
peace of East Asia and how it could be further strengthened and deepened. Here I will return to 
the discovery of Chapter 2 about the narrowness and negative character of the East Asian peace 
and see whether East Asia could be moved from negative peace to a positive peace (using the 
terms of Johan Galtung). Finally in Chapter 9 I will then discuss the contribution of the East 
Asian experience of a long peace to the theory of International Relations and Peace and Conflict 
Studies. I shall make suggestions on how the experience of East Asia should be incorporated 
into the body of the international-relations theory of peace and conflict and how the theory of 
international relations and peace could avoid being too European, in its empirical orientation.  
Thus the structure of the book can be summarized in the following manner: 
1. Introduction. Aim, concepts and approach  
2. The phenomenon to be explained: the long peace of East Asia 
3. The main argument: contribution of the ASEAN Way to the long peace of East 
Asia 
4. Developmentalism and the prevention of the onset of conflicts  
5. Non-intervention and the prevention of the escalation of conflicts into 
wars  
6. Face-saving and the termination of conflicts  
7. How was the successful approach generated? 
8. Will the long peace survive; how could it be made broader, positive and more 
sustainable? 
9. What can the East Asian experience offer to theories of international relations, 
peace and conflicts?  
 
  
Chapter 2 
The Phenomenon to be Explained: The Long Peace of East Asia. 
Introduction 
At the core of the phenomenon of East Asian Peace there is the empirical observation 
that the annual number of battle deaths in East Asia has declined by 95% after 1979
5
, 
compared to the annual level of battle deaths from 1946 to 1979. Any approach in peace 
research that values life, and has a problem with the violent ending of life, must 
acknowledge the value of this sudden development.  
For the legitimacy of the concept or claim on East Asian Peace, annual 
arithmetic averages of battle deaths are a better indicator than any measures that focus 
on the consistency of the lack of conflict. Any measure that is equally affected by each 
life lost due to a conflict is meaningful regardless of whether lives are lost continuously 
and gradually in many conflicts, or seldom in a few conflicts only, but then in greater 
numbers. This is because the normative justification for the concept of East Asian Peace 
is the value of lives. When looking at the drop in the number of battle deaths in East 
Asia, I count them as percentages of the original pre-1980 situation. In this way the 
                                                          
5 Uppsala/PRIO data often assumes an even distribution of battle deaths for each conflict year (unless more accurate 
information is available). For example, if the low estimate of the number of casualties in Zaire’s government’s 
conflict with the rebels of the Independent Mining State of South Kasai in 1960-1962 was 75, then the assumption is 
that 25 battle deaths occurred in each of the three years. Thus it is not possible to take the end date of the Sino–
Vietnamese war as a cut-off point to our investigation. Instead, we consider 1980 as the first year of East Asian 
Peace. The Uppsala data does not distinguish battle deaths between conflicting parties. Whenever this chapter refers 
to national statistics, they are calculated by assuming that battle deaths in conflicts with two or more nations 
involved, are distributed evenly.  
focus is on (the phenomenon of) peace after 1979, rather than the war before 1980, as 
variation in the number of battle deaths during a peaceful period is more strongly 
reflected in the percentage of the drop in the average number of battle deaths than in 
similar variation in the absolute average number of battle deaths before the peaceful 
period.  
In this chapter I shall show how statistics of battle deaths prove that East Asia 
has become more peaceful than before, and more peaceful that most other regions in the 
world, but I shall also look at other indicators of violence to see how broadly based 
peace is in East Asia. This examination will exclude the possibility that the long peace 
of East Asia is an illusion caused by our narrow focus on battle deaths of standard 
conflicts; instead, it will show that battle deaths have not just moved to new kinds of 
conflicts or new categories of violence. It will also show that violence has not grown in 
other categories in a way that would undermine the spectacular decline in the number of 
of battle deaths in standard conflicts. In addition to analysing the phenomenon of the 
long peace of East Asia, this chapter will also look at the issue of the timing of such a 
period of peace.   
When looking at battle deaths I will focus on perhaps the most used dataset 
program, the PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset released in 2005, covering the period of 
1946–2002 (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005). The dataset was updated to the year 2005 in 
2006 by Bethany Lacina, Patrick Meier, and Martin Schüepp. This was further updated 
in October 2009 by Gabriel Uriarte and Bethany Lacina, and extended to 2008. 
According to the dataset’s homepage, a small number of minor corrections to the data 
were made at this stage. The PRIO dataset is compatible with the list of conflicts in the 
Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO)/Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch, 
Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg and Strand 2002, PRIO dataset from hereon) for 
years 1946-2008, and the version 2.0 is compatible with the Correlates of War Dataset 
(Sarkees 2000) for the period 1900–97 and the Fearon and Laitin (2003) dataset on civil 
conflict for the period 1945–99. In addition to studying the version of the PRIO dataset 
I shall compare it with the new Uppsala dataset (v5/2010), and study their relationship 
to other data such as the Correlates of War (COW) data. When looking at other types of 
violence, I have chosen datasets that seem most authoritative and reliable for 
comparisons in time and between countries.   
Battle Deaths and the Long Peace of East Asia 
If we want to answer the question of whether East Asia has become much more 
peaceful or not, we cannot operate on the basis of annual battle deaths data. Annual data 
tells us whether East Asia has avoided battle deaths in a particular year, and how battle 
deaths have developed, but it does not answer the general question of whether a period 
after 1979 was peaceful compared to the period before 1980 (but after 1946). To answer 
that question we simply need to know how many people conflicts have killed during 
that entire period. But then either we should be comparing periods that are equally long 
or we would need to take the arithmetical average of annual conflict fatalities for each 
period. Since the post-1979 period is not as long as the post-1945 and pre-1980 period, 
we must operate with annual averages for the pre-1980 and post 1979 periods.
6
  
The nature of East Asian peace can be examined on the one hand by looking at 
high estimates, low estimates, and best estimates of various data sources of conflict 
                                                          
6 Even though this might seem entirely self-evident, I feel that I need to lay this out clearly as there has been criticism 
of my use of arithmetical averages in the description of the peacefulness of the post-1979 period.  
fatalities. Neither the low nor the high estimate is a safer estimate as such. It is 
sometimes assumed that an estimate is more secure and scientific if it only codes battle 
deaths that can be surely verified (Sundberg 2005; Wischnath and Gleditsch 2011). This 
is presented as an argument for using the low estimate. However, this would mean that 
the most secure estimate would be the one with the strictest source criteria, leading the 
strictest and most reliable scientist to conclude that no conflicts have ever been fought. 
There is no reason to assume that an estimate that is too low is any better than an 
estimate that is too high. Experts of most East Asian conflicts tend to disagree more 
with the low estimate than the high estimate. The low estimates of both PRIO dataset 
versions and the Uppsala dataset on fatalities of Aceh conflict in the beginning of the 
2000s are systematically lower than the number of those people killed by the conflict 
that Kontras (2005), an Indonesian human rights NGO can name. Research and 
Documentation Center Sarajevo (2007) could also name a much greater number of 
people killed in the Bosnian War than the number of casualties the low estimates of the 
Uppsala and PRIO data suggest. The fatalities in the non-state conflict in West 
Kalimantan are estimated at levels that are lower than the number of skulls, some 
scholars have witnessed on the conflict scene. Whether we want to avoid exaggerating 
or underestimating the perception of fatalities depends on our purpose. If we want to 
make sure that some policy does not cause conflict, we had better take a magnifying 
glass and look at the high estimates, but if we want to condemn to death perpetrators of 
conflict, we had better count only casualties with no reasonable doubt, and opt for the 
lower estimate.  
However, it is possible to use the margin between the high and low estimates “to 
be on the safe side” with one’s argument.  Yet the margin is different in different 
datasets and even in different versions and datasets. If one compares the belligerent 
period in East Asia (1946–1979) with the peaceful one and wants to be on the safe side 
with one’s conclusion on East Asia’s pacific turn, one could compare low estimates of 
the belligerent period with high estimates of the peaceful period.  Since the Correlates to 
War data only has best estimates, and the Uppsala data only measures part of the 
peaceful period, one can only use the PRIO dataset versions of the battle death data to 
make the safe argument about East Asia’s pacification. But the two versions have very 
different safety margins, as the difference between high and low estimates of average 
annual battle deaths in version 2.0 is only 15% while in version 3.0 it is 76% (low 
estimate is just 24% of high estimate, or high estimate is more than 4 times higher). The 
difference in margins between low and high estimates makes different datasets or 
versions incomparable. For version 2.0 low estimates are likely to be closer to the 
correct number of battle deaths, while, for sure, the correct number of fatalities is more 
likely to be between the high and low estimates of version 3.0 than version 2.0. Thus, a 
calculation of average annual battle deaths based on high estimate during the peaceful 
period and low estimate in the belligerent period will be more conservative and secure if 
version 3.0 is used. Such calculation on the basis of version 2.0 concludes that at least 
94% of annual battle deaths have disappeared, while according to version 3.0 the 
percentage is at least 79. For the claim on East Asian pacification this means, however, 
that unless the estimate for the belligerent period is twenty times too high, or the 
estimate for the pacific period is just one-twentieth of the correct one, battle deaths 
have, indeed, declined.  
Is it then likely that battle death counts could be totally incorrect and that the 
long peace of East Asia could be just an error of measurement? It is clear that estimates 
of battle deaths are difficult, and thus averages counted on the basis of these estimates 
are not well in line. One clear problem with the use of battle death data for assessing 
developments in East Asia is that datasets also serve studies that only need to operate 
with classes of severity of armed violence, and which only want to examine the 
frequencies of the different classes of militarized disputes, such as non-violent 
militarized disputes, conflicts (with more than 25 fatalities), and wars (with more than 
1,000 fatalities). This means that for many conflicts the high estimate of fatalities is set 
for 999 or/and the low estimate at 25, simply to denote that this incident at least is a 
conflict, or/and that it is as serious as a war. This tendency is clearest in the conservative 
3.0 version of the PRIO dataset. Almost half (47%) of the East Asian conflicts are 
estimated to have either a low estimate of fatalities at 25 or a high estimate at 99. In 
29% of conflicts the high estimate was at 999 and the low estimate at 25. Well over 
one-third of conflicts (38%) in version 3.0 were assumed to have had at least 25 
fatalities. The earlier version (2.0) was in this respect much better for those who are not 
operating with conflict categories but want as good estimates of battle deaths as 
possible. In “only” 22% of East Asian conflicts the coding used the lower limit of 
conflict definition as a low estimate (and only 5% of conflicts had 999 fatalities as high 
estimate). The varying use of the fatality limits of conflict definitions in fatality data, in 
addition to the varying degrees of “conservatism” in body counts, also reduces the 
comparability of the datasets. It is likely that this practice of “rounding” low estimates 
to 25 and high estimates to 999 has expanded the margin between the high and the low. 
Thus if version 3.0 has a wide margin between the high and low estimates, and yet the 
high estimate of fatalities during the peaceful period is still slightly over one-fifth of the 
low estimate of the belligerent period, this deficiency in the data only seems to further 
confirm the thesis of the long peace of East Asia. 
Different methodological choices also lead to different estimates. Gerdis 
Wischnath and Nils Petter Gleditsch (2011) pay attention to the fact that although the 
Uppsala and PRIO datasets share the same conflict definition their coding criteria differ. 
While the PRIO datasets define the entire conflict as eligible for battle death counts, the 
Uppsala data distinguishes between incidents of one-sided violence and conflicts inside 
conflicts, making the coding criterion more restricted. On a global level, the authors 
then conclude that the Uppsala data records only about 50% of battle deaths compared 
to PRIO 3.0 dataset (PRIO 3.0 estimates are 100% higher than the estimates of the 
Uppsala dataset). The same can be seen in East Asia, where the PRIO dataset 3.0 
records 89% (but the 2.0 version only 13% higher) higher battle-death estimates than 
the Uppsala dataset for 1989–2005. It is quite clear that due to the differences of the 
different datasets caused either by different coding methodologies, or by the different 
degree of conservatism (difference between high and low estimates), it is not possible to 
combine datasets in one analysis. The Uppsala data on battle deaths reaches closer to 
the present day than the PRIO dataset, but the PRIO data reaches also to the belligerent 
period in East Asia. Therefore, using the generally lower estimates of the Uppsala data 
for the data period from 1989 and the more historical data from PRIO datasets would 
exaggerate the positive change in East Asia. As a result I shall use the PRIO 3.0 dataset 
as the main data in this book, and the other datasets just for control purposes.  
If it were possible to distinguish the nature of violence (whether a conflict or 
one-sided violence) incident by incident, the Uppsala method could be a substantial 
improvement in assessing of battle fatalities, as it would make it possible to identify the 
subtle changes between different types of violence in conflict dynamics (Pettersson, 
Themnér, Högbladh and Kreutz 2011). Yet, this could lead to difficulties in definitions: 
if battle deaths are defined as civilian and military fatalities in a conflict where both 
sides are armed, when, then, does a civilian belong to a militarized collective entity of a 
conflict party? As such this does not create problems for assessing East Asia’s 
peacefulness, providing that there is no systematic change in warfare from pure conflict 
to mixed conflict, with incidents of extensive one-sided violence. Since the Uppsala 
data does not extend further than 1989, the assessment of the peacefulness of East Asia 
has to be based on the PRIO data, which is less detailed about the nature of the 
incidents. Thus the examination of the peacefulness of East Asia will have to be based 
on observations on conflict that are primarily between armed parties, while conclusions 
will be drawn also from incidents that are targeted against some unarmed groups.  
Furthermore, while the PRIO datasets use various sources including historical 
compendia of casualty statistics from conflict monitoring projects (IISS, 2003), the 
SIPRI Yearbook (annual) as well as case studies, government reports and the media, the 
Uppsala dataset uses mainly and primarily (but not exclusively) the automated events 
data-search by VRA software (see http://vranet.com/FAQ.html) from various public 
sources, including news agencies, journals, reports of international organizations and 
NGOs using the Factiva news database, supplementing this with similar data as the 
PRIO datasets rely on, if the events data is insufficient for a certain conflict (Wischnath 
and Gleditsch 2011). This, too, makes Uppsala’s data collection more restrictive as 
public sources often under-report heavily (typically in authoritarian countries in the case 
of East Asia, and especially in Burma/Myanmar), leading the Uppsala data into rather 
conservative coding practices (Sundberg 2005; Wischnath and Gleditsch 2011). The 
methodologies of the datasets tend to suggest whether the data avoids exaggerating or 
understating the number of casualties. Sundberg (2009: 5) therefore argues that it is 
possible that there are more fatalities than the UCDP high estimate, but it is very 
unlikely that there are fewer than the UCDP best estimate. If this is the case it seems 
that the Uppsala best estimate could almost be treated as the low estimate. Relying only 
on a verified report of fatalities could be supported on grounds of making data 
comparable between countries and periods of time. Relying on case studies exposes 
battle death coding to biases that make country comparisons difficult. If for example 
Burma scholars exaggerate Burmese violence, estimates about this country could not be 
comparable to estimates about countries that have been studied by people who want to 
underestimate fatalities.  Yet, the Uppsala method could risk continuous under-
reporting, or, even worse, bias suggesting that authoritarian countries are more peaceful 
than they actually are. For example, many members of the coalition of NGOs in Aceh, 
who registered conflict casualties during the last years of conflict in Aceh claim that the 
number of fatalities reported by the (military-controlled) media, was much lower than 
the number of fatalities reported by the NGOs, who also listed names of the people 
killed by conflict (Ronnie 2012). In an analysis of the relationship between 
democracy/authoritarianism and peace, this could be problematic.  
Due to the differences in coding practices and definitions, the results of battle 
deaths in both the belligerent period and the peaceful period of East Asia differ rather 
much. If we look at the average annual conflict fatalities during the belligerent period, 
the variation is from less than 80,000 (low estimate of PRIO dataset version 3.0) to over 
300,000 (version 3.0 high estimate), while the averages for the peaceful period range 
from over 17 hundred (low estimate of PRIO dataset version 3.0) to over 16 thousand 
(version 3.0 high estimate).  
Table 2.1: Estimates or average annual fatalities in non-state, extra-state, intra-
state and interstate conflicts  
  
1946–79 1980–2005 
COW  (wars only) 
 
117,514 3,743 
low 3.0 
 
76,286 1,729 
low 2.0 
 
152,317 2,632 
high 3.0. 
 
313,679 16,018 
high 2.0 
 
179,735 8,950 
 
To estimate the reliability of the individual data of datasets one can also take a 
look at the differences in estimates for 1989–2005, which is the part of the peaceful 
period where the two latest PRIO datasets overlap with the new Uppsala dataset. In 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3, the difference to the newest, Uppsala data, has been shown as 
percentage of the Uppsala data of the PRIO data estimate.  
 
Table 2.2: Low estimates, 1989–2005 
2.0 
 
94% 1,286 
3.0 
 
54% 745 
v5/2010 
  
1,366 
    
  
 
 Table 2.3: High estimates 1989–2005 
2.0 
 
261% 5,013 
3.0 
 
335% 6,439 
v5/2010 
  
1,923 
 
As mentioned above the comparisons of low estimates or high estimates do not make 
much sense since different versions of the PRIO dataset have very different degrees of 
“conservatism”, with version 3.0 placing the high estimate almost always higher than 
others, and the low estimate lower than others. Somehow, to produce better estimates, 
one would need to operate on the basis of a best estimate. This is slightly arbitrary in the 
case of operating with PRIO data, as such an estimate is often missing (for almost 1/3 of 
conflicts) and the high and low estimates yield to the extremes of the definition of 
conflict (>25 casualties) that is not yet war (max. 999 casualties). Wischnath and 
Gleditsch (2010) have suggested that a best estimate can be produced by counting the 
best estimate from the arithmetic mean of the low and high estimates. For PRIO data 
version 2.0  this way of calculating makes sense as the best estimate often is close to the 
mean of high and low estimate wherever it is given in the dataset. However, in version 
3.0 this is not optimal as best estimates are often closer to the low estimate. They are 
still closer to the mean than the lower estimate and thus replacing the best estimate with 
a low estimate for those conflicts that lack a best estimate would make even less sense. I 
have calculated, on the basis of the global data, how close the best estimate is to the low 
and high estimates wherever the best estimate is given, and then I have used this 
proximity to produce a new best estimate for those conflicts where it is missing. This 
way we can compare better best estimates of the average number of annual battle deaths 
in each dataset. Again, the percentage of the PRIO figure compared to the Uppsala 
figure is given.  
Table 2.4: Comparison of best estimates of PRIO and Uppsala datasets 
1989-2005 
 
Annual averages 
2.0 new best estimate 115% 1,711 
3.0 new best estimate 159% 2,371 
v5/2010 best estimate 1,488 
 
The three data sources are now closer to one another than if high or low estimates are 
examined, or if best estimates are produced as means of high and low estimates, 
wherever the data source has not given such estimates. However, the Uppsala best 
estimate is still considerably lower than the PRIO best estimate. If one looks at the years 
1992 and 1994 and the conflicts that produce the greatest differences in estimates, one 
can identify two potential sources for differences. Then main differences are related to 
conflicts where the PRIO data has not produced best estimates. If for these conflicts one 
had used low estimates, the differences in annual averages would have evened 
considerably. The conflicts were mainly between the central government of 
Burma/Myanmar and its ethnic challengers, especially the ethnic Mong Tai Army 
(MTA) in Shan State in 1994, and the KNU in Karen State in 1992. Both conflicts 
involved plenty of incidents of one-sided violence. Thus, it is possible that the more 
fine-grained, incident-by-incident approach of the Uppsala dataset is the reason for the 
difference in estimates. Another possibility is that public sources tend to under-report 
fatalities in distant peripheries of authoritarian states. In the case of the fighting of the 
MTA, some of the episodes were clearly between the MTA and the United Wa State 
Army rather than directly between the MTA and the Burmese Army. Thus these 
episodes could have been interpreted as non-state conflict. The fact that the Uppsala 
dataset on one-sided violence (Sundberg 2009; Eck and Hultman 2007) and the Uppsala 
dataset on non-state conflict (Eck, Kreutz and Sundberg, 2010) do not report any 
fatalities of one-sided or non-state violence in Burma/Myanmar for years 1992 and 
1994 means that the difference in estimates could be caused either by my ruling on best 
estimates or by the problem of under-reporting of fatalities in authoritarian peripheries. 
Most Burma specialists would be inclined to say that the Uppsala estimate of slightly 
over 1000 fatalities in both conflicts (1992 and 1994) underestimates the severity of the 
two confrontations.  
Even though datasets have very different estimates of the number of battle 
deaths during both periods, it seems that the difference between the two periods is not 
so different between datasets, versions and estimates. Due to differences in coding 
criteria the level of battle deaths might seem different, while the “shape of the fatalities 
curve” tends to be relatively similar as Graph 2.1 indicates: the new best estimate refers 
to the estimate where missing data is replaced by data that assume that the relative 
distance from high and low estimates to the best estimate is the same as the average 
distance in the cases that the best estimate is given.  
 
 
Graph 2.1: Best estimates of fatalities in East Asia, 1946–2005 (/2008) 
  
Three main problem areas of incompatible data can easily be identified from the graph. 
The number of casualties of the Vietnam–US War have been coded differently in the 
two versions (version 2.0 estimating a greater number of total losses of life), and they 
have been attributed differently to different years (version 3.0 suggesting that a greater 
share of fatalities took place in the last years of the war). This variation is not caused by 
arbitration of best estimates; best estimates for these years, for the main conflicts where 
there is variation, exist in the original datasets. Even though this difference is the 
greatest in absolute numbers, its challenge to the claim of the long peace of East Asia is 
relatively small. Even greater changes in absolute terms during the belligerent time will 
not impact too much on the ratio of average annual fatalities between peaceful and 
belligerent periods.   
Another great difference in the absolute terms is related to the estimate of the 
fatalities in the war in Tibet in 1959. For this conflict the best estimate of fatalities had 
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been lowered to less than one fifth of the number of casualties in the version 2.0 low 
estimate. Bethany Lacina (2009) explains the agonizing choices between conflicting 
sources for her 3.0 version, concluding that the high figures cited in various sources 
seem incredible, given the asymmetry of power between the Chinese and Tibetan 
forces. This ruling does not feel reasonable, given that the great majority of bullets that 
kill in combat are shot into the back of soldiers (thus an asymmetry of powers, Collins 
2007), and that most casualties of wars take place during the high asymmetry of a 
surprise attack and during the great disparity of forces of the last months of war, just 
before one of the sides surrenders. Power asymmetry fuels rather than prevents violence 
in conflict, even if it might make the onset of conflict less likely. However, it is likely 
that in such power asymmetry that existed in 1959 in Tibet, many of the incidents 
should be treated as one-sided violence. Since the dataset on one-sided violence does 
not extend to 1959, this cannot be verified. The best estimate of 3.0 also corresponds 
closer to the estimate of the Correlates of War project estimate on the conflict. While 
this is the most striking difference in the estimates of East Asian conflict fatalities, one 
where, again, many area specialists would not be supportive of the dropping of the 
version 2.0 estimate to less than one fifth, its impact on the claim about the long peace 
of East Asia is minimal. This is because it only shakes the body count of the belligerent 
period where even a great drop in fatalities in absolute numbers only constitutes a small 
correction in percentages (as the number of fatalities is already so high).  
The third main difference between the best estimates of versions 2.0 and 3.0 is in 
the period from 1980 to 1988. Even if the absolute difference in the estimates of the two 
versions is small, this period contributes to 88% of the difference between the annual 
average number of battle deaths for the peaceful period of East Asia. Put together, 
version 3.0 codes 160,318 casualties in East Asia for those years, while the best 
estimate in version 2.0 was just 76,074 – less than half of the estimate of version 3.0. If 
we look at wars only (conflicts with annual casualties over 999) the numbers drop to 
134,749 and 59,177 now showing an even greater difference between the two versions. 
If one compares the latter estimates with the COW estimates, it is clear that the COW 
data is almost exactly in the middle of the two PRIO estimates. The estimate of COW
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for fatalities in wars in East Asia from 1980 until 1988 is over 50% larger than the best 
estimate of version 2.0, while the best estimate of version 3.0 is just under 50% higher 
than the COW estimate.  
The explanation of the variation is not the uncertainty perceived in the coding 
practices about specific cases of conflict. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
occasionally publishes a list of uncertain cases. However, none of the above-mentioned 
cases that have produced greatest uncertainties for the claims of the long peace of East 
Asia are included in the list. The explanations are therefore the following. Firstly, the 
main differences in best estimates are in domestic conflicts in the peripheries of 
authoritarian countries (Indonesia/East Timor, Cambodia and Burma/Myanmar) making 
estimates vulnerable to the under-reporting that is typical for closed societies. Secondly, 
the fact that they take place in authoritarian countries implies that some episodes of the 
conflict belong to the realm of genocide or one-sided violence. Since the Uppsala data 
on one-sided violence does not yet reach to the beginning of the 1980s, this possibility 
cannot be assessed further. Finally, all of the significant differences were in conflicts 
where the original Uppsala data in version 3.0 for best estimates was missing. Thus, the 
                                                          
7 This data is taken from Sarkees 2010. The online version lacks information of many of the intra-state conflicts 
(which Sarkees classifies as extra-state conflicts).  
difference can be related to the fact that my arbitrary method of assigning best estimates 
to conflicts where these estimates are missing is not applicable for these conflicts. 
While this variation in estimates will not challenge the thesis of the long peace of East 
Asia in any way, it does affect our estimate of how peaceful the long peace of East Asia 
has been. If East Asia has been as peaceful as the version 2.0 suggests, it has been more 
than twice as calm if version 3.0 is correct.   
Even with relatively drastic differences between estimates of fatalities in 
individual conflicts, annual averages tend to even out and we are talking about a more 
modest variance.  Despite the fact that the PRIO dataset versions 2.0 and 3.0 belong to 
the same dataset, annual averages based on data from the Correlates of War project and 
the Uppsala Conflict Data Program tend to find themselves somewhere between the two 
versions of the PRIO data. When comparing the average annual fatalities during the 
belligerent period and the pacific period in East Asia, this is once again the case:  
  
Table 2.5: Casualties before and after 1979: several estimates 
 
   
   
Average 
annual 
fatalities in 
1946–79 
Average annual 
fatalities in 1980–2005 
Fatalities in 1980–
2005 as % of 
fatalities in 1946–
1979 
COW[1]
 
117,514 3,743 3.18 
low 3.0 76,286 1,729 2.27 
low 2.0 152,317 2,632 1.73 
high 3.0. 313,679 16,018 5.11 
high 2.0 179,735 8,950 4.98 
best estimate 3.0 149,259 8,583 
5.75%[2]
 
best estimate 2.0 165,452 4,031 2.44 
New best est. 2.0 165,443 4,047 2.45 
New best e. 3.0  146,979 7,717 5.25 
       
       
 
[1]
 COW data is for wars only. For 1946–79 COW dataset lacks data on fatalities of the second phase of the 
Laotian war. The definition of the categories of war differs from those of the PRIO and Uppsala datasets.  
                                                          
 
 
 
[2]
 I have previously claimed (Kivimäki 2011) that the average annual annual of battle deaths after 1979 was 5 and 
not 6% as this calculation shows. This difference is due to the fact that I here compare the periods 1946–1979 and 
1980–2005, while in my previous calculation my comparison was between the periods 1946–1979 and 1980–2008. 
This time, comparing dataset versions 2.0 and 3.0 of the Uppsala data, I must stick to the years available for both 
datasets. This is why the years 2006–08 have been left out of the examination this time. As these years were very 
peaceful, they dragged the average from 5.75 to under 5.5 and thus the previous lower best estimate of the average 
post-1979 annual battle deaths.  
       
 
       
 
It seems that according to this data the annual average amount of fatalities in 
East Asia range from 1.73 to 5.75% of averages during the belligerent period in 1946–
79. Thus, 94–98% of fatalities have disappeared. The basic claim of the long peace of 
East Asia program seems very solid.  
East Asia’s peacefulness can also be demonstrated by its share of global battle 
deaths. East Asia’s share of global population is now about 31%, while it was slightly 
lower in 1946. This would make us assume that East Asia could have about 31% of 
global conflict fatalities. If it is substantially higher, East Asia is belligerent, while if it 
is substantially lower East Asia should be considered peaceful. Using the same 
estimates as above, we can see that before 1979 East Asia was, indeed, belligerent, 
while ever since 1979 it is now peaceful.  
  
                                                          
 
Table 2.6: East Asia’s share of world’s conflict fatalities 
EA BD as 
% of world 
Low 
estim 
2.0 
High 
estim  
2.0 
Best 
estim  
2.0 
 
New  
best 
estimate 
2.0 
Low 
estimate 
3.0 
High 
estimate 
3.0 
Best 
estimate 
3.0 
New best 
estimate 
3.0 
1946–1979 82 78 80 80 82 79 75 76 
1980–
2008/05 
3 6 3 3 4 7 6 6 
 
Since East Asia’s share of global battle deaths during the belligerent period is 
somewhere between 75 and 82%, and since this share has dropped to somewhere 
between 3 and 7%, the comparison with the global share testifies to the fact that we can 
speak about the long peace of East Asia if battle deaths are the measurement of 
peacefulness. 
The Short Peace of East Asia 
What the theorists of East Asian Peace have not discussed so far is the fact that East 
Asia experienced a short period of relative peace already in the 1950s starting at the 
Geneva Conference of 1954 and ending when war escalated in Vietnam after the entry 
of US ground troops in 1964. This short peace should attract attention of scholars of the 
long peace of East Asia. Could this short peace have been caused by the same forces 
that created the longer peace two decades later? Geneva Conference did attempt to 
satisfy some minimum defensive interests of the main powers of the region, just like 
peace according to Robert Ross (1998) was brought about in the 1970s in the US–China 
relationship-centered East Asia. It and the five principles of Chinese international 
relations from 1955 temporarily consolidated the rules of respect for sovereignty and 
non-interference, which some constructivists have seen important for peace in post-
1979 East Asia (Acharya 2001; Kivimäki 2011).  
Secondly the short peace could be interesting for the study of the long peace of 
East Asia because it can point to the weakness of such a peace. What made the peace 
regime collapse at the beginning of the 1960s? Could conditions that ended peace then 
return and end the long peace of East Asia? Why did communism rise to the degree that 
made the US escalate its military action in East Asia? Why did China opt for proletarian 
internationalism and abandoned the five principles after the disastrous Great Leap 
Forward? Would it be possible that the current peace could be risked by undermining 
the US-vital interests in East Asia? Could the US become expansionist again, and start 
threatening the regime of non-interference? Could domestic developments in China lead 
to another reorientation of the country, and end up in China starting to focus on 
expansion as a remedy for its internal problems of legitimacy? 
For such analysis it makes sense to explore what we know about the period after 
the Geneva Conference of 1954. If we look at the period of the short peace of East Asia 
as one starting in 1955 and ending in 1963, just before US ground troops enter Vietnam, 
we can see that the number of battle deaths during this period had declined considerably 
compared to the overall belligerent post-World War II period.  
 
  
Table 2.7: The Short Peace of East Asia, 1955–63 
 Low 
estimate 
(version 3.0) 
High 
estimate 
(version 3.0) 
Best estimate 
(version 3.0) 
Low estimate 
(version 2.0) 
High 
estimate 
(version 
2.0) 
Best 
estimate 
(version 
2.0) 
Average 
annual BDs 
12,693 70,158 24,239 23,326 30,483 26,917 
Percentage 
of BDs 
compared to 
1946–1979. 
16,6 22,4 16,5 15,3 17.0 16,3 
 
It is clear that because the level of battle deaths is so much lower (78–84%) than 
during the entire belligerent period that we should pay attention to this period. 
Something positive happened around the time of the conclusion of the Geneva 
Conference and the adoption by China of the Five Principles. However, this short peace 
was not as drastic as the long peace of East Asia after 1979. While battle deaths were 
reduced they were still on a level that was 3.1 (best estimate in version 3.0)–8.9 (low 
estimate of version 2.0) times higher than after 1979.  Furthermore, the effect was not 
long lasting, and one could almost say that the build-up of adversary powers in East 
Asia in the 1950s was predicting the trouble that then started in the 1960s. While the 
ending of the short peace is marked by the higher fatality counts after the entry of US 
ground troop in Vietnam, communist insurgency had already elevated the annual 
number of battle deaths considerably from the beginning of the year 1960. Yet there 
seem to be similarities between the long and the short peace of East Asia, and thus it 
would be essential for East Asia scholars to see if short peace can teach us something 
about peace and its fragility in East Asia.  
Battle Deaths of Other Types of Political Violence
8
  
What can immediately be observed about East Asian Peace is the drastic decline of the 
number of battle deaths in standard conflicts. The idea of “standard conflicts” borrows 
its definition from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. According to this source a 
conflict is “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where 
the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a 
state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.” Battle deaths, in turn, refer to mortal 
casualties, civilian or combatant, caused directly by conflict. However, this concept of 
peace simply as lack of battle deaths in conflict is too narrow: there can be conditions 
with no battle deaths that we would not like to see as peaceful. There is a possibility that 
instead of pacification, East Asian conflict has simply shifted to forms that are not 
instantly observed by looking at battle deaths in “normal conflicts”. If this were the 
case, the long peace of East Asia would be an illusion – just a matter of definition. This 
section will look at the different types of conflict and try to investigate whether East 
Asia has really become more peaceful or if normal conflicts have simply been 
transformed into other types of violence.  
 
                                                          
8 This section and the following section on ”Beyond Battle Deaths” contain text from my earlier article (Kivimäki 
2010, Taylor and Francis license number 3124121358640). However, in the present chapter reference is no longer 
made to PRIO’s battle death data version 2.0 but instead to version 3.0. Data on conflict termination has also been 
updated. The analysis is now based on the newest version of the Uppsala conflict termination data. 
 Authoritarian Violence  
When looking at the phenomenon of East Asian Peace, the standard Uppsala/PRIO 
dataset definition of conflict requires that both sides of the conflict need to be armed 
and organized, and furthermore, one of them must be the state. Theoretically this is a 
serious limitation. The war in Rwanda that caused something between 58,300 and 
800,000 battle deaths was fought between the government of Rwanda and Tutsi 
civilians. Since the Tutsi side of the war was unarmed, it does not qualify as conflict, 
according to the Uppsala definition. Thus, if Rwanda were in East Asia, we could be 
learning from the recipes of peace in Rwanda in 1994, focusing on when the Hutu 
government slaughtered about half a million unarmed Tutsi civilians.  
Conflict research sometimes talks about one-sided violence
9
 as conflict, where 
only one of the sides is armed and organized. According to the codebook of the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program, one-sided conflict is the use of armed force by the government 
of a state or by a formally organized group against civilians which results in at least 25 
deaths in a year. Yet, extrajudicial killings in custody are excluded from the Uppsala 
definition of one-sided conflict/violence.
 10
 If we look at data that is available from 
                                                          
9 Note that the concept of one-sided violence is not related to the concept of one-sided crisis of the International 
Crisis Behavior project of Maryland University. According to the International Crisis Behavior project, one-sided 
crisis is “an international crisis in which one actor perceives itself to be in crisis by virtue of a verbal or physical act 
by an adversary, but where that adversary does not perceive itself to be in crisis mode” (ICB codebook). 
10 The data on one-sided conflicts since 1989 has been presented in the following sources; Kreutz 2006; Eck and 
Hultman 2007; Human Security Brief 2006. It is available at  
1989 to 2005 (both years included) we could conclude that one-sided conflict should 
somehow be taken into account in assessments of the long peace of East Asia, since 
one-sided conflict has globally caused almost half of the number of casualties compared 
to traditional conflicts.
11
 Thus one-sided conflicts are a significant limitation to the 
usefulness of normal conflict battle death data as an indicator of peace. One could 
identify two types of one-sided conflict: killings by non-government groups of unarmed 
civilians, and killings of unarmed civilians by governments. The former category is 
likely to be a smaller threat to the meaningfulness of the long peace of East Asia due to 
the smaller volume. For example, according to the US State Department’s data (various 
years) on terrorist incidents, the average global number of terrorist killings between 
1982 and 2003 was about 700 and 700 killings compared to the number of annual global 
fatalities in any other type of conflict is a very small number. However, a government’s 
democidal conflict behaviour is likely to contribute significant distortions to concepts 
that disregard this type of violence. A government could manage to pre-empt conflict by 
going after dissidents even before they could mobilize. If this were the case, one could 
be talking about an “authoritarian conflict” instead of a peace. What if the East Asian 
Peace is similar to the authoritarian peace of Eastern Europe between 1956 and 1989? 
The rhetoric of the “Asian Way” strengthens this suspicion. According to Prime 
                                                                                                                                                                          
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/data_and_publications/datasets.htm. Data on one-sided conflict since 1989 in 
this chapter systematically refers to these sources. 
11 However, one-sided conflicts have also not been as deadly and as frequent as traditional conflicts. If one considers 
the case of Hutu government’s one-sided violence against the Tutsi as a special case, and looks at other cases only, 
one could see that the annual number of casualties of one-sided violence drops to less than one-tenth of the number of 
casualties of normal conflicts. There is a clear reason for considering the case of Rwanda in 1995 as a special case, 
since it contributed over 80% of all one-sided conflict casualties since 1989.  
Minister Mahathir Mohammad (1989) of Malaysia, the indigenous Asian approach pays 
less attention to individualistic human rights, and seeks instead collective harmony, 
even if this would require harsher treatment of individuals. According to Suharto, the 
authoritarian ex-president of Indonesia, the ethnic, religious, racial and linguistic 
diversities that exists in Indonesia would cause conflict if too many liberties were 
implemented in the country (Suharto 1991; see also views of army chiefs (Nasution 
1964; Murdani 1987). Finally, according to former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew 
(1994) of Singapore, the collective priority of development made it imperative for 
Singapore to contain destabilizing individual initiatives. What if all this means that 
modes of authoritarian violence that were introduced with the justification of the “Asian 
Values” rhetoric, were the reason why battle deaths disappeared from conflict statistics 
and reappeared in statistics of authoritarian one-sided conflict? This would totally 
undermine the whole concept of East Asian Peace. We could say that the 900–1,800 
unarmed East Timorese killed by the Indonesian forces after their referendum on 
independence, or probably many more killed after the Indonesian occupation of East 
Timor, or the 500-2500 demonstrators killed during the Tiananmen Square incident 
within the period of the East Asian Peace poses a challenge.  
The problem with studying the challenge of government killings (democide) to 
the long peace of East Asia is the lack of comparable data. Democide data often 
includes indirectly intentional casualties of government actions, such as casualties of 
forced movements, when people die of hunger after being placed in an area that cannot 
sustain their livelihoods.  
Rudolph Rummel’s data on government killings is among the most cited 
(1994;  1997).
 
However, its definition of what he calls democide includes, in 
addition to direct killings of the groups of citizens by the government:  
a) deadly conditions in prisons, concentration camps, under forced labour, 
for prisoners of war, or in recruit camps; 
b) murderous medical or scientific experiments performed on human 
beings;  
c) deadly torture or beatings; 
d) encouraged or condoned murder or rape, looting and pillaging during 
which people are killed; 
e) a famine or epidemic during which government authorities withhold aid 
or knowingly act in a way which makes conditions more deadly; or 
f) forced deportations and expulsions resulting in deaths. 
 
One cannot compare Rummel’s data with the Uppsala data on one-sided 
violence or conflicts, because of two reasons. On the one hand, Rummel’s definition 
includes indirect conflict casualties – this inclusion exaggerates the number of 
casualties. On the other hand, Rummel only counts casualties of the government’s 
violence, while the Uppsala data looks at one-sided violence exercised by civil society 
actors as well. The Uppsala data seems to suggest that governmental one-sided violence 
constitutes almost 90% of all one-sided violence. Data on terrorist violence seems to 
suggest that this type of violence is indeed much less extensive. This reduces the 
relevance of the second problem. However, the first problem, indirect casualties, makes 
the two data incomparable. It also seems that the different types of conflict have very 
different ratios between direct and indirect casualties. While the Uppsala statistics of 
direct battle deaths suggest that normal conflicts cause twice as many battle deaths than 
one-sided conflicts, Rummel’s data suggests that one-sided (and only government-
initiated one-sided) violence causes six times as many (direct and indirect) casualties as 
conflicts (Rummel 1994). Clearly, one-sided conflicts seem to cause more indirect 
casualties. The way to compare earlier data on one-sided violence and the more recent 
data since 1989 of the Uppsala dataset, is through an assumption that tendencies in East 
Asian one-sided violence can be measured by looking at the relationship between East 
Asian and global casualty levels, and assuming that if East Asia’s share of these 
casualties increases or decreases, this also indicates an increase or decrease in absolute 
levels. This assumption is based on the premise that we do not have any reason to 
assume that the East Asian ratio between indirect and direct casualties should differ 
from the global ratio.  
Rudolph Rummel reveals data that suggests that East Asia has traditionally been 
exceptionally prone to one-sided conflicts where the government takes the lead. 
According to his data, Communist China has contributed to almost 30% of democide 
casualties in the world, while Nationalist China and a number of other East Asian 
governments had been among the top 20 democidal regimes in the world. Just before 
the beginning of the East Asian Peace, Pol Pot’s government earned the questionable 
honour of reaching a world record in the share of the total number of people killed by 
their government. Furthermore, most Indonesia-specialists
12
 would claim that the 
transition from President Sukarno’s rule to President General Suharto’s rule in 
Indonesia involved somewhere between 500,000 and 1.5 million mortal casualties due 
                                                          
12 See for example, Cribb 1990. 
to the government’s one-sided violence. While the numbers Rummel presents are vastly 
different than those of the Uppsala conflict dataset, due to differences in 
operationalization and definitions
13
, one could assume that the geographical shares of 
governments’ one-sided conflicts could remain relatively unaltered regardless of 
whether one counts indirect casualties or not.  
The main East Asian episodes of democide have taken place in the context of 
China’s Great Leap Forward, the struggle between nationalist and communist forces in 
China, Pol Pot’s Cambodia, and in the aftermath of Indonesia’s General Suharto’s 
takeover. All these major periods were before 1979. Yet the genocide in East Timor in 
1999 and the Tiananmen Square (1989) incident took place after 1979. According to 
Rummel’s calculations, China alone (communist and nationalist China put together), 
accounts for over 30% of global democide during the 20
th
 century, and an even higher 
                                                          
13 Also, the time periods covered by Rummel’s data and the Uppsala data are different, so one can only speculate 
about the differences. 
Graph 2.2: East Asian share of global battle deaths in one-sided conflict 
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percentage after the two World Wars. At the same time, Uppsala data since 1989 reveals 
that the entire East Asian region has only twice (in 1989 and 1999) reached 30% of 
global battle deaths in one-sided conflicts after 1988. 
On average, East Asian one-sided violence after 1989 is no longer more than 
1.2% of the global share of one-sided conflict battle deaths.
14
 All this suggests that the 
claim that there would be a considerable increase in one-sided conflicts is not credible. 
On the contrary, the indicator of this kind of battle deaths clearly also testifies to East 
Asian Peace. Thus, the limitation related to one-sided violence does not pose a 
fundamental challenge to the notion of East Asian Peace. However, on the basis of this 
data, we do know that East Asia has been peaceful (if measured by battle deaths in 
conflicts and one-sided conflicts) after 1979 and before 1989, but we cannot be sure 
exactly when. Thus, even though the claim of East Asian Peace is based on a definition 
of peace where the government is not violently challenged by armed opposition, East 
Asian Peace seems to exist also as peace where also violence against unarmed groups is 
minimal. While the killings by Indonesian and Chinese governments in the aftermath of 
the 1999 referendum in East Timor and related to the Tiananmen Square incident in 
1989 are an exception to the rule of declining one-sided conflict, one could also say that 
it is precisely these two governments that have cleaned up their act most drastically after 
the beginning of the long peace of East Asia. While it seemed to be slightly outside the 
                                                          
14 It seems that the Graph 3.2. suggests a higher figure. This is due to the fact that the Rwandan genocide in 1994, 
when the East Asian share was 0.0%, caused over 80% of all battle deaths in one-sided conflicts since 1989. Thus 
during the rest of the years, the East Asian number of casualties is considerably higher than the average of 1.2% 
which is the percentage of all East Asian casualties as a proportion of all global casualties from 1989 to 2006.  Yet 
even without the Rwandan genocide, the East Asian share of global battle deaths in one-sided conflicts is no more 
than 6.2% – a share clearly disproportionate to the East Asian  population share of 32%. 
drastic decline of battle deaths, in terms of keeping the levels of one-sided violence 
down, the Philippines has managed to perform rather well. The conflict in Mindanao, 
which is also the largest Philippine source of battle deaths, is troublesome from the 
point of view of one-sided violence. However, even there, the government has 
according to Uppsala and PRIO data, managed to avoid genocidal practices. The 
government of Myanmar, however, stays outside the long peace of East Asia in this 
category of conflict as well.  
Non-State Violence  
The second, form of conflict to be examined in this section is the one that does not 
involve the state.  The Uppsala definition of conflict requires that one of the conflicting 
parties is the state. For conflicts where “the use of armed force between two organized 
groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-
related deaths in a year”, the Uppsala Conflict Data Project codebook uses the name 
“non-state conflict”. Naturally, this limits the common-sense relevance of any concept 
of the long peace of East Asia: East Asia should not be called a peaceful area if non-
state war were to rage there. Instead, it should probably be called East Asian anarchy. 
The fact that non-state conflict is on the rise makes this limitation even more serious. 
However, empirically, non-state conflicts tend to cause much fewer battle deaths (non-
state conflicts cause 6% of battle deaths compared to normal conflicts, to be precise) 
than conflicts that comply with the standard definition, and this makes this limitation 
less serious as an empirical issue. Furthermore, the number of non-state battle deaths in 
comparison to normal conflict casualties is less than 4% in East Asia.  
At the same time, conflicts between communities are often very harmful for the 
social fabric of areas, and thus cause indirect effects and casualties that are 
disproportionate to direct battle deaths. Based on this, one could assume that the 
limitation is slightly more meaningful than the 6% would suggest. In East Asia, the 
problem of non-state conflicts or non-state one-sided violence has mainly been relevant 
in Burma/Myanmar and in areas where unarmed migrant populations from central areas 
of the conflict country become targets of displaced frustration and hate by separatist 
armed groups. However, conflicts have traditionally been more closely related to the 
state in East Asia than in many other regions, and the extent of spontaneous conflict 
between civil society groups is less pronounced than for example in Africa, where the 
state has less relevance for most of the societies. In fact, the share of East Asia in global 
non-state violence is less than 1.5% (between 2002 and 2005). Furthermore, violence 
that non-state actors inflict upon unarmed groups is non-existent in large parts of East 
Asia. In fact, the Uppsala Conflict Dataset has not recorded a single such conflict since 
the beginning of 1989 in Indo-China (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia) and Northeast Asia 
(the Koreas, Japan China, Taiwan and Mongolia). Thus, all in all, it is clear that the 
volume of non-state conflict simply makes it less likely that this is the problem that 
challenges the legitimacy of the conception of East Asian Peace. Even if there was a 
reason to believe that non-state conflicts have started to cause more battle deaths, they 
still cause less than 4% of battle deaths compared to normal conflict battle deaths. In 
this way, this ignored category does not challenge the legitimacy of calling East Asian 
peaceful. The long peace of East Asia, therefore, is peace that is not only characterized 
by the lack of normal or one-sided conflict but also by low levels of non-state conflict. 
Low levels of non-state conflict were not, however, something that had emerged just 
before 1979, but instead something typical of East Asia over an extended period time. 
 
 
Homicide 
A step further from non-state conflict is violent crime, which sometimes, like when we 
are talking about gang wars, is rather similar to conflicts. Here the difference is that the 
incompatibility in crime does not normally concern governance or territory (although 
disputes about gang territories do sometimes motivate violence between criminal 
gangs). Furthermore, one incompatibility does not normally cause more than 25 battle 
deaths, but instead incidents of “criminal battle deaths” are numerous and separate, with 
each causing less than 25 casualties. Homicide as battle death would be a relevant 
category if it was sufficiently close in terms of definition, as current rates of homicide in 
East Asia have only been matched by conflict battle deaths in major wars. If there was a 
suspicion that law enforcement has been lax, and because of this the state becomes 
involved in violent incidents with, say ethnic gangs less often, this category of violence 
could challenge the notion of East Asian Peace. Law enforcement and conflict are 
discursively connected in East Asian debate as countries sometimes refer to East Asian 
collectivist values where tolerance towards individualistic, but immoral ways are met 
with tougher sanctions. If this practice disappeared around 1979, this could explain the 
drop in conflict battle deaths even without an emergence of something that could be 
called the long peace of East Asia. It could be possible that conflict violence did not 
really disappear after all, but was simply transformed into criminal violence, as the East 
Asian states simply gave in to dissidents and gave up the maintenance of order. We 
could then call this East Asian criminal anarchy instead of the long peace of East Asia. 
If this were the case it would be demonstrated in a decline of the conflicts that the 
government is a party to, but simultaneously demonstrated in an increase in murders 
(and one-sided violence by civil society groups). If there has been a violent way to 
address grievances alternative to conflict (such as through crime) after 1979, this could 
explain the disappearance of conflict battle deaths, which then would erode the 
legitimacy of the notion of East Asian Peace.  
An investigation of the trends of violent crime is tedious. The only source of 
relatively reliable data that can be used for cross-country comparisons as well as the 
investigation of trends over time is the data produced by the ten United Nations 
Surveys on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (CTS) 
from 1970 until 2006
15
. Obviously this limits the observation of the pre-1980 period, as 
data on the period from the Second World War to 1970 is missing.  
If one tries to find a crime category that could be sufficiently close to the 
indicators of conflict it would need to be homicide, since our conflict definition deals 
with fatal phenomena. To specify further, we should be looking at evidence on murders 
– intentional homicides, rather than unintentional – and we should be looking at actually 
committed intentional homicides rather than attempts. Our starting point in the analysis 
of whether there is any normative relevance for claiming that East Asia is pacific by 
                                                          
15  The data is available for various years, in various formats and with various definitions at 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/United-Nations-Surveys-on-Crime-Trends-and-the-Operations-of-
Criminal-Justice-Systems.html A coherent dataset based on the national data, compiled by the UN will appear at 
www.nias.ku.dk.  
pointing to the decline in battle deaths was based on the preference for life and against 
the taking of lives. Since conflict is defined as intentional violence with political 
objectives, looking at murder statistics naturally loosens the definition of motives of 
violence, but should not loosen the definition of intentionality or the mortal outcome. 
Thus, we will follow the data on intentional homicide, which the UN Organization on 
Drugs and Crime defines in the following manner: “Intentional homicide” may be 
understood to mean death deliberately inflicted on a person by another person, including 
infanticide.”
16
  
While conflicts are collective phenomena, criminal violence is only rarely so. 
There is recent data on organized crime, but not historical surveys that could enable a 
comparison of the situation before and after 1979. Furthermore, organized crime 
statistics do not normally differentiate between mortal and non-mortal crime, and this 
distinction, as mentioned before, is crucial for the normative relevance of our 
conception of East Asian Peace. Thus our investigation of criminal “conflict” will have 
to give up the criterion of collectiveness: this violence is not necessarily collective, 
driven by ideologies, or ethnic, religious or other communal loyalties, but can be, and 
often is, driven purely by individual greed.  
The UN data on intentionally committed (suspected)
17
 homicide is based on 
information that UN member states have chosen to make available to international 
                                                          
16 Questionnaire to the national coordinators, which has been the basis of the United Nations Surveys on Crime 
Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems. 
17 The number of suspected committed murders is slightly higher than the number of convicted murders. For the 
purpose of this investigation the number of suspected murders is more useful because of the conservative criteria of 
murder having to be proved and attributed to someone “beyond reasonable doubt”. If I would operate with convicted 
exposure. This means that homicides committed by a government are likely to be under-
reported. However, since the critical hypothesis was that perhaps governments have 
given up the maintenance of order, governmental crime is not what we are after in our 
analysis of homicide statistics. The hypothesis of conflict violence being transformed 
into governmental authoritarian violence was tackled by the analysis of one-sided 
conflict.  
In some cases the fact that UN statistics rely on the records of its member 
countries means that the practices of recording homicides might vary from country to 
country, despite the fact that the UN has given a unified set of definitions for each 
crime. If we were to compare homicides in democracies and dictatorships, or developed 
and developing countries, it would be difficult to use the UN data that relies of records 
of the member countries. It is likely that such data has a bias against democracies and 
developed countries, which are less likely to fail to record each crime, or manipulate the 
statistics to the liking of the elite. However, since East Asia has both developed and 
democratized since the 1970s, this problem can be addressed. If homicide statistics 
show that East Asian homicide rates have not deteriorated substantially, then we can 
rule out the possibility of conflict battle deaths having been converted into criminal 
violence.  
Sometimes the comparison over time also seems to be limited in the UN data. 
The third survey covering the years 1980–1986 seems to produce higher results for 
                                                                                                                                                                          
murders I would also need to ignore cases where murder has undoubtedly happened, but there is no certainty about 
the perpetrator. While convictions try to minimize the number of convicted innocent people, our investigation would 
need to establish the best estimate for the number of murders. For this, suspected murders are a better indicator than 
convicted murders.  
many countries than the other surveys. In addition to this, in 15 countries, the years that 
were common to either the second (1980) or the fourth survey (1986) were reported 
substantially differently.
18
 However, ignoring the results of the third survey does not 
substantially change the results below.  
The main challenge with this data is not unreliability or biases, but the fact that 
data is missing from many important countries, for instance from the pre-1980 period 
for China and Burma/Myanmar, while the post-1979 period of the latter is likely to be 
undermined. The Indo-Chinese states Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos are all without 
homicide data in the UN dataset. Furthermore, data for other East Asian countries are 
missing for an average of half of the years. Thus the remaining data could only be seen 
as a sample of all homicide data, even if it is perhaps a relatively extensive and 
representative sample.  
It is not possible to compare East Asian homicides with global levels of 
homicides, simply because both the global and the East Asian data are insufficient. 
Comparisons could only be made of the available data on the basis of average casualties 
per population of each country.  
The available data can clearly prove wrong the suggestion that conflicts in East 
Asia have been converted into crime. East Asia has not become a criminal anarchy.  It 
seems that despite the fact that the countries have become more able and willing to 
truthfully report each homicide, the levels of reported homicide have been reduced. 
While the global average number of per capita homicide rates in the post-1979 period 
                                                          
18 There were clear deviations in the reports of overlapping years other than those related to the third survey, for six 
other countries. None of these clear data problems were related to East Asian countries.  
was slightly higher than in 1970–1979, East Asian per-capita homicide rates are down 
in all but one (Malaysia) of the seven countries where the data was available both for 
the pre-1980 and post-1979 period. While East Asian per-capita homicide levels were at 
global levels in the 1970s,
 19
 the average East Asian level was less than half of the 
global levels after 1979.
20
 Thus homicides have not taken the place of conflict battle 
deaths – on the contrary, criminal violence in clearly on the decline in East Asia. 
However, while it is clear that post-1979 is more peaceful when criminal violence also 
is considered, one cannot clearly show that 1979 would somehow have been a 
watershed year. It might be true that homicides have been reduced relatively 
consistently since 1979, but if homicides are seen as an indication of conflict, then 1980 
can by no means be considered as the first peaceful year. On the contrary, homicidal 
violence can only be seen to have reached a stable low level at some time in the mid-
1990s. A graph of the countries with the fullest data available shows the tendency:
21
 
 
                                                          
19 If counted on the basis of the average of national averages it was almost 25% higher, while if counted on the basis 
of regional averages, it was 3% lower.  
20 If counted on the basis of the average of national averages it was almost 53% lower, while if counted on the basis 
of regional averages, it was 61% lower. 
21 In this presentation the missing data has been filled in assuming that the homicide situation has developed in a 
linear manner from the last available data-year to the first available data-year after the gap.  
  
As can be seen, the homicide rates of East Asian countries become more similar after 
the two main trouble countries, Thailand and the Philippines, have found ways to curb 
criminal violence. In terms of East Asians as a population, the lack of Chinese figures 
for most of the years is a problem. However, per-capita homicide levels for China tend 
to be far lower than those of the global level, though the tendency is difficult to estimate 
on the basis of the data that the UN statistics provides for the country (1981, 1982, 
1983, 1984 and 1986).
22
 Thus it is difficult to say whether the availability of Chinese 
data could weaken the results regarding the decline of crime in the region. It seems at 
least that with its low levels of homicide, Chinese data would definitely not, if fully 
                                                          
22 During this short period homicide numbers went first down but then up again in the last two years, ending on a 
level that was higher than any other year. 
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: 
available, contribute to an interpretation according to which the long peace of East Asia 
could be challenged by violent crime.  
Beyond Battle Deaths 
The number of conflict-related fatalities is a good indicator of peacefulness for analysis 
that respects human life and aims at scholarship that can reduce the number of human 
lives lost due to warfare. From this perspective, the indicator of battle deaths has 
normative relevance as an indicator of peacefulness. The lack of battle deaths is 
probably also an indicator that somehow relates to all definitions of peace: there is no 
concept of peace that would allow a large number of battle deaths. Furthermore, 
mortalities are a practical indicator; whether or not something is a conflict (especially if 
we do not require conflicts to produce battle deaths) is often a difficult matter to define 
in a universally acceptable way, whereas whether a person is dead or not is more clear-
cut (yet if he died as a direct consequence of the conflict or not can also be a matter of 
interpretation). Yet this indicator of battle deaths certainly does not empty the concept 
of peace. There are many other elements of peace that battle-death statistics do not 
measure.  
Indirect Conflict-Related Fatalities  
If one looks at mortalities, one can choose between deaths of combatants, which is the 
narrowest category covering military deaths only; battle deaths, which covers both 
civilian and military deaths resulted from a conflict; and conflict-related mortalities, a 
category which includes casualties of conflict-related famine, disease and other indirect 
conflict-related calamities. It would be difficult to argue, on the basis of our normative 
starting point of valuing life, that the annual level of battle deaths is a worse indicator of 
conflict and peace than the level of military casualties. From the point of view of 
normative relevance it would be difficult to ignore civilian casualties of war in the 
definition of peace. However, there is an immediate problem with battle deaths related 
to a very short causal chain from conflict to deaths. According to the Uppsala conflict 
dataset definition, battle deaths include the following.  
[T]raditional battlefield fighting, guerrilla activities (e.g. hit-and-run 
attacks/ambushes) and all kinds of bombardments of military units, cities and 
villages, etc. The targets are usually the military itself and its installations or 
state institutions and state representatives, but there is often substantial collateral 
damage in the form of civilians being killed in crossfire, in indiscriminate 
bombings, etc. All deaths – military as well as civilian – incurred in such 
situations, are counted as battle-related deaths.  
If death does not follow directly from a bullet/bomb of war, it is not seen as a 
battle death. This could be seen to reduce the normative relevance of the concept. The 
article by Lacina and Gleditsch (2005) that launched the standard battle-death statistics 
already warned about the limitation of focusing only on battle deaths and not on indirect 
costs of war, too. When comparing the severity of conflicts, why would we want to 
ignore the casualties of famine or mortal disease caused by conflicts? At the same time, 
disease and famine in war contexts are almost always also results of poverty or one-
sided violence. Direct battle deaths measure those deaths that are caused by war only. 
Thus, what can be claimed on the basis of battle death data is that East Asia is 
experiencing peace where conflict no longer causes destruction that would threaten the 
lives of people as such. However, even if conflict alone did not directly cause fatalities 
it would be serious enough if conflict was part of an East Asian complex humanitarian 
emergency. Were that to happen, we would not be talking about the long peace of East 
Asia, but instead about East Asian complex humanitarian emergency where conflict is 
one of the components. 
However, empirical investigation seems again to lend its support to the 
genuineness of the notion of the long peace of East Asia. It seems clear that the general 
vulnerability of the population affects the indirect effects of conflicts. Conflicts cause 
famine and disease-related fatalities especially when the welfare system is poorly 
developed and food security is not guaranteed with emergency measures, or when the 
regime or rebels use access to food or health services as tactics of war. Thus the ratio 
between indirect and direct fatalities is dependent on the will and the ability of the 
conflicting parties to avoid loss of lives. 
The question of willingness to avoid indirect conflict casualties relates to one-
sided violence due to the fact that famine and diseases are not something one can pin on 
organized military opponents only. As discussed in the section on one-sided conflict, it 
seems that especially East Asian governments have utilized the control over the access 
to food and health services as a weapon that they have used against their opponents. The 
famine of 1997–1998 in Papua killed hundreds of people, especially in the areas where 
separatist anti-government activities were taking place; the Hmong people of Laos 
fought against the communist-nationalist forces in the 1960s and 1970s; the Muslim 
Moro and Malay of the Philippines and Thailand often complain about discrimination 
surrounding vital services. However, as mentioned in the section on one-sided conflict, 
the main incidents of indirect violence in a conflict context took place before 1980, 
while the more current cases could be described as more incidental and exceptional 
elsewhere than perhaps in Burma/Myanmar, where the denial of access to international 
humanitarian work has been for decades, and still is, a systematic policy of the 
government.
23
 Thus it is probable that the ratio between indirect and direct casualties in 
conflicts is declining, and the number of indirect casualties, caused by the democidal 
practices of the governments, is declining in all areas of East Asia except perhaps in 
Burma/Myanmar, where the number of indirect casualties is still not possible to assess.  
Regarding the ability to avoid indirect fatalities of conflict, it is likely that the 
best indicators are related to those economic indicators that tell something about how 
people survive unexpected changes (such as poor harvests, natural disasters, etc.) in 
general. Life expectancy, education and many other indications of human development 
could, therefore, be used to estimate to what extent indirect fatalities are caused by 
vulnerability to conflict. If we look at the human development index, which consists of 
equal components of life expectancy, literacy, educational attainment, and GDP per 
capita, we realize that again, only Burma/Myanmar’s and perhaps East Timor’s case is 
not entirely clear. All other East Asian citizens (even if there is no data on some of them 
in the pre-1979 period) seem to develop rapidly. If one calculates on the basis of 
UNDP’s Human Development Reports one can see that the average human development 
indexes of East Asian countries after 1979 range between 11 (the Philippines) to 36% 
(Indonesia) higher compared to pre-1980 period.
24
 Thus the ability of East Asia, except 
for Burma/Myanmar, to avoid indirect casualties due to conflicts has increased.  Since 
                                                          
23 The minister for information explained this in a positive framing by saying that humanitarian assistance is given 
(and international humanitarian assistance is allowed access) to non-fighting or cease-fire territories in order to offer 
an incentive for peace (discussion by the author in October 2006, in the framework of a Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung/Myanmar International and Strategic Studies Institute fact-finding mission for EU scholars and officials.  
24 This calculation does not compare averages for 1946–1979 and 1980-2005, but averages for 1970–1979 and 1980–
2007, due to data availability. 
both willingness and ability of the region (with the exception of Burma/Myanmar) to 
avoid indirect fatalities due to conflicts has improved, it seems clear that peace in the 
region indeed means substantially lower levels of conflict-related fatalities, not just 
lower levels of battle deaths.   
Conflicts Without Fatalities  
Another challenge to battle deaths as an indicator of the lack of peace could be the 
existence of non-violence conflicts over territories or governing power. If this was the 
case, should we then forget the notion of the long peace of East Asia and, instead, talk 
about East Asian non-fatal war? Here a measure of the lack of peace that is not based on 
the loss of life could be seen as less powerful in terms of its normative relevance: if we 
want to reserve the word ‘conflict’ for something with a very negative value, there have 
to be casualties involved. Thus conceptually, non-violent conflicts do not seriously 
challenge the notion of the long peace of East Asia, which is based on low levels of 
fatalities. Even if it was discovered that the number of non-violent conflicts rose 
tremendously as the East Asian Peace started, we would not need to abandon our 
concept. The miracle of the long peace of East Asia would simply be in East Asia’s 
ability to manage conflicts so that they do not cause fatalities.  
Reign of Fear  
Sometimes it is fear that prevents people from taking up arms even if they are suffering 
and lack non-violent options. Again, living under fear and unbearable conditions does 
not correspond to our common-sense view of peace. Could “East Asian Peace” in fact 
be a dystopia similar to the ones described by George Orwell and Aldous Huxley in 
1984 and New Brave World respectively? In these novels, popular grievances keep on 
piling up, but the efficiency and brutality of the repressive system causes fear in people 
and groups, and prevents them from staging revolts. Surely if fear was the main causal 
determinant of “East Asian Peace”, the concept would lose its normative relevance and 
we should not call it peace at all. Instead of the long peace of East Asia we would be 
dealing with an East Asian authoritarian peace. If the long peace of East Asia is of the 
Orwellian nature, we should not consider it a genuine peace, and we should not take it 
as a mode whose recipes could be emulated elsewhere.  
In order to decide whether the long peace of East Asia is real, or if it simply has 
been caused by increased fear, and in order to see if the profile of the long peace of East 
Asia is Orwellian, we need to look at the development of fear in the polities of East 
Asian nations. We have already looked at one-sided violence and realized that the fear 
that could be preventing people from any acts that could lead to conflict is not based on 
systematic killings of the population by the governments. The fear that we would be 
talking about when studying the Orwellian hypothesis would be a fear of predictable 
punishment for any activity that aims at challenging the system. Thus we are talking 
about the practices and the rights of the executive to punish people, and the possibilities 
of the people to address their grievances and change the system. If the government has a 
credible deterrent to keep the population under tight control in order to keep societal 
peace, we would be talking about some kind of an Orwellian peace. If this predictable 
credible deterrent emerged just before or during the drastic decline of battle deaths, we 
would not be able to rule out the possibility that this Orwellian fear-based control is the 
reason for the declining number of battle deaths. In the latter case we should not talk 
about peace at all.  
The ability of the rulers to maintain predictable fear among the population is 
dependent on conditional sanctioning opportunities of the state. Since we are not 
looking at fear based on the practice of killings (one-sided violence), our investigation 
will be directed towards the legal punitive system – to what extent the executive can 
punish people (intensity of punishment), and on which scale this punitive system is 
used. Both of these elements are needed, since we cannot imagine an Orwellian society 
where the state could only subject its citizens to mild punishment (say minor fines), and 
neither could we imagine such a society in a state that can only punish murders, but 
cannot restrict its citizens with regard to any other category of actions. An Orwellian 
society is one where the rulers are unrestricted in controlling all kinds of activities, and 
where the instruments of this control imply extreme punishments for actions that are not 
desired by the state.  
If we look at the punitive system of the governments in East Asia, a good 
indicator of deterrence is the practice of capital punishment. Aside from torture, for 
which we do not have reliable cross-country comparable data, the right of the state to 
take a citizen’s life is probably the most useful crude indicator of whether the state does 
or does not have means for severe punishment. If a country has this extreme instrument 
in its use it does not necessarily mean that it is Orwellian. We can talk about an 
Orwellian setting only if capital punishment exists, and at the same time, the executive 
branch of government has unrestricted power to practise it, to control any element of 
societal life, and especially if the citizens lack the capacity to change the system. But 
nevertheless, the possession of extreme instruments of punishment is a necessary 
element in an Orwellian setting.  
If one looks at the capacity to punish as a possible cause for the elusive peace 
after 1979, one has to conclude that the availability of mortal sanctioning of societies is 
not the cause of the disappearance of battle deaths. On the contrary, the number of East 
Asian countries in possession of the opportunity to practise capital punishment has 
declined since 1979. Amnesty International
25
 lists countries and puts them into four 
categories:  
A. Those whose legislation makes capital punishment totally impossible,  
B. Those whose legislation does not allow capital punishment in response to 
normal crimes,  
C. Those whose practice is not to punish citizens with death for normal crimes, 
and  
D. Those that still practice the death penalty.  
 
  
                                                          
25http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty/abolitionist-and-retentionist-countries#allcrimes  
 
Table 2.8: Average share of countries with four orientations to capital punishment, 
in %  
Period  A B C D 
1946–79 World 6 11 26 70 
1946–80 East Asia 0 0 4 96 
1980–2008 World 26 33 56 44 
1980–2009 East Asia 7 7 20 80 
 
If we look at the averages for the post-World War II period until 1979, and 
compare them to the post-1979 period, we realize that in each of the categories, East 
Asia has rather become more liberal than authoritarian, and less Orwellian,. Thus this 
component does not support the idea of considering fear as the explanation for the 
disappearance of battle-deaths. However, fear could profile the peace of East Asia, as it 
is clear that East Asian states are better equipped with coercive tools to control their 
citizens. Fear could play a more important role here than in the rest of the world. Graph 
3.4 shows the comparison by focusing only on the practice of capital punishment 
(category D).  
 
 
 
Graph 2.4   Share of countries that practice capital punishment 
  
However, even this graph presents a picture that is too rosy for East Asian 
Peace. It is mostly the least populous countries – Brunei and East Timor at their birth in 
1957 and 1999, and Cambodia and Laos in 1989 – that have given up capital 
punishment, whilst Indonesia and China, and most of the other bigger nations still 
practice the death penalty. South Korea and the Philippines are the only exceptions to 
the rule: while the Philippines totally banned capital punishment in 2006, South Korea 
has simply not practiced it since 1997. This indicates that for South Koreans as well, the 
threat is there, despite the fact that capital punishment is not in practice. If one looks at 
the share of citizens living in countries with death penalty we can see that over 92% of 
East Asians still live in those countries. If one takes into account that in practice the 
Philippines government is also being accused of large-scale killings of journalists 
critical to the government, directly or through proxy militias, one could conclude that 
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the threat of the death penalty is a reality for almost all East Asians (only East Timorese 
and Cambodians are exempt).  
Graph 2.5 Percentage of East Asians living in countries that practice capital 
punishment 
 
Access to harsh measures alone does not, however, constitute authoritarian, 
Orwellian peace, if the government is well controlled and its exercise of coercive 
measures is restricted to crime control only. However, if the state can use its strong 
coercive measures in an unlimited manner, we could imagine an extremely violent and 
coercive setting even if there were no fatalities. Polity data, which is probably the most 
used quantitative dataset on the development of political systems, has information for 
each country about the development of the limits on the authority of the executive to use 
the coercive measures and methods of control. This data is useful for our purposes when 
comparing the pre-1980 period after the World Wars with the post-1979 period.  
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Polity data builds a scale starting with (1) “Unlimited Authority”: a category 
reserved for states where there are no regular limitations on the executive's actions (as 
distinct from irregular limitations such as the threat or actuality of coups and 
assassinations). At the other end of the scale is category (7) “Executive Parity or 
Subordination” for countries with accountability groups having effective authority equal 
to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity. Between the extremes are cases 
in category (3) with “Slight to Moderate Limitation on Executive Authority” and (5) 
“Substantial Limitations on Executive Authority”. The former is for countries where 
there are some real but limited restraints on the executive: the legislature initiates some 
categories of legislation; the legislature blocks implementation of executive acts and 
decrees, and attempts to change some constitutional restrictions (such as prohibitions on 
extending his term). The latter is for countries where the executive has more effective 
authority than any accountability group, but it is subject to substantial constraints by 
them. Legislature or party council often modifies or defeats executive proposals for 
action. Legislature sometimes also refuses funds to the executive. The legislature makes 
important appointments to administrative posts, and the legislature refuses the executive 
permission to leave the country. Additionally, the scale has intermediate categories 
between values 1 and 3, 3 and 4, and 5 and 7.  
Even the definition of the Polity variable on executive constraints is problematic, 
and the coding of this variable has been more difficult than the coding of other polity 
variables. Executive constraint is the element that could help investigate whether the 
strong coercive instruments at the disposal of the states in East Asia are used at will 
without proper control and constraint. Yet, we should be cautious with regard to treating 
the scale. If we consider it, as has been the purpose in polity data, as an additive scale, 
and if we thus consider that the distance between the categories is the same, we could 
again study the averages of post-1979 and pre-1980 (1946–1979) periods. Again, we 
will see that the long peace of East Asia has not been caused by fear. 
 
Table 2.9: Constraints to the executive, East Asia and in the world 
Constraints to the executive in East Asia 
  pre-1980 3.08 
  post-1979 4.02 
      
Constraints to the executive in the world 
 pre-1980 3.58 
  post-1979 4.31 
  
While it seems clear that constraints to the executive authority are higher in post-
1979 East Asia than before, one could also see that they are nevertheless lower than the 
global levels. If we are more careful with the Polity data and do not necessarily accept 
the additive nature of the scale on executive constraints, we can still clearly see that East 
Asia has moved in the right direction. The most common category for countries for both 
periods was the category of “Slight to Moderate Limitation on Executive Authority” (3). 
However, for the pre-1980 period, 45% of the country-years (for example, Indonesia in 
1972) were in a worse situation than that, while in the post-1979 period only 17% of the 
country-years’ executives were less controlled than that. While in the pre-1980 period 
24% of country-years had better control of executives, while after 1979, 42% of 
country-years experienced a better situation. Thus regardless of how we interpret the 
result, we cannot assume that the relaxing of the control of the executive has brought 
about fear that prevented battle deaths after 1979. Constraints on the executive have 
clearly increased in time in East Asia.  
At the same time, the long peace of East Asia is still characterized by 
authoritarianism, since both the coercive instruments at the disposal of the executives 
are on average harsher in East Asia than globally, and because of the fact that the 
executive has on average always been less constrained in East Asia than in the rest of 
the world. Even if fear is not the explanation of low levels of violence, it is part of the 
political life in many parts of East Asia.  
While the availability of capital punishment was a threat to almost all East 
Asians (all but East Timorese, Cambodian and Philippine citizens), the low level of 
constraints of the executive also affects a greater number of people for a greater number 
of years than they affect country-years. If we again assume that the Polity data scale is 
additive, we can calculate the average level of constraint to the executive for each 
person. While the global average is closer to “Substantial Limitations on Executive 
Authority” than “Slight to Moderate Limitation on Executive Authority”, the average 
for East Asians is closer to “Slight to Moderate Limitation on Executive Authority” all 
through the period of the post-1979 era, with more than two thirds of the population still 
living under regimes that have only slight to moderate limitations to executive authority. 
Yet, the level of constraints on the authority of the executive for an average East Asian 
remained under the level of slight to moderate (3) all though the period before 1980, so 
regardless of how we measure it, there has been progress in this aspect.  
Negative Peace   
If the long peace of East Asia is simply established by referring to the low numbers of 
battle deaths and the relative absence of direct violence, its core is negatively defined as 
lack of something (fatalities). However, our common sense would suggest that we 
should define peace both in positive and in negative terms as Johan Galtung (1969) 
suggested. For Galtung, peace is not only the absence of war, but also positive 
cooperation towards the elimination of the threat of conflict, as well as towards the 
rectification of the structures of violence.  
Furthermore, common sense would suggest to us that the long peace of East 
Asia has little meaning if it occurs in a structure where no one directly kills anyone else, 
but where structures of distribution expose a part of the population to inhumane 
conditions that eventually kill them before it is their time to die. In the Galtungian 
tradition, structural violence is present when human beings are influenced by structures 
so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations. 
An extreme version of structural violence is such that kills people unnecessarily before 
their optimal life expectancy. According to Galtung and Høivik (1971) this extreme 
structural violence can be operationalized in a way that makes it comparable to direct 
violence, as both deprive people of years of life. The number of lives deprived indicates 
the gravity of violence – direct or indirect – and this can be measured by the same unit 
of measurement, i.e., numbers of years. While this definition is elegant in its ability to 
produce a common measurement for structural and direct violence, it has been criticized 
(Eide 1971: 71) for its inability to strictly define how to calculate the number of years 
lost through structural violence. More specifically, the problem is in the difficulty in 
defining fair conditions to which the structurally violent conditions can be compared to. 
Galtung and Høivik (1971: 73) talk about “avoidable deaths that occur because medical 
and sanitary resources are concentrated in the upper classes”, but how can one define 
avoidable deaths? Can we say that all inequality is structural violence if it prevents 
people from reaching their potentials, or is this definition inherently ideological? Only 
an extreme egalitarianist would say that the structure is violent if someone who does not 
want to work for more than 10 hours per week cannot go golfing as often as someone 
who works 60 hours per week. Most would even say that people who do not want to 
earn enough money to buy an expensive car with optimal safety features do not deserve 
one. Yet, according to Høivik and Galtung, a 40-year-old who has enjoyed life instead 
of earning money for a safe car is a victim of structural violence if he suffers an 
avoidable death in a road accident that could have been avoided with optimal safety 
equipment. According to Galtung and Høivik, in conditions where life expectancy is 80 
years, he would be subject to the same amount of violence as two 60-year-old people 
who get shot in war. Even if this proposition would not be supported by many, most 
people would probably say that a structure where only white people have access to 
public health services (even if all members of society pay taxes to maintain these 
services) is structurally violent. I have suggested elsewhere (Kivimäki 2001b) that 
exploitation and structural violence should be defined by equal opportunities to seek 
resources, instead of equal resource enjoyment. A loss of the years of life is avoidable.  
It is only caused by structural violence if it has been caused, not by one’s own actions or 
the resources one has achieved for oneself, but by the structural limitations to one’s 
actions to avoid loss of years of one’s life. However, with this definition, any easily 
measurable operationalization of how East Asian countries should be, so that we could 
call their existence peace, becomes impossible. Yet, even if the difficulty of 
operationalization could prevent us from measuring the lack of positive peace in East 
Asia, measurability should not guide our definitions and assessment of whether or not 
the notion of the long peace of East Asia makes sense.  
While inequality could be measured by many already-existing measurements 
and statistics, deaths caused by unequal opportunities cannot be measured by already 
existing measurements. Accusations of discrimination have been at the root of many of 
the conflicts in East Asia. In Burma/Myanmar especially, there have been accusations of 
Burman primacy over seven established ethnic minorities in the central areas, as well as 
the domination of main minorities over sub-ethnicities and non-native ethnicities in the 
ethnic states (Shan, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Mon, Chin and Rakhine). In Thailand 
Malay-Muslims in the three southernmost provinces (Pattani, Narathiwa, and Yala), 
have complained of lethal discrimination and lack of access to basic health and 
nutritional services.  Before the peace in 2005, Acehnese claimed (and Papuans still do 
for themselves) a right in the say of opportunities for ethnic Acehnese in comparison to 
the Javanese majority population of Indonesia. Indigenous groups (Malay and Dayak) 
also complained about impoverishment based on race, and the privileges taken by the 
migrant groups, most specifically the Madurese. In Maluku, many Muslims accused the 
local Christian administration of Maluku and parts of Sulawesi of discrimination against 
and disregard of the basic needs of the Muslims of the area.  In some areas claims were 
made in the opposite direction, too. Laos with the Hmong population, the Philippines 
with its Moro-Muslim population, and China with its Tibetan population face similar 
claims.  
In addition to racial and ethnic structures of violence, governance conflicts have 
often been caused by perceptions of extreme inequality between economic classes. 
Rebellious communist movements have still been active after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in many East Asian countries. While the formal Burmese Communist Party was 
defeated at the end of 1980s, many of the opposition movements continue to draw their 
legitimacy from the social and economic inequality of opportunities in the country. In 
the Philippines, the communist challenge to the government is still strong, and it 
continues to mobilize especially by using the grievances of the landless classes in order 
to gain support. Thus, in terms of structural violence, it is likely that East Asia has not 
reached a positive phase of peace. With the level of economic development of the 
Southeast Asian countries especially, this structural violence is also likely to affect life 
expectancy, and thus cause the loss of years of human life. Yet, one cannot formulate a 
hypothesis that could threaten the very legitimacy of the notion of East Asia peace by 
suggesting that structural violence has been the explanation for the decline in direct 
violence. The contrary seems to be the case: the existing discriminatory ethnic and class 
structures cause direct violence (as well as criminal violence), rather than channel direct 
violence to other forms.  
Galtung’s criteria for positive peace related to cooperation towards the removal 
of the sources of conflict and structural violence are also problematic for East Asia. East 
Asia would not have achieved its steep decline of battle deaths without effective 
cooperation regarding the transformation of structures that cause conflict. Community 
building, economic development and the creation of economic interdependence are all 
measures that have probably greatly advanced the prospects of peace in the area. 
However, what Galtung had in mind, too, was the explicit focusing on conflict 
resolution as a requirement for such cooperation. This aspect of positive peace is also 
very weak in East Asia.  
According to Uppsala University’s Conflict Termination Dataset (Kreutz 2011) 
only 5% of terminated conflicts ended in a peace agreement in post-1979 East Asia, 
while the percentage before 1979 was 15.
26
 This data gives us the first indicator of 
peace, which indicates a worse East Asian performance after 1979. This disappearance 
of peace agreements in East Asia is special and cannot be explained by referring to 
global trends. It seems that, globally, the share of peace agreements as a way to 
terminate conflicts has increased from 7 to 10% if one compares pre-1979 to post-1979 
averages. Clearly the hesitance to focus on politically divisive issues is common to post-
1979 East Asia.  
The prominence of non-political termination of conflict in ceasefire agreements 
is also common to the post-1979 East Asian pattern of conflict management. Ceasefires 
constituted only 2% of conflict termination cases in East Asia before 1979, while after 
1979, the share of ceasefire agreements with confidence building rose to 11%, and 
simple ceasefire agreements to 5%. There had been a global increase (again comparing 
the pre-1979 and post-1979 averages) in this category, too, from 10% to 15%, but 
nothing as spectacular as in East Asia (from 2% to 16%). The share of conflict 
terminated by no action at all also increased after 1979. Before 1979, 48% of conflicts 
terminated were already at that time terminated without any visible “peace action”. This 
share increased to 68% after 1979. While the trend could be explained by referring to a 
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similar global pattern, the fact remains that globally, this type of conflict termination 
only takes place in less than half (43%) of the conflict termination cases.  
Thus we can clearly say that the long peace of East Asia is mostly negative in 
nature. While East Asian economic development has not been detrimental for the poor, 
it has not entirely avoided ethnical or class-based inequality in opportunities available to 
East Asians. Furthermore, while East Asia has managed to transform its conflict 
structures, it has been inefficient in conflict resolution, and as a result, it still has 
disputes which in a matter of days could turn battle death statistics upside down. If East 
Asia has only produced just over 100,000 battle deaths since 1979, it could produce ten 
times that in only a matter of days if a nuclear war were to erupt on the Korean 
peninsula or between Taiwan and China. Thus peace in East Asia lives under a shadow 
of great risks of war.  
The Beginning of the Long Peace 
If the shift from belligerence to peacefulness in East Asia can be established on the 
basis of the existing PRIO, COW and Uppsala data, the next interesting question is, 
when did this change take place? For this we must look at the trends without looking 
into the details of each year. If we take a 5-year running average of annual conflict 
fatalities, we see that the change took place right after the ending of the Vietnam–US 
War and the following bilateral conflicts between Vietnam and China. If radical change 
is the criterion, it seems that the year 1979 would be the best candidate for the 
watershed between belligerent and peaceful East Asia.  
 
Graph 2.6: Trends of conflict fatalities (as 5-year running averages) 
 
 
However, if we assume an absolute criterion of peacefulness for the long peace 
of East Asia we might have other possible years for its beginning. Depending on “how 
much peace” we expect from the long peace of East Asia we can already see that the 
change from belligerent to pacific took place between 1979 and 1994. If we assume that 
East Asia cannot be defined as peaceful before there are (measured by a 5-year running 
annual average) less than 10,000 annual casualties, peace started somewhere between 
1981 and 1994.  
We might also define the watershed year in relative terms, comparing the new 
period with the old. If we say that, we can talk about East Asian relative peace only 
once a certain percentage of casualties has disappeared from the period’s annual average 
compared to the annual average of the post-war period before the beginning of the 
peaceful period. Graph 2.7 shows the development of this according to various 
estimates by PRIO.  
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If we expect 96% to have disappeared before we can call the period peaceful, the 
beginning of the long peace of East Asia can be placed somewhere between 1978 (low 
estimate of version 3.0) and 1987 (high estimate of version 2.0).  
Profile of Peace 
The thesis of the long peace of East Asia has been emphasizing the drastic decline in 
interstate warfare, rather than focusing on the declining number of fatalities in intra-
state wars. The differences between the estimates of different datasets on this are not big 
even though the estimates of interstate wars of East Asia trend to decrease slightly as 
newer estimates are created. However, since this is true both for the belligerent and 
peaceful periods, it seems that different estimates are almost perfectly similar regarding 
the drastic (99.8–99.9%) decline in interstate conflict.  
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Graph 2.7: Remaining percentage of average annual battle deaths after each year 
However, as the long peace of East Asia thesis claims, peacefulness is not 
restricted to inter-state conflict only. The COW, PRIO, and Uppsala data are in 
agreement that conflict between states and non-state actors outside state territory has 
disappeared from East Asia. These colonial wars seem to stay outside East Asia due to 
the strong states, even if the War on Terror tends to bring back fighting by Western 
coalitions against non-state terrorist actors outside Western states.  
The claim about the decline in intra-state conflict seems robust, even though 
estimates vary on how much this type of conflict has been reduced. While the best 
estimate of PRIO data’s version 2.0 claims that this decline has been about 93%, the 
newer version estimates decline at under 90%. All in all variation between all estimates 
of PRIO, Uppsala, and COW is between 81 and 97% for both intra-state conflict and for 
such intra-state conflict that eventually gets internationalized.   
The Uppsala and PRIO data distinguish between conflicts that have been fought 
about issues of territory and issues of governance. The newest data of both has a 
category for conflicts where both of these issues are central. This distinction is 
interesting as one could assume that the great change in 1979 that could have 
contributed to peace in East Asia is China’s turn from revolutionism to 
developmentalism, and its respect for non-interference and sovereignty. Perhaps this did 
indeed offer the long peace of East Asia a chance. However, it seems that the main 
reduction in conflict fatalities took place in territorial conflicts. China’s reduced interest 
in exporting its communist way of governance could have been expected to contribute 
to a decline in governance conflict rather than territorial skirmishes. What the new 
PRIO data does not reveal (and Uppsala data cannot touch due to limitations in the 
period of coverage) is that some of the allies of Burma’s Communist Party were ethnic 
militias (such as the country’s greatest ethnic militia, of the Wa-people) who used to 
receive Chinese aid for their territorial ambitions. The PRIO data does not classify their 
conflict with the Burmese government in the 1970s and 1980s as a governance conflict, 
even though Chinese support to them was arguably motivated by the Chinese promotion 
of communism. To classify the fight of communist ethnic militias of Burma/Myanmar 
as purely territorial could be a mistake in the coding practices of PRIO’s data project.  
The thesis of the long peace of East Asia has claimed that it is not based on a 
skillful conflict resolution that dissolves disputes before they escalate into conflicts or 
wars. Instead, it has been claimed that East Asia has become skillful at preventing the 
escalation of conflict rather than at preventing it altogether. Analysis based on MID data 
in Kivimäki (2002) revealed that East Asia and ASEAN have not managed to prevent 
non-violent disputes and disputes that do not lead to 25 casualties. Furthermore, 
analysis on the basis of the numbers of conflicts (Kivimäki 2008) reveals that the 
number of conflicts has not drastically declined while the amount conflict fatalities has 
dropped.  The newest PRIO and Uppsala data seem to strengthen this conclusion by 
offering a variable on the intensity of conflict with two categories: intensive (over 999 
casualties) and less intensive (with less than 1,000 but more than 25 casualties). While 
earlier versions have suggested that it is mostly intensive conflicts that have declined, 
the new data suggests that only the amount of intensive conflicts has declined, while the 
number of fatalities in less intensive conflicts has actually increased!! If measured by 
the new measure of best estimates of the PRIO data version 3.0, minor conflicts cause 
annually 6% more fatalities than they did during the belligerent period. Low and high 
estimates tend to support this assertion. At the same time, fatalities in major conflicts 
are down by over 99% regardless of the version of data one chooses.
27
 Thus, the long 
peace of East Asia is not about conflict resolution, and it is not about conflict avoidance 
or prevention either. It is first and foremost about the ability to prevent the escalation of 
conflicts into full-blown wars.  
According to COW and the earlier versions of PRIO data, the Philippines is the 
only country in East Asia where conflict fatalities have actually increased rather than 
decreased. While the estimates of the contribution of the Philippines to the total conflict 
fatalities in East Asia during the regions peaceful period have been downgraded from 46 
to 23% from PRIO datasets version 2.0 to 3.0, and further in the latest version of the 
COW data, all the data seem unanimous that the Philippines is so far the only country 
that has defied the long peace of East Asia. Thailand will join the Philippines, unless it 
finds away to manage separatist and authoritarian violence in its Southern-most 
provinces. The great variation with regards to estimates of the share of the Philippine 
fatalities of the total East Asian fatalities in the two versions of the PRIO dataset is not 
as much due to changes in the estimates of the Philippine conflict, as it is due to 
changes in the assessment of the amount of fatalities elsewhere. With the doubling of 
the best estimate of fatalities after 1979 in East Asia, a stable estimate on the Philippine 
violence shows as a halving of the Philippine share in fatalities. The even lower share of 
the Philippine fatalities in the COW data, again, is related to the fact that the Philippine 
violence tends to be constant, but not very intensive. Thus conflicts in the Philippines 
(mostly between the government and its Muslim and communist challengers) rarely 
exceed the 999-fatalities limit that COW’s coding practice considers as a threshold of a 
war.   
                                                          
27 According to COW data this drop is “just” 97%. 
According to 2.0 the Philippines is the great, only exception; according to 3.0 
the Philippines is less anomalous. According to COW, the share of the Philippines as a 
producer of battle deaths is vastly smaller. But the Philippines is still an exception, the 
only one.  
If we look at the new data on fatalities, we can also see that new estimates of 
violence before countries joined ASEAN have changed and limited the explanation of 
the contribution of the “ASEAN Way” to the long peace of East Asia. While in the 
earlier version of the PRIO data, it seemed that the Philippines was the only country 
where the average annual number of conflict fatalities increased after the country joined 
ASEAN, it now seems, on the basis of version 3.0 of the PRIO data and the new COW 
data, that Thailand has also had more annual violence after it joined ASEAN than 
before the establishment of the association.  
Conclusion 
Data on East Asian conflict-related fatalities, despite great variation, seems to tell a tale 
of an astonishing pacification of the region. If not used for a very detailed profiling of 
this peace, the accuracy of the existing Uppsala, PRIO and COW data is sufficient as 
the foundation of generalizations on tendencies and associations between the conditions 
for and the changes in this peace. East Asian turn to a more peaceful coexistence has 
been convincingly shown.  
The investigation of the profile and depth of peace showed that the long peace of 
East Asia is a relative phenomenon with some exceptions. There are still conflicts and 
violence in the region, and the risk of war has not ended either. It seems that 
Burma/Myanmar is not fully a part of the East Asian relative peace phenomenon 
because it does not share the same level of peace as the rest of the region while the 
Philippines is totally and Thailand partly outside the phenomenon.  
Furthermore, the long peace of East Asia has a slightly Orwellian nature. There 
is not much authoritarian violence in it, but the threat of violent authoritarian measures 
nevertheless plays an important role in disciplining East Asians. Despite the reduction 
in the availability of capital punishment by East Asian governments, and despite the 
better surveillance of the users of authoritarian means, East Asia is still more 
authoritarian than the rest of the world. 
Finally, one has to notice that the long peace of East Asia as a notion is 
legitimate only in a negative sense of peace. Yet since East Asian Relative Peace is real, 
the next step in the investigation of this phenomenon is to try to find explanations for it. 
Such a drastic turn for the better deserves an explanation even if the phenomenon is not 
coupled with positive peace. 
Another reason why the long peace of East Asia requires investigation is that its 
explanation is not obvious and clear. East Asia has become peaceful even if it does not 
seem to be based on a solid, strong power balance (Leifer 1989), strong security 
institutions (Rüland 2000), even if it cannot resolve its conflicts (Svensson 2011) and 
terminate some of the major security threats (such as the risk of a nuclear war on 
Taiwan or on Korea), or even if its integration has failed to pool sovereignty to regional 
bodies (Hund 2002; Narine 2002) and even if there are still many protests (Svensson 
and Lindgren 2011) and disputes and smaller conflicts in the region (Kivimäki 2008). 
The new threats of terrorism do not seem very serious as their contribution to battle 
deaths is still relatively minimal (Kivimäki 2003), but even there, East Asia does not 
seem to have found the silver bullet. Yet scholars who conclude (Michael Vatikiotis 
2006) that conflicts and conflict casualties have increased with democratization, the 
decline in US involvement, and the rise of terrorism in East Asia are clearly wrong in 
their conclusions. With democratization many conflicts have become more visible, 
while the threat that terrorism poses to wealthy consumers of the global media has 
highlighted this type of violence. Yet, terrorism and the recent conflicts that have been 
fuelled by spontaneous civil-society groups have resulted in a marginal number of 
fatalities and thus compare poorly with conflicts of the 1960s or the 1970s. East Asia 
has, undoubtedly, become more peaceful, not more belligerent.  
The curve of East Asian battle deaths already reveals that the long peace of East 
Asia does not simplistically follow the global trends of power. East Asian battle deaths 
ended before the ending of the Cold War, while the beginning of it did not have a 
systematic effect on battle deaths. Thus the study of the long peace of East Asia will 
require a more sophisticated approach than the one that simplistically derives regional 
developments from global power political changes.  
A closer look at individual nations suggests that most US allies do not benefit 
from US strength, at least in terms of security. On the contrary, as will be shown in 
Chapter 5, US power correlates positively with battle deaths, especially in US-allied 
countries in East Asia. Thus the most simplistic interpretation of the theory of 
hegemonic stability that suggests that hegemonic leadership predicts peace in the 
countries subordinate to the hegemon has very little currency in East Asia. It could, 
however, be true that the US promotion of a developmental attitude has contributed to 
the peace among development-oriented East Asian states. It could also be suggested that 
change from a negative to a positive (or an accommodating) attitude towards the US 
contributed to stability in East Asia. This change seemed to contribute to the Japanese 
peace in 1945, to the ASEAN/Indonesian peace since 1967, to the Chinese peace after 
the transition from 1972 to 1979, and to the Indo-Chinese peace a decade later.   
The classical explanation of democratic peace seems also to be dubious in the 
East Asian context. Goldsmith (2007) has shown that economic rather than political 
structures and institutions seem to explain peace in Asia. The long peace of East Asia 
follows development and interdependence, while democracy seems to have a more 
complex relationship with peace as I have shown elsewhere (Kivimäki 2012d). 
Democracy has some correlative associations to peace, but the interference of external 
powers to domestic governance issues before 1979 tended to dominate the relationship 
between democracy and conflict. After 1979 East Asian regimes sought legitimacy by 
offering economic development and prosperity to their people. Democracy became less 
relevant for the legitimacy of governance and the lack thereof lost its legitimizing effect 
with regard to international intervention. In the post-1979 peace regime states respected 
each others’ sovereignty regardless of their political system. This way also wars of 
liberation of various sorts ended. Thus, at least on its own, the theory of democratic 
peace does not seem to lead the research on the long peace of East Asia far.  
A liberal model of peace could have more explanatory power since after 1979 
governments of East Asia have emphasized the need to develop and trade with each 
other. Goldsmith (2007) also suggests that there is a significant relationship between 
economic interdependence and peace. However, Southeast Asian peace started while the 
level of development was very low and continued to be low, and during the first decade 
of this peace interdependence continued to decline. Before the ASEAN, the very nations 
that were at war, Malaysia (including Singapore) and Indonesia, were the most 
interdependent of East Asian nations. Thus the long peace of East Asia in Southeast 
Asia at least was not mechanistically produced by liberal interdependence or 
development (Kivimäki 2001).   
As an exception, the long peace of East Asia could offer some interesting new 
cases for the development of ceteris paribus conditions for global theories on peace. 
Regional contexts, especially those have been studied less than the various Western 
contexts, could be meaningful in the explanation of peace.  Furthermore, it could be that 
the  unexpected and less recognized periods of peace of East Asia could underline the 
importance of social constructs different from the more thoroughly studied Western 
constructs, to the determinants of peace and war. The long peace of East Asia could 
prove a case that could enrich peace research by offering examples alternative to the 
ones that have been used for the development of more general theories of peace.  
Making better sense to the exceptional peace of East Asia will be the mission of 
the following chapters. At the end of the book I shall take a look at how the exceptions 
can enrich the general theories of regional peace. I shall start the explanation by 
showing how the ASEAN formula of peace seems to be associated with the success of 
East Asia.  
  
Chapter 3 
The Main Argument: The Contribution of the ASEAN Way to the Long Peace of East 
Asia
28
 
 
Introduction 
As we have now seen that the long peace of East Asia is real, our attention will turn to 
the questions of how East Asia become became so peaceful, and why this change take 
took place. Before going into details of the relationship between different conditions, 
structures, discourses, etc., it makes sense to start with a fact that the long peace of East 
Asia begun inside ASEAN in 1967. While ASEAN was initially unable to create peace 
in all of Southeast Asia, let alone East Asia, it seems that its members have experienced 
less war after joining the association. The main question of this chapter is therefore: is 
the long peace of East Asia a creation of an approach, a discourse, norms or something 
else that was generated in the emergence and development of ASEAN? 
 
In this chapter, “ASEAN peace” refers to the absence of conflicts (inter- and 
intra-state) within the area that at each point in time belonged to ASEAN. Originally, 
this meant just a part of Southeast Asia – Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines 
                                                          
28  This chapter is based on my article (Kivimäki 2011, Oxford University Press license Nr. 3124110689921). 
However, in the present chapter reference is no longer made to PRIO’s battle death data version 2.0 but instead to 
version 3.0. Data on conflict termination has also been updated. The analysis is now based on the newest version of 
the Uppsala conflict termination data. For comments to an earlier version of the manuscript, presented at the ISA 
conference in 2008 in San Francisco, I am grateful for Amitav Acharya, Robert Ross, Mathilda Lindgren and Isak 
Svensson.   
and Singapore – while eventually, it came to encompass all of Southeast Asia:Vietnam 
from 1995, Laos and Myanmar from 1997 and Cambodia from 1999. By Southeast 
Asia, I then mean the ten countries that are currently members of ASEAN.  
By tracing the origins of a regional phenomenon to its local roots we may 
attempt to understand the prevailing cause-and-effect factors. Is it possible that the long 
peace of East Asia began in ASEAN and spread, like a benign disease, to the rest of 
East Asia? It seems from the symptoms (the end of interstate war, decline in intra-state 
conflict, greater decline in conflict casualties than in militarized disputes, inability to 
resolve conflicts) that the ASEAN ‘disease’ could provide a diagnosis for the 
peacefulness of East Asia since 1979.  
This chapter argues that the two processes of pacification (in ASEAN and in 
East Asia) are interlinked, and that the ASEAN approach to security that has spread to 
all of East Asia is associated with greater peace on the entire subcontinent. A full 
explanation of this requires both a disclosure of the correlative relationship between the 
ASEAN approach in East Asia and its pacific outcome, and an explanation of the 
mechanism by which the ASEAN way produces a certain profile of pacification, both in 
East Asia and in ASEAN.
29
This chapter aims first at revealing the correlative 
relationship between plausible causes and effects and the following chapters 4-6 will 
then take the elements revealed in this, into a closer analysis. Finally, Chapter 7 will 
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 Philosophers have different ideas about the primacy of these two elements. The fact that this chapter focuses on 
the correlative aspect does not mean that I support the line, which says that an explanation requires first and 
foremost the revealing of the correlative regularity between elements of social systems.   
explain the cultural/historical context in which the successful ASEAN Way culture was 
generated, not only in Southeast Asia, but also in China.  
Thus the starting point in this chapter is to prove that East Asia has adopted an 
approach or a culture that I call “the ASEAN Way”, and that after the adoption also its 
security developments have been similar to those within ASEAN. This is necessary 
because complex processes are tackled in so many studies by using qualitative methods 
without first investigating how common and representative these processes are.  
Thus, this chapter lays the foundation for an investigation in the following 
chapters that will also conduct historical analysis and process tracing to reveal the 
mechanism by which the ASEAN Way produces peace in East Asia.  
The ASEAN Way is treated in this book as a discourse or a culture, an approach 
consisting of several norms as well as interpretations of identities and realities. I do not 
claim that ASEAN as an organization or an actor is the cause of East Asian pacification, 
but simply that an approach/culture/discourse that we call the ASEAN Way was 
common to both ASEAN and post-1979 East Asia and was correlated with success in 
the prevention of conflict. One could say that the approach, or elements of it – such as 
the focus on development rather than revolution – caused the establishment of ASEAN, 
not the other way around. What seems even more plausible is that ASEAN as an entity 
and an identity has been interlinked to the successful, peaceful ASEAN approach in a 
mutually strengthening association, one in which both constitute each other. As 
explained in Chapter 1, the fact that I try to use quantitative methods does not mean that 
I would subscribe to the world-view of most quantitative analysis. It is important to 
know at this stage if the ASEAN Way approach actually is the same approach that was 
utilized in East Asia after 1979 and if that approach was then associated with the similar 
record of success. This can only be proven by looking at measurements that grasp the 
entire area for a number of decades. Clearly numerical description is needed for that. 
Yet, this does not lead us to assume that the correlative associations found have to be a 
result of causal mechanisms between mutually exogenous factors. On the contrary, the 
ASEAN Way is already a way to peace, and peace clearly strengthens it. It would not be 
wise at this stage to rule out the possibility of the ASEAN Way not being a traditional 
external condition that has caused peace in East Asia, but that peace and the approach 
have a more mutual, complex and constitutive relationship.   
The argument about the role of the ASEAN approach in the pacification of East 
Asia is based on an examination of the patterns of the conflict frequency, the number of 
battle deaths and conflict termination,
30
 which, as explained in Chapter 1, are all based 
on the PRIO/Uppsala conflict data. Instead of engaging various modes of conflict as in 
the previous chapter, I shall from now on mainly look at standard conflicts and use the 
version 3.0 data on battle deaths for the measurement of conflict propensity. Both the 
approaches and the outcomes will be contrasted with those approaches and outcomes 1) 
before ASEAN members joined ASEAN; 2) in East Asia before 1979; and 3) 
approaches outside East Asia. This is to rule out the possibility that Asian approaches 
were there already at the time of war and instability, as well as the possibility that 
ASEAN and East Asian pacifications are just global trends that cannot be explained 
from the point of view of East Asia’s own approaches.  
                                                          
30 UCDP Conflict Termination dataset v.2.1, 1946 – 2007, at 
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/data_and_publications/datasets.htm. See Kreutz 2010.   
I shall first define what we mean by the ASEAN Way, and then operationalize it 
(by defining it into measurable components). Then I shall look at the statistics of 
conflict and conflict termination in East Asia and ASEAN and see whether the pattern 
defined by ASEAN documents, declarations and praxis as the ASEAN Way can be 
found in East Asia, and whether this way is somehow unique to the area. Then I shall 
compare the outcomes of this approach in East Asia and ASEAN, and also to other 
areas where the ASEAN Way was not adopted. 
 
 
 
The ASEAN Way 
The ASEAN Way is not totally unique in all of its elements. But despite standard 
references to common diplomatic principles, the core elements are different from 
security orientations of other areas. The final chapter of this book will deal with the 
difference between the East Asian/ASEAN approach and the Western principles. 
However, there is an ongoing debate on whether the East Asian approach actually 
mainly reflects Chinese strategic tradition (Kang 2007) or regional culture (Shambaugh 
2004/2005) instead of the ASEAN Way. In this chapter I shall organize the orientation 
that we call the ASEAN Way and its reflections on the profile of security into 
measurable proxy components. This way the claim of an association between the 
ASEAN Way and positive security developments can be made verifiable. Later I into 
measurable components show that it is exactly the principles generally known as the 
ASEAN Way that have spread to East Asia.  
According to the ASEAN declaration of 1967, its two main goals are economic 
development (growth, cultural development and social progress) and regional peace and 
stability. While this sounded very trivial, the developmentalist undertone of the 
declaration clearly contradicted the earlier revolutionary approach of some of the 
countries in the region, most distinctively Indonesia. It also contradicted the approaches 
of those Southeast Asian countries that did not join ASEAN, as well as the approaches 
of many other developing countries in the revolutionary 1960s. ASEAN practice has 
verified that these two objectives, economic development and regional stability, were 
the main goals of the organization. The latter objective was previously interpreted in an 
elitist manner almost identical with the stability of the regimes themselves, while after 
the democratization of much of Southeast Asia, peace and stability have attained new 
meanings, some of them now approaching the concept of human security.
31
 
The principles of the ASEAN Declaration were further elaborated upon by the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) of 1976. The emphasis on non-interference 
was clear, as the three first principles out of the six somehow related to the principle. 
According to the TAC, ASEAN principles are the following:  
 mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial 
integrity and national identity of all nations;  
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ASEAN elitism during its first decades is best revealed by statements of the New ASEAN leaders who want to 
contrast the old elitist ASEAN with the New ASEAN. For example, Indonesia’s president Susilo Bambang Yudhyonon 
has gone public in saying that “[w]e have to listen to them [people] and that is actually the spirit of the ASEAN 
charter, where ASEAN should show that it is no longer elitist but cares for not only matters of government but also 
civil matters in all ASEAN nations”, cited in Abdussalam (2009).  
 the right of every state to lead its national existence free from external 
interference, subversion or coercion;  
 non-interference in each other’s internal affairs;  
 settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means;  
 renunciation of the threat or use of force; and effective cooperation 
among the regimes. 
Instead of intervening in problems and supporting conflicting parties against 
each other, the ASEAN approach has been to allow the states to deal with their 
problems, even if this is done by means of violent repression. According to Singapore’s 
former Foreign Minister S.  Jayakumar (1997), “ASEAN countries’ consistent 
adherence to this principle of non-interference is the key reason why no military conflict 
has broken out between any two ASEAN countries since the founding of ASEAN… Let 
us maintain it in the twenty-first century.” 
There is qualitative research available on the impact of the principle of non-
interference on the level of political action, and even if the desirability of this principle 
and the recent interpretations of it are under debate, scholars are relatively unanimous 
that during the first decades of ASEAN, the principle has managed to translate into 
reality.
32
 ASEAN is still unanimous about the minimum conditions of non-interference: 
ASEAN countries should not use troops to support rebels or other countries that are in 
conflict with the government of another ASEAN state. Before the ASEAN declaration 
                                                          
32 For a view that the principle will survive political practice, see, for example, Ramcharan (2000). For the view that 
it is about to, and should, change, see Kao Kim Hourn (2000). Both scholars accept the fact that non-interference has 
been an important principle that has also in reality guided the work of ASEAN countries. 
such support was common, as exemplified by the Malaysian confrontation and several 
colonial and post-colonial struggles.  
If one looks at conflict statistics, it is clear that the tendency to hesitate in taking 
a stance in favor of rebels in another country’s internal conflict has been translated into 
actual reality: there has not been a single case of one ASEAN country using troops to 
support an organization fighting the government of another ASEAN country. Out of 139 
conflict dyads (years of conflict between two conflicting parties) between ASEAN 
countries and their domestic challengers, there has not been a single dyad where another 
ASEAN country has supported the rebel side with troops. While there are no reliable 
statistics on economic support to rebels, it seems that aside from Malaysia’s safe haven 
for Pattani and Aceh rebels, and probable Indonesian safe havens for Pattani, Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front and Abu Sayaaf Group soldiers, there have been no clear cases 
of either voluntary economic or political support for rebels fighting an ASEAN 
government. It seems that, in addition to not supporting rebels in other ASEAN 
countries, ASEAN countries have not in general been eager to support rebels in 
countries outside of ASEAN. The original members have not, for example, participated 
in Burma/Myanmar’s conflicts with its ethnic and political opposition. This explains 
why Burma/Myanmar has been able to focus on its domestic enemy without the fear of 
external involvement. Before joining ASEAN, current ASEAN countries had supported 
insurgents in 29 Southeast Asian conflict dyads. The support by US allies of 
counterrevolutionaries in Indochina is a prominent example registered also by the 
Uppsala data, but the Indonesian military action against Malaysia soon after the Azhari 
revolt of December 1962 should also be seen as an example of support of the insurgents 
of fellow Southeast Asian regimes.  
In promoting peace and stability, the strategy of ASEAN has not been to address 
problems head-on. To use Deutsch’s (Deutsch et al. 1955) terms, ASEAN has an 
element of a “no-war community”, which, rather than resolving conflicts, just avoids 
them. The long Jakarta Process related to the management of disputed territories in the 
South China Sea exemplifies this very well, as this process contributed to the avoidance 
of war but did not even try to resolve the sovereignty disputes. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that ASEAN would not aim at the permanent end of war from the 
Southeast Asian side (as the original concept of a “no-war community” assumes), but 
instead, cooperation for long-term peace has focused on building the constructs that 
unite the nations, so that interests for peace would permanently become stronger than 
interests of war. Amitav Acharya (2000: 18) tried to prove the utility of ASEAN as an 
emerging security community, not simply as a myopic “no-war community”. However, 
I would maintain that Acharya’s argument did not consider all options. Even though a 
“simple, no-war community” might not seemdurable, a community that does not resolve 
disputes can also transform conflict structures and thereby permanently remove the risk 
of wars. This is the type of security community that I see in ASEAN. The fact that 
ASEAN does not resolve conflicts while still addressing long-term needs of conflict 
transformation was acknowledged even by Michael Leifer (1996), who did not 
otherwise see a lot of value in ASEAN. Thus, instead of conflict resolution, the focus of 
this approach has been to “try to build up something that unites us, and cope [note: not 
resolve, but cope] with all the problems that separate us.”33According to Narine (2002: 
31) and Askander, Bercovitch and Oishi (2002), conflicts are dealt with by postponing 
difficult issues (such as territorial disputes) and compartmentalizing issues so that they 
                                                          
33 President Fidel Ramos, quoted in Djiwandono (1994: 49).  
do not hamper diplomacy and trade. Furthermore, the ASEAN Way aims at 
downplaying -– by means of disallowing public debate – the divisive issues for the sake 
of harmony. This approach of not getting involved in difficult issues resonates with the 
approach of not getting involved in other countries’ wars.  
Again, the approach of not focusing on disputes and problems, but instead just 
working for common interests is clearly reflected in the ASEAN peace-making record. 
The number of cases in which conflict has been terminated is low – only 18 – because 
of the difficulty in tackling these conflicts. Less than 13% of the conflicts in ASEAN 
have been terminated, while the global figure is almost double that (21%). However, the 
special character of the ASEAN Way and the effort to shy away from divisive political 
disputes shows in the rarity of peace agreements (Svensson 2011). Only once or has a 
conflict been ended by a peace agreement (Aceh Memorandum of Understanding in 
2005), while globally, 14% of terminated conflicts end in a peace agreement. The share 
of peace agreements dropped from 14% (seven successful peace agreements) to 6% 
with Southeast Asian countries joining ASEAN. The numerable efforts to resolve the 
Malaysian Confrontation by inviting external help and explicitly focusing on the 
disputes in the talks of Manila (July–August 1963), Bangkok (February 1964) and 
Tokyo (June 1964) clearly demonstrate that the Southeast Asian tendency of not 
focusing on divisive issues did not exist before the emergence of ASEAN. In the 
ASEAN Way, conflicts are terminated without settling the divisive political disputes. 
Here the dominant manner of terminating conflicts clearly does not involve any focus 
on the conflict as such (not even a ceasefire), but simply allows the conflict to fizzle 
away by means of inaction. Over three quarters of terminated ASEAN conflicts end this 
way, thus testifying to the effectiveness of tackling conflicts indirectly by not directly 
touching upon any of the conflict-causing issues. Indonesia’s conflict episodes with 
separatist Acehnese and Papuans before the Henry Dunant Centre and Helsinki Process 
in Aceh were all terminated this way, as were many of those conflicts in Myanmar 
involving ethnic minorities (many of these episodes with Karen groups) which did not 
end in ceasefires. Less than half (22 out of 49) of Southeast Asia’s conflicts were 
terminated in this way before nations joined ASEAN, but within ASEAN, this form of 
conflict termination became prominent. 
Instead of focusing on head-on disputes, ASEAN countries have focused on 
building conditions of order and peace. The common ASEAN commitment to economic 
development, ‘ASEAN developmentalism’, is often mentioned as the main tool in 
constructing a harmonious ASEAN community of nations. This was not the case before 
ASEAN. According to President Sukarno, for example, ‘Indonesian people can take 
everything for the sake of revolution’.34 After the establishment of ASEAN, Indonesia’s 
new president, General Suharto, silenced any voices advocating policies that did not 
serve economic development. This economic emphasis quickly became the founding 
principle of the new ASEAN cooperation.
35
 Developmentalism has three kinds of 
plausible conflict effects:  
1. Conflict fatalities might have declined because economic roots of intra-state 
conflicts were now dealt with by means of development.  
2. Inter-state conflict declined as states no longer needed to seek legitimacy 
from expansionist and adventurist revolution. 
                                                          
34 Sukarno’s Independence Speech in 1963, cited in Djiwandono 1996: 49. 
35 For the view that developmentalism still is important in ASEAN and in East Asia, see Beeson 2008. For an 
opposing view, see Dittmer 2007: 829–833. 
3. Focus on development might have created a sense of positive 
interdependence that positively affected the relations between states and 
peoples.
36
 
 
These plausible mechanisms in which developmentalism generates peaceful policies 
will be discussed right after this chapter.  
Consensual decision-making involving maximum efforts to save face for 
everybody involved characterizes the diplomatic approach of ASEAN. This can be done 
in a) lengthy negotiations and b) quiet, c) non-legalistic, d) personal e) confidence-
building aimed at f) gradual down-playing and prevention (or sometimes resolution) of 
disputes g) by means that can be accepted unanimously, h) by using the principle of the 
lowest common denominator.
37
 The idea of seeking consensus, no matter how watered-
down and no matter how much time and personal persuasion it takes, overrules any 
attempt at majority decision-making.  
All this is reflected in conflict statistics in the disappearance of conflict 
terminations by victory. Since the ASEAN Way is about avoiding loss of face, it rules 
out the forcing of one’s opponents to capitulate, and this is also what the statistics show. 
                                                          
36  As will be shown in Chapter 4, developmentalism did not necessarily mean objective development or 
interdependence. It seems that at least the Philippines and Myanmar have not developed as fast as the rest of the 
world during their membership in ASEAN, while new members of Indochina developed faster before than after 
joining ASEAN.  
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 On a), see Snitwongse 1998: 184; Kurus 1995: 406; Busse 1999: 46–7; on b), see Busse 1999; Soesastro 1995_ iii–
ix; on c), see Soesastro 1995; on d) and e), see Simon 1998: 2–3; Amer 1998: 39; Soesastro 1995; Caballero-Anthony 
1998: 58; on f) and g), Snitwongse 1998: 185; Caballero-Anthony 1998, 60; Busse 1999; and on h), see Snitwongse 
1998: 184; Kurus 1995. 
Not a single victory has been recorded in ASEAN countries, compared to the situation 
before joining ASEAN, when 11 out of 49 terminated conflicts, or 22%, ended in that 
way.
38
 To some extent, the decline of conflict termination by victory conforms to the 
global pattern, but at the same time, the global decline is less drastic and, as a matter of 
fact, during the past three decades the global share of conflicts ended by victories has 
been 22%.   
In summary, the ASEAN Way of managing conflicts can be presented in the 
following manner:  
1. Conflicts are managed by honoring the sovereignty and non-interference of 
other ASEAN countries. While Jones (2012) has shown that this principle has 
not been consistent on all levels of interference, it has been consistent on the 
highest levels of interference: intervention with military forces. ASEAN 
countries have not supported rebels in conflict with military force.
39
 This is 
unique compared to the situation in the pre-ASEAN Southeast Asia and in 
other parts of the world, too.  
                                                          
38 Indonesia defeated the anti-communist Darul Islam revolt (1959–62) and the separatist campaign of the “Republic 
of Southern Maluku”, while Malaya managed to defeat its communist challengers (until 1960) and the Azhari Revolt 
(1962). Myanmar defeated the Mon resistance, and made a ceasefire with the New Mon State Party just before 
joining ASEAN, and the Vietnam–US War ended in the defeat of South Vietnam in 1975.  
39 Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand contributed troops to the International Force for East Timor, which came to 
pacify the pro-Indonesian militias that refused to accept the result of the East Timor referendum for independence. 
Despite the tense situation, and despite the linkages between the militia and the Indonesian military, the INTERFET 
was not a force that challenged the Indonesian rule, as Indonesia had on its own promised to respect the result of the 
referendum that eventually lead to the independence of East Timor. Uppsala/PRIO conflict datasets do not classify 
this conflict as direct military interference. 
2. The formula for ASEAN peace has been based on a strategy that does not 
focus on conflict issues. This has been reflected in low levels of conflict 
termination and a high share of conflicts being terminated by no visible 
action, and a low share of conflicts terminated by peace agreements. This, 
too, is unique when compared to pre-ASEAN Southeast Asia and to other 
parts of the world. 
3. Downplaying conflict the ASEAN Way is a developmentalist approach. This 
element of the ASEAN Way is reflected in public discourses emphasizing 
development. The subjective valuation of economic growth differs from pre-
ASEAN Southeast Asia, as well as from other parts of the developing world 
of the 1960s.  
4. Finally, the ASEAN diplomatic style avoids situations where one of the 
conflicting parties could lose face, and thus it is reflected in a conflict 
termination record with a low frequency of defeat to one of the parties.  
 
East Asia and the ASEAN Way 
The four characteristics of the ASEAN Way were also adopted by East Asian states 
around 1979. The first of the four characteristics of the ASEAN Way was the adoption 
of the Westphalian idea of the recognition of state sovereignty and the principle of non-
interference and non-support for forces fighting governments of other East Asian 
nations. This change as a rhetorical principle began in East Asia at the end of the 1970s 
and translated into a course of action in which especially China stopped its subversive 
support to regional communist insurgencies gradually, and the US and its allies stopped 
their direct military support against counterrevolutionary groups. All of the East Asian 
nations interpreted the agent structure of East Asian security as one dominated by states 
in a same manner despite power political rivalries, conflicts of interest and ideological 
differences in domestic approaches.  
In East Asia literature, the prominence of the principle of military non-
interference in East Asian diplomacy is not disputed. The debate is more one of whether 
these principles will or should dominate inter-state relations in the future. Amitav 
Acharya’s theories on the emerging East Asian security community do not seem to 
suggest that this cluster of principles will be seriously threatened,
40
 while according to 
some, non-interference will not play a central role in future East Asian diplomacy.
41
 
Yet, regardless of different interpretations of the role of the non-interference principle, 
no one seems to be claiming that the principle of avoiding support with troops to rebels 
that are fighting against another East Asian government (minimal non-interference) has 
been compromised.  
If one looks at the change from the viewpoint of conflict statistics, it is seen that 
before 1979, East Asian States were engaged in 35 conflict dyads after the Second 
World War in which they supported – with military troops – the enemy (domestic or 
international) of another East Asian state. China’s support of various communist groups 
and allied Western support against communist-nationalists, especially in the context of 
Indochina wars and the Korean War, were the dominant forms of external interference 
in internal conflicts. However, after 1979 this stopped, and there was no longer a single 
dyad in which one East Asian State lent military support to an enemy of another East 
Asian state. This cannot be explained as a global trend, since in the rest of the world, 
                                                          
40 See for example, Acharya 2004b. 
41Chalermpalanupap 2009. The author was special assistant to the Secretary-General of ASEAN 
there have been 27 conflict dyads involving external support for groups fighting a 
government, constituting a decline (from pre-1980 to post-1979 periods) of only 35%. 
The total support of military non-interference promoted by the ASEAN Way seems to 
characterize post-1979 East Asia, too.  
However, until the end of the 1980s, China did sponsor some communist parties 
in East Asian countries economically and politically, while the pro-US members of the 
ASEAN gave some support to Khmer rouge in the 1980s to oppose the power of 
Vietnam (and Soviet Union) in the region. Yet this support never meant direct support 
by troops as the Uppsala and PRIO conflict data corroborates. There are no reliable 
statisticson lower levels of support of insurgents, except for the fact that the Chinese 
support of the Burmese Communist Party contributed to a great deal of conflict in 
Burma until 1987. However, after that China ceased this support, and by the end of the 
1980s, neither China nor any other East Asian state supported any group fighting 
another East Asian state. Thus, from this perspective, the approach of East Asia was 
very similar to that adopted in Southeast Asia on the establishment of ASEAN.  
The principle of non-interference indicated by the statistics of non-support for 
enemies of neighboring countries also had some declaratory expressions. As in 
Southeast Asia earlier, the principles of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation also 
became central to East Asian diplomacy, and therefore the formal adoption of the 
document as the foundation of ASEAN-led cooperation was not difficult. The close 
similarity between the East and Southeast Asian approaches was also emphasized by the 
ease with which the ASEAN-based institutions – ASEAN Dialogue mechanisms, 
ASEAN Plus Three, East Asian Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum, The Council for 
Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, etc. – were adopted in East Asian diplomacy. 
While efficient in the prevention of violent conflict, this common approach and 
orientation was not particularly suited for the prevention of authoritarian violence in 
Southeast Asia or in East Asia, as the experiences of Tiananmen Square in 1989, 
transitional violence in Indonesia in 1965–67 and the last years of Ferdinand Marcos in 
the Philippines from 1981–86 testify. Yet also authoritarian violence declined as was 
statistically shown in the previous chapter. Thus, ASEAN and East Asian profiles of 
pacification were, in this respect, very similar. East Asia was not very efficient in 
resolving conflicts either, as can be seen in the continuing high number of militarized 
disputes (see Chapter 6 of this book). The record of East Asian conflict termination after 
1979, therefore, is also quite similar to that in ASEAN.  
The patterns of conflict management in East Asia have also changed along lines 
similar to those in ASEAN. Disputes and divisive issues are not tackled directly. As in 
the case of ASEAN, slightly more conflicts are being terminated in post-1979 than in 
pre-1979 East Asia. In addition the new approach to conflict termination is very similar 
both in ASEAN and in East Asia. What is surprising is that in neither of these areas was 
conflict terminated by resolving the dispute behind the violence. Only 3% (one case: 
Aceh peace agreement)
42
 of terminated conflicts have ended in a peace agreement in 
                                                          
42While the termination of conflict in East Timor in 1998 was previously classified in the category “other types of 
termination”, the newest Uppsala data suggests that also this conflict was terminated in a peace process. Even though 
East Timor is not part of the ASEAN it is part of East Asia and thus the ruling is relevant. An important role in the 
termination of this conflict was played by the international intervention, but yet, the process did not involve a 
humiliating victory over Indonesia, because it did involve some peace negotiation (under some kind of military 
pressure). If the case can be ruled as a peace negotiation process, the share of peace negotiations in the newest 
version of termination data rises to 5%. This weakens the conclusion on the disappearance of peace negotiation, but 
does not seriously challenge it. 
post-1979 East Asia, while the percentage before 1979 was 16 (7 cases out of 48 
terminated conflicts).
43
 The “disappearance of peace agreements” in East Asia and in 
ASEAN is special and cannot be explained away by referring to global trends. It seems 
that, globally, the share of peace agreements as a method of terminating conflicts has 
increased from 7 to 10% if one compares pre-1979 averages to post-1979 averages. 
Clearly, reluctance to focus on politically divisive issues is common to both ASEAN 
and post-1979 East Asia. This also testifies to the fact that East Asia has followed the 
ASEAN Way in its transformation. The tackling of difficult political issues has become 
less important for conflict termination in East Asia as well, just as had happened 
previously within ASEAN.  
The developmentalist path of ASEAN was eventually adopted by the entire East 
Asia about a decade later. The transformation of China into a developmentalist state 
after more than a decade of a power battle between developmentalist and revolutionist 
forces happened at the time when Japan and Korea were developing their doctrines of 
comprehensive security in the latter half of the 1970s. Economic grievances were 
explicitly tackled, while revolutionary discourses blaming others for the lack of 
economic performance (diversionary discourses) became unpopular. Development 
became the prime declared objective and rationale for states, and the rationales of 
nationalism and revolution were put in the back seat.
44
 Subjective focus on development 
                                                          
43 All of them were in Southeast Asia. However after 1979 peace agreements cannot be found in those countries that 
were not yet ASEAN members, while before 1979 there were plenty of peace agreements in those countries.   
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For this development, see, for example, Lo 2001. For analysis that associates developmentalism with East Asia in a 
more global investigation, see Robinson and White, eds., 1998. For analysis that argues for the link between East 
Asian development and success in conflict prevention, see Goldsmith 2007: 5–27. 
also translated into impressive objective economic progress with the exception of North 
Korea, Burma/Myanmar and the Philippines (arguably the three most violent East Asian 
countries).  
Finally, it seems that the priority of saving face has also been adopted from the 
ASEAN Way by East Asian governments. The effort to defeat ones enemies no longer 
belongs to the code of conduct. Instead, efforts are made to at least try to conceal 
victory by offering ceasefire agreements to the losing side. While the share of victories 
out of all conflict terminations in East Asia declined from twelve (out of 48) to three 
(out of 37 terminated conflicts) after 1979, the pattern was the same, but less drastic 
than in ASEAN, where victories disappeared entirely. Although this corresponds to the 
global patternto some extent, it is clear that both East Asia and ASEAN declines were 
more drastic, and in the end the share of victories declined to a much lower level than 
the global one. While the global share of victories declined to one half compared to the 
share before 1980, it remained at 22% in the post-1979 situation, whereas in ASEAN 
victories had disappeared totally and their share in East Asia was less than 9% (the 
share has declined to one third of what it was before 1980).  
Consequences of the ASEAN Way in ASEAN and in East Asia 
The claim that the ASEAN Way may be the reason behind East Asian pacification 
seems to be supported by a comparison of East Asian approaches to security after 1979 
and the ASEAN Way. However, the argument also requires that the consequences of 
this approach are similar. Both areas have to be successful, and the profile of their 
successes has to be similar: they have to be successful in similar issues and perhaps less 
successful in other similar issues.  
The first issue when looking at the outcomes of East Asian and ASEAN security 
approaches is that the similar approaches used by the original ASEAN members since 
1967, the late-comers since 1995, 1997 and 1999 and East Asia since 1979 have 
managed to reduce battle deaths and conflicts causing casualties in both places. In both 
cases, success has been measured by the ability to avoid conflict escalation, and, to a 
lesser extent, by the ability to prevent disputes from turning violent. The success of the 
ASEAN Way has definitely not been a question of the ability to avoid or resolve 
disputes. As I have shown elsewhere (Kivimäki 2008) by using the statistics of the 
number of conflicts and militarized interstate disputes, the number of militarized 
disputes was not reduced substantially despite the reduced number of battle deaths and 
conflicts.  
In terms of the type of violence, it seems that the ASEAN Way has especially 
managed to prevent inter-state conflicts. In the case of ASEAN, there has been no 
interstate conflict involving more than 25 casualties per year between two ASEAN 
members, despite the fact that some ASEAN members have been traditional enemies 
since before joining the organization.
45
 This is the case also in East Asia: inter-state war 
has almost disappeared after 1979, and especially after 1987.  
The success of ASEAN peace can be seen in the difference between conflicts 
(Table 3.1.) and battle deaths (Table 3.2.) before and after joining the organization. We 
can see in Table 3.2. that the number of battle deaths has not decreased systematically 
on joining ASEAN, as both Thailand and the Philippines have had more battle deaths 
                                                          
45 There is some disagreement about this with regard to the recent clashes between Thailand and Cambodia. However 
the generally conservative and restrictive (only direct battle deaths) estimates of the PRIO and Uppsala statistics, this 
dispute did not escalate into conflict levels (at least 25  fatalities in a single year).  
per year after joining ASEAN. For Thailand, this is explained by the continuation of the 
Vietnam-US War and the instability, which spilled from it over to the Thai side. The 
decline in conflict fatalities in Thailand was delayed because of that. However, all in all, 
the average annual number of casualties that ASEAN nations have experienced 
compared to what they had earlier is just 8.3% as Table 3.2 shows. 
46
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 It is clear that the Vietnam–US War had a great influence on the difference between ASEAN and pre-ASEAN 
violence. Yet, even if we subtract the effect, not only of the great Vietnam–US War from 1965 until the mid-1970s, 
but of all Vietnamese wars (and there have not been wars in Vietnam after the country joined ASEAN), the 
difference would still be great. Without all Vietnamese conflicts, the number of ASEAN battle deaths has still been 
reduced to just 35% compared to the time before the countries joined ASEAN. 
Table 3.1: Number of conflict dyads before and after joining ASEAN 
 
Number 
of 
conflicts 
 
Annual 
average 
  
 
Before 
joining 
As 
ASEAN 
member  
Before 
joining 
As 
ASEAN 
member  
Decline 
% 
Brunei 1 0 0.04 0.00 100 
Burma/Myanmar 223 20 4.29 1.82 92 
Cambodia 44 0 0.81 0.00 100 
Indonesia 17 32 0.77 0.78 -1 
Laos 27 0 0.52 0.00 100 
Malaysia 21 3 0.95 0.07 92 
Philippines 9 75 0.41 1.83 -347 
Thailand 3 20 0.14 0.49 -258 
Vietnams 42 0 0.84 0.00 100 
TOTAL ASEAN 
  
8.77 4,99 43 
 
   
    
Table 3.2: Number of battle deaths before and after joining ASEAN 
 
Number 
of 
fatalities 
 
Annual 
average 
  
 
Before 
joining 
As 
ASEAN 
member  
Before 
joining 
As 
ASEAN 
member  
Decline 
% 
Brunei 45 0 2 0 100 
Burma/Myanmar 223,209 3,889 4,292 354 92 
   
Cambodia 372,577 0 6,900 0 100 
Indonesia 55,918 90,472 2,542 2,207 13 
Laos 30,408 0 585 0 100 
Malaysia 12,956 356 589 9 99 
Philippines 9,695 78,244 441 1,908 -333 
Thailand 617 7,947 28 194 -591 
Vietnams 2,029,549 0 40,591 0 100 
TOTAL ASEAN 
  
55,969 4,671 92 
 
 
The decrease in the number of battle deaths between ASEAN countries cannot be seen 
as a global or a regional trend, but must be seen as something specific to ASEAN 
countries. In fact, as Graph 4.1 demonstrates, ASEAN is an exception even in its own 
area, where the number of battle deaths was on the rise at the same time that ASEAN 
countries experienced increasing peace. Global (excluding East Asia and ASEAN) 
numbers of annual battle deaths increased substantially after the establishment of 
ASEAN as well as after 1979, and did not start to decline before 1992.  
 
Graph 3.1. Battle deaths in Southeast Asia 
 
  
The emergence of the ASEAN Way is also associated with a reduction in the number of 
conflict dyads that claim lives (Table 3.1). Again, the pattern is not without exceptions: 
Thailand and the Philippines had more conflict years after joining ASEAN than before 
while there is no clear change in Indonesia. Yet concerning the average annual number 
of conflicts involving ASEAN all countries dropped from 9 to 5, 43% of the earlier 
figure. This is convincing, but not as convincing as the decline in the number of battle 
deaths.  
However, it seems that the most drastic ASEAN contribution in Southeast Asia 
is to interstate relations. ASEAN members have not yet fought a single war, despite the 
fact that they were often in conflict before their memberships.  
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Graph 1: Southeast Asian Battle DeathsGraph 3.1. Southeast Asian Battle Deaths 
Table 3.3: Inter-state conflict and the ASEAN Way 
 
The pattern has been the same in all of East Asia. The fact that the number of battle 
deaths fell more drastically than conflicts can be seen by comparing Graph 3.1 on page 
00 with Graph 3.3.  
  
 All conflict 
dyads 
Conflicts with future 
ASEAN member  
Conflicts with 
ASEAN member 
Brunei 4 4 0 
Burma/Myanmar 236 0 0 
Cambodia 44 18 0 
Indonesia 44 4 0 
Laos 27 8 0 
Malaysia 24 4 0 
Philippines 94 11 0 
Singapore 4 4 0 
Thailand 37 21 0 
Vietnam 54 22 0 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To make the presentation comparable with that of ASEAN peace, we can also calculate 
the average numbers of battle deaths for the period from the Second World War to 1979 
and compare it with the average number of battle deaths from 1980 to 2005.  
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show that the number of battle deaths dropped rather 
drastically in all but two East Asian countries, the Philippines and Thailand.
47
 The 
average decrease was even more drastic than that among ASEAN countries. The 
                                                          
47If we calculate the average number of annual battle deaths per population, we will realize that both the Philippines 
and Thailand have become more peaceful, as the battle deaths per population have gone down by 37% and 27% 
respectively. The average annual number of battle deaths for the entire East Asia has declined by 97% rather than 
95% if the increase of region’s population is controlled for. 
Graph 3.2. Number of conflict dyads in East Asia 
average annual number of battle deaths in East Asia after 1979 fell by 95% compared to 
that before 1979 (while the drop in ASEAN countries after membership was “just” 
92%). At the same time, the average national number of conflicts after 1979 was 72% of 
the levels up until 1979. Thus, common to ASEAN and East Asia was the decrease in 
the number of conflicts and the even more drastic decrease in the number of battle 
deaths. 
Table 3.4: Number of conflicts in East Asia before and after 1979 
 
Number 
of 
conflicts 
 
Annual 
average 
  
 
Before 
1980 
After 
1979 
Before 
1980 
After 
1979 
Decline 
% 
Brunei 1 0 0.05 0.00 100 
Burma/Myanmar 151 93 4.44 3.21 28 
Cambodia 25 19 0.74 0.66 11 
China 18 7 0.53 0.24 54 
Indonesia 27 22 0.79 0.76 4 
Laos 22 5 0.88 0.17 80 
Malaysia 23 1 0.68 0.03 95 
Koreas 5 0 0.15 0.00 100 
Philippines 30 54 0.88 1.86 -111 
Thailand 11 12 0.32 0.41 -28 
Vietnams 35 7 1.03 0.24 77 
TOTAL 348 220 10.49 7.59 28 
 
Table 3.5: Number of fatalities in East Asian conflicts before and after 1979 
 
Number 
of 
fatalities 
 
Annual 
average 
  
 
Before 
1980 
After 
1979 
Before 
1980 
After 
1979 
Decline 
% 
Brunei 45 0 2 0 100 
Burma/Myanmar 179,748 47,350 5,287 1,633 69 
Cambodia 320,062 52,515 9,414 1,811 81 
China 1,265,703 1,827 37,227 63 100 
Indonesia 93,079 53,311 2,738 1,838 33 
Laos 30,108 300 1,204 10 99 
Malaysia 13,212 100 389 3 99 
Koreas 995,384 0 29,276 0 100 
Philippines 45,867 42,072 1,349 1,451 -8 
Thailand 4,465 4,099 131 141 -8 
Vietnams 2,027,722 1,827 59,639 63 100 
TOTAL 4,975,395 203,400 146,655 7,014 95 
 
 
While ASEAN’s most spectacular achievement was that of ending conflicts between 
member states, the trend was the same in East Asia. There has been only one inter-state 
war since 1979 in East Asia (China–Vietnam 1987), with something between 300 and 
4000 battle deaths, while before 1979, China alone was involved in 13 interstate war 
dyads with Vietnam, Taiwan, the Soviet Union, and India with a total of almost 140,000 
battle deaths, and the Koreas fought five war dyads with almost 1.3 million casualties.   
The explanation in East Asia is neither a global trend nor a pacification of a 
greater region. While the number of East Asian battle deaths dropped by 95%, the 
global average excluding the East Asian figures increased 2.8 times. The number of 
East Asian battle deaths as a percentage of the global number clearly shows that East 
Asia is outstanding in its pacification.
48
As was seen in table 3.5 East Asian share of 
global conflict fatalities has dropped from 76% to 6%. 
Conclusions 
It seems that the recipes for peace in East Asia after 1979 are similar to those of 
ASEAN after 1967, and that their relationship to conflicts has also been very similar. 
The ASEAN Way is, indeed, practiced in post-1979 East Asia, and the developments in 
the realm of security after the adoption of this approach are the same. Thus it seems 
plausible that the origin of the long peace of East Asia could be found in the collectively 
shared approaches and orientations known as the ASEAN Way. There is a need to look 
at the various components of the “ASEAN Way” to see whether and how they 
contribute to the pacification of domestic governance and foreign relations before one 
can be sure that similar approaches and similar outcomes are not a result of intervening 
phenomena. However, the correlative relationship is there and the ASEAN Way is 
associated with success, also in the rest of East Asia.  
                                                          
48 The reason for presenting East Asian change as a graph and ASEAN change as a table is because different nations 
joined ASEAN at different times.  
Since different elements of the ASEAN Way approach affect different phases of 
conflict differently, I shall structure my closer look at these elements chronologically. I 
shall study conflict onset, and the focus on things that unite, especially, 
developmentalism, as an approach to conflict prevention in Chapter 4. From conflict 
onset I shall, in Chapter 5, move to approaches to escalation once conflict has already 
started. The focus will be on the approach to how external powers are being allowed to 
be involved in the conflict. Chapter 6 will then take a look the termination of conflicts 
focusing on the question of face-saving and avoidance of victories in conflicts after 
1979 on the one hand, and on the other, on the problem of the failure of conflict 
resolution in East Asia. After the closer look at the elements of the successful strategy 
of pacification of East Asia and the mechanisms that these elements used in the 
generation of the long peace, Chapter 7 will then look at the historical context in which 
this pacification was made possible, and in which the successful culture of conflict 
prevention was generated.  
  
Chapter 4 
Developmentalism and the Prevention of the Onset of Conflicts 
Introduction  
This chapter will look at the contribution of the approach that does not focus on 
disputes, but on development and its contribution to peace in East Asia. More 
accurately, at this stage I shall look at an identity of the state that has made the onset of 
conflicts less likely. Even though it was concluded in Chapter 2 that the main challenge 
that was solved after 1979 was the escalation of conflicts into wars, it is important also 
to examine how East Asia has managed to reduce the likelihood of the emergence of 
destructive conflicts and wars. Yet, since the prevention of escalation has been the main 
reason for success in East Asia since 1979, we must remember that the developmentalist 
identity and role of states as a way to tackle conflict onset, is of secondary importance, 
while the norm of non-interference, discussed in Chapter 5 is the primary reason for the 
long peace of East Asia. 
As suggested in Chapter 3, the main ASEAN Way of avoiding the onset of the 
war is by focusing on things that unite, economic development being the core of 
concern. The East Asian strategy of avoiding the onset of conflict has been based on 
defining economic development (rather than revolution, expansion, national pride etc.) 
as the main task regimes and as the main identity of states. This strategy based on 
development-identity of states I will call “developmentalism”.  
While non-interference (Chapter 5) is clearly a regional orientation (individual 
countries cannot prevent intervention if others do not subscribe to the norm of non-
interference), developmentalism is possible locally. Indonesia, for example has been 
focused on development already since 1967, while Burma/Myanmar was not much 
interested in anything but national security and regime survival until only recently. Thus 
the impact of developmentalism can be identified by means of inter-state comparisons 
and the number of battle deaths in one country during its developmentalist and non-
developmentalist phases.  
It was claimed in Chapter 3 that developmentalism and dispute aversion were 
something that ASEAN adopted upon its establishment, while the rest of East Asia 
followed the suit more than a decade later. However, if the contribution of the focus on 
things that unite, especially development, is analyzed in detail, it will be possible to 
make more detailed conclusions on the level of commitment to uniting development at 
different times in different countries. I shall in the beginning look at how the big wars 
were related to developmentalism and harmony thinking, and how these orientations 
were related to the onset of peaceful periods. I shall also look at how developmentalism 
relates to intra-  and inter-state conflicts. Before all of this, though, I shall briefly look at 
existing the literature on the association between developmentalism and peace and then 
review how developmentalism has developed in East Asia over the years in different 
countries. I shall develop a simple additive scale of the commitment of regimes and 
constituencies to development as a unifying focus of East Asian states and then use that 
scale for the comparisons.  
Since I am not studying the region in its entirety, but instead comparing nations 
in it for their peacefulness and for their commitment to development, it makes sense to 
take battle deaths per population as the main indicator of peacefulness (instead of 
looking at battle deaths without adjusting them into the population of the state). 
Comparing Singapore’s peacefulness with China’s peacefulness would not make sense 
without controlling the influence of population size in the analysis. Thus instead of 
average and actual annual numbers of conflict related fatalities, I shall adjust the 
number of battle deaths to population by dividing each year’s actual number by the 
population divided by million. Thus the conflict indicator shows how many fatalities 
there are for each million people.  
 The relationship between an approach of states towards others or towards their 
citizens, to focus on things that unite rather than divide, and the peacefulness of these 
states, is not entirely exogenous. One could, for example, say that fighting wars 
obviously focuses on divisive things. Yet it is not empirically trivial to say that peace 
strategy can be focused on problem-solving, which again focuses on divisive issues, or 
on harmony, which focuses on things that unite. Here, too, as will be in the case with 
interference and conflict escalation (Chapter 5) and in the analysis of East Asian face 
saving in conflict termination (Chapter 6), I need to look at an association that despite 
its partial endogenousness is empirically interesting.  
Previous Work 
In the theory of negotiation and dispute resolution, an approach that neglects the 
divisive issue of dispute has been almost unanimously disapproved until the 1990s and 
the emergence of the idea of conflict transformation. While the traditional security 
studies were focused on strategies to contain enemy aggression by means of power and 
deterrence, peace research has taken a more conciliatory approach by focusing on 
efforts to resolve disputes that lie behind the aggressive behavior of conflicting parties. 
The crucial role of dispute resolution and the focusing on the divisive issue of disputes 
in peace research can be seen in the fact that one of the two main peace research 
journals reveals in its name, Journal of Conflict Resolution, the centrality of the 
research on resolution for the discipline. To counter the harmony approach of not 
focusing on divisive issues such as disputes, Louis Kriesberger (1998) distinguished 
between constructive conflict (argument that raises the divisive problem issues) from 
the violent and destructive one. In the similar vein William Ury (2008) introduced the 
concept “positive no”, an approach, where yielding to unacceptable terms of interaction 
is negative, while confronting ones collaborator and not accepting terms that constrain 
the relationship is more positive to the relationship. While there are no empirical studies 
verifying that such an approach would be useful in intra-state or inter-states relations, 
the idea of favoring active problem-focus in conflict prevention is widely accepted. The 
experience of East Asia seems to raise a doubt to this: perhaps excessive focusing on 
problems and disputes can sometimes construct a reality where interaction is dominated 
by divisive rather than uniting issues.  
Only in the literature of the 1990s on the so-called conflict transformation (see 
for example Väyrynen 1991) is it recognized that a single-minded focus on disputes 
might not be an optimal strategy for conflict prevention. In some cases structures can be 
transformed into more peaceful ones even without having to resolve any disputes. One 
of the structural avenues of peaceful change is the development of positive economic 
interdependence, the so-called liberal or capitalist peace. Regardless of the severity of 
disputes, positive interdependence can make them look smaller in comparison with the 
common interests of development. Kristian Gleditsch has found that whenever countries 
lack a motive for territorial expansion and they have a continued interest in serving and 
protecting a given population, then conflict is rare among developed countries 
especially if they are geographically clustered (Gleditsch 2003). The level of 
development has also been found to be a qualifying variable for peace between 
democracies. According to Hegre (2000) and Mousseau (2000) democracies do not fight 
each other only if they are developed. Gartske confirms this by discovering that the 
level of development (as measured by GNP per capita) is not significantly associated 
with inter-state peacefulness. Thus development has been found relevant for peace, but 
only as one of the components. Its impact is dependent on the existence of other 
conditions. Another strand of research emphasizes the type of economic development 
and says that contract-intensive development typical of “advanced capitalism” appears 
to cause peace (Mousseau 2009). Mousseau’s analysis also moves towards a more 
constructivist direction by explaining the relationship between contract-intensive 
capitalism and peace by referring to the peace-inducing norms that advanced capitalism 
socializes to states and citizens. Development no longer causes peace as an objective 
condition, but instead, the relationship is more complex, and some would say less 
exogenous. Even if the claim is not as tautological as “civilized, contract-oriented 
peaceful capitalist countries are peaceful”, the relationship is more along the lines of 
generative causality than strict Humean, objective causality.  
While the theory of capitalist peace usually refers to inter-state peace, development 
is also associated to intra-state peace. Here the association is less qualified: 
development is good for peace in general. According to Collier and Hoeffler (2002), for 
example, the level of development substantially raises the threshold of violence and 
contributes to the removal of frustration motives for violence.  
One of the most powerful regional arguments in favor of the positive impact of 
development on peace in Asia has been presented by Benjamin E. Goldsmith (2007), 
who showed the clear association between capitalist (trade) interdependence-based 
development between the Asian states and their likelihood of peacefulness in intra-
Asian inter-state relations. According to Goldsmith Asian capitalist peace has regional 
differences. Asian conflict trends tend to be less associated to democracy than the global 
patterns while they also seem to be more associated with international capitalism. 
Goldsmith’s focus was on objective structures of economic interdependence in Asia, 
rather than some socially constructed or development-specific realities.  
A more constructivist version of Goldsmith’s, and Collier and Hoeffler’s objectivist 
analyses has been presented by Amitav Acharya, who claims that East Asian and 
ASEAN peace is institutional, normative and identitive, and that material development 
follows the social constructions rather than the other way around (Acharya 2001). This 
is the argument of the present book, too: the ASEAN Way approach leads to peace and 
material changes that then also consolidate peace. Ba (2009) has emphasized the role of 
socialization in East Asian conflict prevention, while Acharya (2001) and Jetly (2003) 
underline the importance of endogenous norms and their effect in reducing violence. 
Developmentalism as subjective valuation of economic development has been 
suggested as the reason for the long peace of ASEAN (Kivimäki 2001). Instead of 
assuming like objectivists, that material wealth reduces objective grievances and thus 
affects motives of violence, the process to peace for constructivists is more direct. Once 
states are  identified as instruments for development, and once development becomes 
the main objective of rulers and citizens destructive wars, intra- and inter-state, become 
unattractive, regardless of whether the states are successful in promoting prosperity. 
This logic applies both to intra- and inter-state wars: if the people and leaders appreciate 
development they will try to avoid both internal and interstate wars. Thus the 
constructivist explanation of capitalist peace is applicable for the explanation of the long 
peace of East Asia, which is mostly related to the ending of wars between East Asian 
countries, but also to the decline in the number of battle deaths in intra-state conflicts. 
Furthermore, if states and citizens prioritize development, they have to cooperate and 
develop contacts with one another. East Asian identity and the density and quality of 
interaction between East Asian countries (Tan and Cossa 2001; Acharya 2001) have 
been emphasized in the constructivist explanations of capitalist peace in East Asia.  
It can be argued that constructed relationships between developmentalist 
preferences, identities and policies can be tested by measurable proxies. Even if the 
measurement of associations between two phenomena cannot prove exogenous, 
objective relationships (since the relationship between common liberal interdependence 
and peace can be a result of our belief that other capitalist countries are our friends), one 
can still falsify, or at least cast doubt on claims on the existence of exogenous cause–
effect relationships by referring to correlative relationships that are inconsistent with the 
picture of objectivist explanations of liberal/capitalist peace in East Asia. The use of 
observable proxies is the strategy of this chapter even if the argument will be that in 
liberal/capitalist peace of East Asia I am talking about a partly endogenous relationship 
between developmentalism and peace where the “independent variable” is not 
conceptually entirely independent of the dependent variable. In my investigation of the 
contribution of developmentalism in the long peace of East Asia, I shall also show how 
development, rather than commitment to development, seems like a less credible 
explanation for the long peace of East Asia.   
Developmentalism  
Objective level of development refers to a condition where the incomes are high and 
poverty is low. Development, in turn, means that there is progress towards a higher level 
of development. The fundamental difference between objective development and 
developmentalism is the fact that the latter exists only in the minds of people while the 
former can be measured in studies as an objective outcome of policies. If people ceased 
to value development, developmentalism would disappear, but development and the 
level of development, as growth and per capita income would persist. 
On the one hand, developmentalism is an attitude (by the regime) that sees the 
promotion of liberal economic development and poverty reduction as one of the main 
tasks of the state, while on the other, it is an orientation (of the people) where the 
legitimacy of the state is seen crucially dependent on the performance of the national 
economy. Developmentalism is an orientation and a discourse rather than a result of a 
policy and thus it cannot be measured by observing the outcomes of actual economic 
policies of the state (even though it is highly likely that without developmentalism it is 
difficult to produce economic growth). Economic policies reflect developmentalist 
orientation regardless of whether this developmentalism leads to actual developmental 
outcomes or not.  
Despite the fact that developmentalism cannot be measured by looking at the end 
result, development, developmentalism is goal oriented. It has to look at the experience 
and learn from it in order to maximize economic growth. Developmentalism is not an 
ideological attitude where rhetoric of development never meets the empirical test of 
material reality. Development portrays sometimes frequently in states official rhetoric, 
but only as an ideological concept. Mao’s great leap forward was launched as a 
development-oriented effort, even though the ultimate objective of it (even in the 
rhetoric) was not growth but ideologically oriented transformation from agricultural 
economy to communism (Perkins 1991). However, what it lacked for that period to 
qualify as a developmentalist period was an effort to look at observed results rather than 
deriving beliefs about development and what brings about it from the doctrine. To some 
degree developmentalism, therefore, also means some kind of rationality with regards to 
an attitude that is open towards evidence on success and failure (as opposed to the 
attitude of Pol Pot or the Gang of Four who derived their experience of the economy 
from the doctrine).
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Analysis in this section takes its departure from the literature on developmentalism 
(Beeson 2009; Doner et. al. 2005). However, there are two important exceptions. The 
existing literature does not differentiate between objective development achievements 
and subjective orientation towards development. Unlike in the literature on 
developmental state, in our definition, developmentalist state need not assume a central 
role in development, just as long it prioritizes development. 
Developmentalism can be either equitable (aiming at poverty reduction) or non-
equitable (aiming at general growth), but it cannot focus of development of the regime 
only. Cleptocratic orientation of the regime is not developmentalist even if it does aim 
at economic benefits of the regime itself. Yet, developmentalism does not necessarily 
mean an administration free from corruption. In some cases, developmentalism has been 
interpreted as originating in the business interests of the military, or the political elite, 
but if the partisan economic interests of the elite are compatible with the economic 
                                                          
49 More on this discussion in Chapter 7.  
interests of the people or the national economy in general, obsession to develop, with a 
hidden corrupt agenda, should still be seen as developmentalism.  
Developmentalism should be seen as an approach where security-related priorities 
do not have such primacy that they would consider economic priorities secondary. 
Security paranoia that makes countries willing to limit the flow of resources important 
for development substantially (as in Burma/Myanmar) or paranoia that values security 
much higher than beneficial trade relations (as in Sukarno’s anti-imperialist Indonesia 
of the 1960s) compromises the primacy of development.  
With regards to domestic conflicts, developmentalism as a policy that recognizes 
the legitimacy of the economic grievances of rebel constituencies differs from security-
obsessed policies that emphasize a military option for conflict areas. This way 
developmentalism is a softer option than militarism or legalism, and it is easy to see that 
it is not conceptually entirely separate from security, even though the successfulness of 
the hard military approach and the softer developmentalist approach are empirical 
questions.  
With regards to foreign relations, developmentalism as a policy tries to avoid the 
damage to the economy from the deterioration of external relations. In this respect 
developmentalism as an approach is by definition also at least to some extent peaceful 
in intent. The relationship between developmentalism and peace is thus, especially in 
relation to inter-state warfare, endogenous. Furthermore, it is clear that 
developmentalism and peace are not associated just in a one-directional: 
developmentalist identity of the state does promote peace, but successful peaceful 
development also constitutes developmentalist state-identity.  
For the quantitative analysis I will measure regimes and constituencies with a 
simple additive scale in accordance to the following criteria. 
1. Regimes and constituencies with no commitment to development: Paranoid 
security concerns, ultra-nationalism, communism or democracy define the 
purpose of the state, leaving little or no room for utility maximizing economic 
policies. Such eras are characterized by policies that treat economic policies as 
an instrument of revolution, expression of national identity, or something else 
than economic development. The category of zero-commitment to 
developmentalism is wide, ranging from regimes that are still too occupied with 
national-building and national-revolutionary politics, or nations whose regime 
stability is so low that the leaders are unable to focus on any economic policies 
to regimes who systematically sabotage the nations’ economy. The extreme 
cases of Pol Pot and the last years of Sukarno, or some of the worst years of the 
Burmese Junta could deserve a category of their own: -1=negative commitment 
to development. However, since the statistics of conflict fatalities during those 
regimes are unreliable, mostly due to the lack of good data on authoritarian one-
sided violence (conflict against unarmed people) before 1989, the additional 
category would not manage to bring much new information. This is why the 
category 0 (=zero commitment to development) will be left wide.  
2. Regimes and constituencies with intermediate commitment to development: A 
regime which is not alien to developmental priorities but is mostly preoccupied 
with something else could be classified as one with weak commitment to 
development. In the case of weakly committed regimes government texts 
mention development, but they often also mention political, religious or other 
rationales that compromise developmental rationality. These overriding 
orientations could be revolutionary hesitance of accepting foreign involvement 
in a country’s economy, policies to promote one ethnic group in economic 
competition at the expense of developmentally rational competition, or strict 
rejection of trade with a politically compromising, yet economically vital trading 
partner. In this category of states the regime or the citizens do not consider the 
promotion of development as an important function of the state. Nationalist or 
revolutionary credentials, populist, developmentally hostile merits are more 
important in political competitions. Among the regimes with intermediate 
commitment to development, some have a stronger commitment than others. In 
these cases the regimes are mostly concerned by development priorities but do 
not define the mission of the state, and thus other priorities keep competing with 
development priorities in the official discourse, although developmental 
priorities are not in obvious contradiction of these priorities. Developmentalist 
credentials (commitment and full understanding of the functioning of the 
economy) offer political capital in political competition, but these merits are not 
in a dominant position. Due to the fact that it is simply impossible to establish 
objective criteria for the classification of intermediate commitment into weak 
and strong the two potential categories have been collapsed into just one 
category, intermediate commitment. This despite the fact that weak measuring 
will reduce the appearance of strength of the association between 
developmentalism and conflict in statistical analysis.  
3. Developmentalist state: The most developmentalistic category of 
regimes/constituencies is one where political, ideological, religious and security 
commitments are not in contradiction with the primacy of economic 
development. The government and the citizens see development as the main task 
of the state. Economic performance is the ultimate criterion for the success of a 
regime.  
This classification is very rough and thus coding of nations into these categories 
does not need stricter quantitative coding criteria. Qualitative criteria presented above 
suffice. Evidence of commitment to development is very different in different countries 
and setting quantitative coding criteria that define where evidence has to be found for 
each nation could reduce subjectivity in coding, while at the same time it would also 
reduce common sense accuracy of coding decisions. In this sense coding in this chapter 
takes a relatively similar approach to the one taken for Polity data, which, as this 
coding, sets criteria for each category, but does not set quantitative coding criteria. 
Instead of assuming that it would be possible to analyze the discourses of different 
cultures by studying comparable documents by the state, I will opt for a meta-analysis 
strategy. I will code country years to the three categories by using the assessments of 
political discourses of each country in the central research literature. To reduce 
subjectivity we have presented the final coding results in two workshops and five East 
Asia specialists have carefully gone through them. Only rather few changes have been 
suggested to the coding rulings. The presentation of coding in this chapter makes the 
coding rulings very transparent to the readers who can then judge whether coding 
decisions have been accurate enough to warrant conclusions of this chapter.   
The Classification of East Asian Regimes and the Degree of Commitment to 
Development 
Regimes with Lacking Commitment to Development (1) 
The various regimes of Burma/Myanmar have until recently not been much focused on 
development and their approach to stability has definitely never been emphasizing 
development as a remedy for conflicts. During the unitary democracy of the 1950s, 
political consideration was on political and ethnic issues, the political culture pushed 
rebels to demand self-determination rather than development, and the government made 
occasional compromises towards the rebels by promising measures of improving the 
self-expression of the rebel constituencies. According to Robert H. Taylor (2005: 12) 
economic development did not portray in the priorities of the state and on the level of 
citizens, economic survival strategies were sought together with fellow members of the 
race, rather that with the entire state. Thus instead of seeing the promotion of prosperity 
as the main function of the state, black market emerged as the backbone of the 
economy, including the funding of opposition movements.  
Despite the differences in approach between the civilian, semi-democratic rule 
of the 1950s, and the military controlled rule and counter-insurgency approach after 
that, development never played a significant role in the government rhetoric of 
Burma/Myanmar until the late 1990s, while government approach were characterized 
by a negative commitment to development. Economy was to serve nationalist and 
security purposes in a system that emphasized the Burmanization of the economy 
regardless of what this did to economic growth (Cribb 2006: 736-7). The total 
subordination of the economic needs to political priorities could be seen in much of the 
military regimes policies, but it was best exemplified by the junta’s decision in the 
1960s to declare the banknotes worth more than a certain amount invalid 
(Demonetization Law May 17, 1964). This measure was taken to combat economic 
crime, but it hit criminals and businessmen alike. Burmese military regimes destroyed 
actively the economies of potential rebel constituencies and this policy also affected the 
national development. The doctrine of “four cuts”, introduced in the 1970s, is a good 
example of this approach: according to this rebel constituencies were cut from supplies, 
information, recruits and food, in order to weaken their military strength (Smith 1999). 
This is why I classify Burma/Myanmar until 1997 a country with a lacking 
commitment.  
Not until the late 1990s, during the rise of General Khin Nyunt, did the rhetoric of 
development enter the regime’s thinking, despite the fact that military priorities still 
overruled many of the crucial economic rationales. In 1997 the regime, which was until 
then called the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), reflecting the 
paranoid security rationales, was renamed the State Peace and Development Council 
(SPDC). This, together with the acceptance to join the ASEAN, reveals a modest 
change in the identity and discourse of the state, even if part of this apparent change was 
needed merely for external branding of the regime (Taylor 2006: 15). The change does 
not constitute a fundamental transformation in the framing of the regime’s attitude 
towards development and counter-insurgency, but it does reveal the acceptance of the 
regime that it has to offer some economic benefits to its people. After 1997 the 
government started seriously working with some infrastructure projects, while at the 
same time focusing on falsifying the government’s economic statistics to show better 
results. The role of development (no longer just bribing of the ethnic leaders) in 
ceasefire agreements also suggest that development has become a more prominent 
source of government’s legitimacy in the 1990s.  
The domination of the competition between communism and anti-communism in 
the Korean Peninsula probably justifies the classification of both Koreas into the zero-
development-commitment category in the 1940s and the 1950s. North Korea’s 
continuing commitment to the Songun principle of military primacy suggests that the 
military discourse still guides the country and that the military continues as the 
‘supreme repository of power.’ Blending military primacy with a revolutionary identity 
demonstrated the weakness of economic priorities in the official discourse (Haggard and 
Noland 2007). The secondary role of economic development in the official discourse is 
expressed also in Juche ideology that adapts power-political maxim also to economic 
policy: political ideas of self-sufficiency rule even when they go against efficiency and 
international comparative advantage in economic policies (Cumings 2005). The 
peripheral priority of economic development and growth can be seen in the fact that an 
authoritative document on the Juche idea (Kim Jong Il 1982/1998) uses the concept 
‘development’ 36 times, and only five times to refer to economic aspects of 
development, while only using the word ‘growth’ three times, not a single time referring 
to economic growth. The declared insensitivity of the North Korean government on 
development and economic side payments in nuclear negotiation completes the picture 
and rules the country to the same category of zero-commitment until today. As a nation 
that has been peaceful since 1953 and yet totally insensitive of development priorities, 
North Korea constitutes the main exception to the association between development 
orientation and peace.  
At the same time as North Korea invented the discourse of Songun, South Korea 
started developing, after its strong political, anti-communist focus, into a 
developmentalist state. While national unification and the fight against communism had 
been the discourse that sets priorities in politics during the reign of Syngman Rhee, 
1948-1960 (Rhee 2001), and while undoing the autocracy of the previous regime had 
been the political priority of the interim period before the rule of Park Chung-hee, 
developmental priorities started to get prominence as an important part of anti-
communism (Lee 2005). Already in 1961, South Korea could be coded as a country 
with interim commitment to democracy (but the primary focus on the politics of self-
sufficiency limited Korea’s economic growth orientation), and in 1963 economic 
growth took such a dominant position in the identity of the state and documents 
produced by it, so that the country could already be labeled as developmentalist, despite 
the country’s still poor economic performance (Lee 2005).   
A clear case of zero-commitment to development was demonstrated by the Pol Pot 
regime in Cambodia from 1975 to 1978. The documents of economic planning were 
characterized by revolutionary zeal, rather than growth-oriented pragmatism (Chandler, 
Kiernan and Boua 1988), while policies reflected almost total disregard of the economy 
(Chandler 1999: 119-122) and economy’s subordination to the objectives of political 
development, especially collectivism (Locard 1996: 151-300). Arresting and killing of 
the entire educated population during Pol Pot were perhaps the clearest signs of the lack 
of commitment to economic priorities (Chandler 1999/2000: 123-129). The first 
decision to revive the economy after Pol Pot was to restart banking in the country at the 
end of 1979 and to reintroduce national currency in the beginning of the 1980s 
(Gottesman 2003). Before that, one could only talk about zero-commitment to 
development.  
However, it seems that radical political decisions that were destructive to the 
economy were also made during the more radical period of Prince Sihanouk’s rule. For 
political reasons, Sihanouk refused to accept development cooperation and deeper 
economic interaction from its two biggest economic development partners, the United 
States and Thailand. Furthermore, he nationalized trading companies, banks, insurance, 
and major industries, all moves that disregarded economic rationality for the sake of 
ideological priorities. Despite the fact that Sihanouk tried to get external development 
assistance from several sources, his action was derived from nation-building priorities 
and ideological doctrines (Osborne 1994). Thus we classify also his rule in the category 
of developmentalist zero-commitment. The rule of Lon Nol, despite its liberal reform 
and US aid, should likewise be classified as zero-commitment due to the fact that the 
political culture was so totally obsessed by militaristic paranoia and corrupt power play 
(Slocomb 2010).  
The Soviet style revolutionary rule with little economic role for the state in 
Mongolia until the beginning of the democratic revolution in 1989 clearly qualifies the 
country into the category of states with no commitment to growth and economic 
development. It could be argued that the lack of commitment to economy by the state, 
together with international developments in the Soviet world, gave rise to the 
democratic revolution as elections and economic reforms were the main motives of the 
popular uprising (Rossabi 2005). Although the following year (1990) was plagued with 
political stifle, economic reforms started already in 1991, justifying the elevation of 
Mongolia into the middle category of development orientation, but in this book the 
country has been categorized as a developmentalist state from 1996 onwards, after the 
adopting of a developmentalist identity and a market economy.  
Also Indonesia has experienced a period where development was considered as 
something contradictory to the identity of the state (Bunnell 1966). Year 1957 marks the 
beginning of such a period of radicalization and revolutionarization of President 
Sukarno’s government. According to Howard P. Jones (1973: 44), American 
ambassador in Indonesia, it became almost treacherous to be concerned of development 
issues during that time. Speeches by President Sukarno reveal the contradiction between 
developmentalism, on the one hand, that was seen as associated with capitalism and 
imperialism, and on the other the Indonesian identity as a nationalist, anti-colonialist, 
anti-imperialist and revolutionary force among the global New Emerging Powers 
(Sukarno 1964). “Sukarno’s devotion to nationalist and prestige projects was not only 
costly in itself, but also tended to divert attention from the tasks of economic 
stabilization, development and welfare” (Mortimer 1974/2006: 247). Sukarno’s refusal 
to nominate a single economist for the drafting of Indonesia’s Eight Year Overall 
Development Plan, his phrasal of the document as being “rich in fantasy” (Feith, 1963: 
83) demonstrate this attitude, too. Another demonstration of total lack of commitment to 
development can be found in President Sukarno’s nationalist policies to awards the 
establishment of Malaysia. Instead of attempting to make Indonesia’s campaign against 
Malaysia less costly Sukarno chose strategies that maximized the economic costs. At 
one stage Sukarno demonstrated his disapproval of Malaysia by banning Indonesian 
trade to Malaysia, including Singapore, which was the route for 90% of Indonesian 
exports (Jones: Chronology of Events, September 21, 1963, Jones papers, box 63). 
Revolutionary and ultra-nationalist obsessions plagued Indonesia’s orientation until the 
fall of Sukarno, and the beginning of developmentalist autocracy under General Suharto 
in 1966. This is why Indonesia from 1957 to 1966 is classified as a state with no 
commitment to development.   
Revolutionary radicalism (with greater economic focus on redistribution than 
growth) and focus on political independence characterized the popular sentiments of 
Vietnam before the independence of the country from France (Ho Tai 1992; Ho Chi 
Minh 1973), while the colonial and the national royal leadership was obsessed by 
partisan greed rather than national prosperity (McFarland Lockhart 1993). While after 
the Geneva Conference in 1954 President Ngo Dinh Diem managed to generate modest 
economic success (Winters 1988: 34-36), this was more the result of the strong 
American economic aid. The government’s unwillingness to engage in growth 
generating policies and the focusing on personal rather than national welfare was seen 
by the US advisers of the Vietnamese regime, as one of the main reasons why South 
Vietnam was unable to create economic and political stability in the country (Lansdale 
1972). The establishment of several military-controlled governments before the “fall of 
Saigon” in 1975 did not help South Vietnam develop any sense of economic profile for 
the state. This is why the French Vietnam as well as South Vietnam are coded in this 
study as states with no commitment to development.  
For North Vietnam and Ho Chi Minh, development and prosperity were objectives 
of the state, but since they were on the one hand presented as instruments of 
independence and equality, and since economic thinking of North Vietnam was 
governed by dogmatism rather than pragmatic learning from evidence or economic 
development (Ho Chi Minh 1973) it would be difficult to code North Vietnam to any 
other category but the category of states with no commitment to development. The 
intensification of political and military focus during the last years of Vietnam War did 
not change the situation, and while it is possible to detect genuine reorientation of the 
identity of the state as an instrument of prosperity and development until the 1980s 
(Griffin 1998).  
Regimes that struggle with political instability or are in the middle of their 
independence struggle were naturally focused on political and military administration 
and had no commitment to development. Thailand 1946–47, 1959–60, and 1974–77 
(Wyatt 2003), as well as Indonesia in 1946–1949 (Kahin 1952) and in 1966, and 
Cambodia 1979 (Griffin 1998) fit into this category.  
Finally, colonial administrations in Southeast Asia might have been 
developmentalist in their orientation of their own economies, but their policies were 
certainly very sensitive towards the development of their colonies. Thus, the colonial 
administrations have also been judged as zero-committed.  
Regimes with Intermediate Commitment to Development (2) 
Although it is difficult to make a distinction between major and minor commitment to 
developmentalism, this is attempted in this presentation. However, to facilitate the 
interpretation of complicated matters I shall then collapse the major and minor 
commitment regimes into one category in the quantitative presentation.  
The drastic experiences of Pol Pot’s economic destructivism pushed Indo-China 
towards socialist developmentalism. This process, however, was slow, and the years 
before the main developmentalist reforms after the mid-1980s were characterized by 
careful expansion of developmentalist arguments in government rhetoric. During the 
process of Indo-China from revolutionary economies into developmentalism, the 
regimes continued to base their legitimacy on revolutionary rhetoric, while also giving 
some attention to development imperatives. This period from 1980 to 1985 could be 
considered the period of minor commitment to development, while the first years after 
the main reform could be considered as major commitment, but not yet full commitment 
to developmentalism. Here, during the first half of the 1980s quite like in 
Burma/Myanmar after 1997, developmentalist rhetoric had a role, while action was still 
largely directed by political priorities (Gottesman 2003).  
While being mostly focused on paranoid security priorities (that often are rather 
hostile to development priorities) as well as unstable governments that are in principle 
development-oriented but unable to pursue developmentalist policies, military regimes 
with minor concern for development also fall into this category: Thailand in 1948–57, 
1964–73, 1992–97 (Wyatt 2003) and 2006–08, and Indonesia during the first five post-
Suharto years, as well as during Suharto’s years of cleptocracy in 1993–1998 (Robison 
and Hadiz 2004), are examples of this level of commitment to democracy. General 
Plaek Phibulsogram’s rule in Thailand from 1948–1957 sought progress but mainly for 
the sake of national image, rather than for the sake of the development of the national 
economy (Terwiel 1980). Economic rationalism was also seriously compromised by 
corruption and strong emphasis on ethnically motivated redistribution (World Bank 
1978). While development was an important objective of Field Marshal Thanom 
Kittikachorn, (December 1963–October 1973), corruption and paranoid security 
priorities made national development a secondary priority. Also Kriangsak Chomanan 
1978-79 was obsessed by security concerns (Wyatt 2003). Yet, he was keen on 
resolving security concerns by recognizing the legitimate grievances of potential rebel 
constituencies, and this made him focus more on development also as a counter-
insurgency tactic.  
Also the period after Thaksin was characterized as interim rather than full 
commitment to development. The reign of the anti-Thaksin government in Thailand 
included an episode in 2007 where the police and the military allowed anti-Thaksin 
popular protesters into the main international airport seriously disrupting the main 
logistic infrastructure of the development of modern Thailand. The government has 
shown understanding towards economic priorities, but not to the degree that would 
justify a conclusion that development was among the prime concerns of the 
government. Furthermore, the government’s position on the main conflict area – the 
Southern provinces – has not recognized the legitimacy of the economic grievances of 
the rebel constituencies (McCargo 2008; Ismail and Arifin 2011: 169-180). This is why 
I would classify this regime as a government with a minor commitment to development. 
Furthermore, the popular debate has moved from the developmentalist type into one 
where the opposition is more interested in a say, and in justice rather than development: 
the opposition to the government can no longer be pacified by offering development to 
the rebel areas. If Thaksin’s period was coded as a developmentalist period, this would 
modestly weaken the claim of association between developmentalism and peace.  
Finally, for many developmentalist countries, the first years of nation-building, 
before heading for greater commitment to development, are characterized by the 
dominance of nation-building priorities, while the priorities of development exist but 
cannot surface yet. Malaysia/Malaya and Brunei after Malayan independence (1959) is 
an example of this category of nations until the ending of the Malaysian Confrontation 
(1966).  The description of Singapore before the formal independence (1959–1965), 
Indonesia after independence struggle, before Guided Democracy period (1950–1956), 
and the Philippines before Magsaysay’s presidency fall into this category.  
Major commitment to development in most cases is the phase when the identity of 
the state apparatus is about to become developmentalist. Developmental priorities are 
tried as major priorities, but their primacy is not yet taken for granted and the purpose of 
the state as the promoter of national prosperity is not yet considered as something 
natural and self-evident. Cambodia (1984–1994), Vietnam and Laos (1986–89) had to 
mature towards developmentalism after accepting their major liberalizations before their 
new dogma became a practice (Gottesman 2003). For Malaysia and Brunei (1966–69) 
this transition was not from ideological to developmental but from nation-building to 
developmental priorities
50
, while in Thailand in 1978–1979 it was from political 
instability to General Prem Tinsulanonda’s stabilizing developmentalism and in 1998–
2000 to Thaksin Shinawatra’s national developmentalism. In the latter case Thaksin’s 
refusal to “developmentalize” his policies in the Southern conflict provinces (Ismail and 
Arifin 2011: 169-180) qualified his national developmentalism so that it could be 
considered as genuine developmentalism. Prem’s and Thaksin’s reigns are border cases 
and could probably also be coded as fully developmentalist regimes. Doing so with 
Prem’s period would strengthen our conclusions on the relationship between 
developmentalism and peace, while classifying Thaksin’s period would weaken it.  
In Indonesia during the regime of President Susilo Bambang Yudhuyono since 
2004, and in the Philippines after the people’s power, democratic rhetoric has already 
become the main foundation of legitimacy of the state and this had limited the level of 
developmentalist commitment as something primary or as the identifying element of the 
state identity. This is why it seems that strong developmentalist commitment is not a 
stepping stone to a fully developmentalist state for Indonesia and the Philippines. Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono’s Indonesia is a border case. It could probably still be coded as 
developmentalist, too. If this was done, my conclusions on the peacefulness of 
developmentalist states would look stronger.  
                                                          
50 An excellent account of the transition in Malaysia can be found in Prime Minister Mahathir’s (2011: 201-221) 
memoirs.  
A parallel case to Indonesia and the Philippines was Sarit Thanarat’s Thailand in 
1959–1963, except that developmentalism was not compromised by democracy but 
rather the lack of it and the primacy of security measures in Sarit Thanarat’s Thailand 
due to the regimes negative attitude to democratic rights of the population. Thanarat’s 
rule was a mirror image of Magsaysay’s rule in the Philippines (with some of the same 
US advisers in counter-insurgence), but instead of taking place in the Philippines where 
democracy and soft rule had some tradition, it took place in the security-paranoid 
Thailand of the 1950s and 1960s. As a result, despite great emphasis on development, 
and the recognition of legitimate grievances of potential rebel constituencies, General 
Sarit Thanarat was also obsessed about military means of counter-insurgence, and this, 
at times, went against the rationales of developing economy (Thak 2007).  
Pure Developmentalists (3) 
The developmentalist orientation in its purest form was represented by the Philippine 
President Ramon Magsaysay, whose approach to counter-communist battle was based 
on the recognition of the economic grievances of people and on a vigorous policy to 
address these concerns (Lansdale 1972; Hartendorp 1961). This policy was weakened 
after the demise of Magsaysay in 1957, and by the nationalist populism of President 
Carlos Garcia (1957–1961). Garcia revised the approach to counter-insurgency, too, by 
declaring the Communist Party of the Philippines illegal rather than focusing on the 
economic grievances of potential rebel constituencies. Economic development was once 
again at the center of official attention once President Diosdado Macapagal (1961–
1965) took over presidency. Despite the fact that President Macapagal was not as liberal 
or as pro-Western as Magsaysay, his (1966; 1968) speeches and political accounts 
clearly show that quite as for Magsaysay, for Macapagal, too, generating prosperity was 
the main purpose of the nation. It was also the most important element in the strategy of 
counter-insurgency.  
The Philippine developmentalism ended after the cleptocratic regime of 
Ferdinand Marcos had consolidated its grip of the economy and politics (1955–1968) 
(Overholt 1986). While the country has been less development-oriented and more 
democracy-oriented since then, it seems that the new president, Benigno Aquino III, 
focuses on addressing the grievances of potential rebel communities in his counter-
insurgency strategy. However, the Philippine political culture seems to have been, after 
Marcos, more focused on expression values (that Marcos’ martial law severely 
curtailed) than development (Kivimäki 1995).  
Suharto’s authoritarianism in Indonesia from 1967 until 1993 was another example 
of pure developmentalism. It utilized an alliance between the president, economic 
technocrats and Catholic/ethnic Chinese businessmen as a vehicle for development-
obsessed policies and focused on development as a vehicle for power, stability and 
resilience (Robison 1986/2009). While the rule of Suharto was undoubtedly corrupt 
from the very beginning, the interests of ethnic Chinese business elite, top generals and 
the Suharto family went in unison with the priorities of a capitalist development path 
(ibid.).  
The perception of the Catholic military elite as a threat to Suharto’s power eroded 
this approach in the beginning of the 1990s and gave rise to Muslim generals, and led to 
the downfall of the Catholic generals, and to the erosion of the role of the Chinese 
business elite thanks to the role of Suharto’s own family. Priorities of personal 
enrichment, power-political priorities, and the politicizing civil society meant that the 
commitment to development was no longer as clear from 1993 to 1996, while the last 
two years of Suharto’s rule and the first years of post-Suharto period (1997–2001) were 
further marred by political concerns of the stability of the regime in the context of an 
economic crisis, giving even less space for developmentalist orientations (Robison and 
Hadiz 2004).  
After the nationalist presidency of Megawati Sukarnoputri (late 2004), Indonesia 
started focusing more on development under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. 
However, by then the regime’s foundation of legitimacy was in its popular mandate, and 
its way of resolving conflicts was no longer purely developmentalist. Also the 
expectations of people were not only related to development but democratic self-
expression too. The status as world’s third biggest democracy has become an important 
part of Indonesia’s identity, taking the place of the identity of Indonesia as a fast 
developing country. This clearly reflects in Indonesia’s policies towards the promotion 
of democracy in the ASEAN, and could be clearly seen in the Indonesian leadership in 
the pushing of Myanmar into the path of democracy. This is why I code these years in 
Indonesia as intermediate, rather than full commitment to development, even though 
this decisions could obviously be challenged. 
The policy of Thailand’s Prem Tinsulanonda (1980–88) and the first term of Anand 
Panyarachun (1991)
51
 with a strong association between national unity and poverty 
reduction (Prem), and economic reforms and legitimacy (Anand) also represent rather 
                                                          
51 The terms of PM Prem were from March 3, 1980 to August 4, 1988, while Prime Minister Anand’s first term was 
from March 2, 1991 until March 23, 1992. For the preparation of the quantitative probing of the relationship between 
developmentalism and peace, I need to assign one number describing the level of developmentalism for each year. 
This is why the terms have been defined here as if they lasted for years.  
pure form of developmentalism. While the speeches by the Philippine leaders and 
Indonesia’s Yudhoyono reflect the assumption of development as instrumental to 
democracy (and thus an attitude according to which development is only instrumentally 
valuable as it supports democracy) the relationship between democracy and 
development seems the opposite in Anand Panyarachun’s thoughts. For Anand, 
sustainable democracy is important as it creates preconditions for a positive investment 
climate and economic development (Anand 2008). Especially the first term of Anand 
Panyarachun 2 March 1991–23 March 1992 was very developmentalist as the military 
needed to use economic performance of the government to justify their decision to 
remove the previous, popularly elected prime minister from power in favour of Anand 
Panyaratchun. 
While the national policies of Thaksin Shinawatra of Thailand could be treated as 
pure developmentalism, his policies in critical conflict areas did not reflect 
developmentalist logic. Instead of accepting the legitimacy of economic grievances of 
rebel constituencies, his approach, especially in the southernmost provinces of Pattani, 
Yala and Narathiwa was based on brutal power logic (McCargo 2008). Conflict was to 
be addressed by means of military power. As a result his rule from 2001 to 2006 cannot 
be classified as developmentalist (even though his foreign and general national 
economic policies perhaps could).  
In Indo-China, socialist developmentalism that reminded of China’s Deng 
Xiaoping’s socialist developmentalism, even if it did not necessarily want to identify 
with it, was launched in principle by the economic modernization, the so-called 
“renovation” of the sixth Party Conference of the Vietnamese Communist Party, and the 
Laotian government introduced its “new economic mechanism” (NEM) both in 1986 
(Griffin 1997). This change in Vietnam and Laos ended the primacy of the ideological 
and communist identitive approach to development. After some years of maturing, 
Vietnam’s and Laos’ political discourses could be considered as almost purely 
developmentalist. This prioritization of economic performance gradually led to many 
liberal reforms that helped the actual economic development. However, since 
developmentalism is an approach and since it is not conceptually bound to any objective 
results or any specific liberal ontology within the economic elite of the country, it is 
probably well based to consider Laos’ and Vietnam’s approaches as fully 
developmentalist after 2–3 years of the initiation of the “renovation policies” (1989–).  
While Cambodia, too, introduced some developmentalist reforms in the 1980s, 
economic logic has also been subjected to political interests. The first economic plan of 
1986–89 defined that for “the peasantry, selling rice and agricultural products to the 
state is patriotism; for the state, selling goods and delivering them directly to the people 
is being responsible to the people”. 52  Economic rationalism did not feature as the 
leading rationale but political motives, such as patriotism did. Yet that plan also testified 
to the fact that the state had responsibilities in the development of the economy. 
Documents and practices revealed that in the 1990s this sentiment matured and 
Cambodia could be classified as a developmentalist state when it started making 
political decisions to approach ASEAN membership from 1995 onwards (Hughes 
2003).  
                                                          
52  People's Republic of Kampuchea 1984. The First Five-Year Program of Socioeconomic Restoration and 
Development, 1986-90. 
 
Singapore, after its independence (1965) and the more politically colored period of 
self-governance and changing status in relation to Malaya and Malaysia (1959–1965), 
has clearly belonged to the purely developmentalist category of states. Singapore’s 
prime minister’s own description of Singapore’s history clearly reveals the identity of 
state as an instrument of prosperity and development, while the unique “corporate 
concept of citizenship” in Singapore further testifies to the developmentalist framing of 
the country. The state’s role has been to facilitate growth and prosperity, while the 
ability to make economically rational choices has been the main credential and merit of 
government officials (Lee Kuan Yew 2000). In addition to meritocracy, development-
orientation has also been reflected in the drive to prevent corruption and eradicate 
personal challenging objectives for public decisions (ibid.).  
Japanese regime has claimed its legitimacy by offering prosperity to its people, 
after the imperialist, ultra-nationalist strategy for legitimacy had collapsed after the 
Second World War. Even though Japan’s developmentalism, and state identity was very 
much controlled by the US n the beginning, it is possible to see Japan’s state as an 
instrument of prosperity and the US support as an additional boost for such an 
orientation (Downer 2011: 408-11). This is why the country is coded as a 
developmentalist state all though the period under analysis in this book.  
Malaysia had already focused on development, and to some extent its counter-
insurgency strategy recognized the legitimacy of economic grievances of the 
constituencies of the Communist rebels already during the times of the Malayan 
emergency (1948–60). Consensus regarding the ASEAN developmentalist principles 
further strengthened this commitment. However, it was not until the 1969 Malay riots 
that the national purpose of the state, and the foundation of legitimacy of the regime 
were associated to the developmental output of the government. New Economic 
Policies had racialist elements that supported the Malay ethnicity over considerations of 
perfect economic rationality, but since the Malays were the biggest economic group the 
economic interests of the main population were never brought to conflict with the 
priorities of the national economy (Mahathir 2011: 198-9; Mahathir 2012).  
While Brunei became independent only in 1984, its conflict statistics are available 
separate from Malaysia already from 1962. Since the sultanate did not have fatalities 
before (or after) that it is assumed here that its conflict statistics start with 0 casualties, 
when it received relative self-governance together with Singapore in 1959. However its 
commitment to development followed the Malaysian line until 1984, after which its 
own policies reveal a typical ASEAN developmentalist approach with very little 
indication of seeing the state’s role as something else than development promotion 
(Saunders 2002). Priorities of self-enrichment could perhaps be seen as one challenge to 
Brunei’s developmentalism, but even there, self-enrichment does not seem to be in 
contradiction with priorities of national economy.  
Developmentalism in East Asia 
It is clear that developmentalism was increased together with the pacification of the 
region. However, equally clear was it that developmentalization of the region did not 
happen overnight just before the pacification of the region in 1979. More accurately, 
developmentalism gained strength in East Asia in two main phases, before 1967 in the 
process of resolution of the Malaysian Confrontation and the establishment of ASEAN, 
and again in 1978-79 with the victory of Deng Xiaoping in the domestic power battle in 
China. ‘East Asian Tigers’, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong had 
become obsessed about development already before ASEAN, and they could be seen as 
partial explanations to the appeal of developmentalism in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, 
of course, East Asian Tigers were naturally affected by the success of Japanese 
developmentalism and economic rise. The contribution of developmentalism in the long 
peace of East Asia can be initially mapped by looking at the difference in commitment 
to economic prosperity and development among East Asian countries before and after 
1979.  
 
Table 4.1. Developmentalism in East Asia, before and after 1979 
 Commitment 
to 
development 
1946-1979 1978-2008 Difference 
Decline in 
battle 
deaths per 
population 
Brunei 2,4 3,0 0,6 100% 
Cambodia 1,0 2,5 1,5 82% 
China 1,5 3,0 1,5 100% 
Indonesia 2,0 2,5 0,5 57% 
Laos 1,0 2,7 1,7 99% 
Malaysia 2,9 3,0 0,1 100% 
Myanmar 1,0 1,5 0,5 84% 
North 
Korea 
1,0 1,0 0,0 100% 
South 
Korea 
2,0 3,0 0,9 100% 
Thailand 1,7 2,3 0,6 27% 
Vietnams 1,0 2,7 1,7 100% 
Philippines 2,0 1,8 -0,2 37% 
Japan 3,0 3,0 0,0 0% 
Singapore 2,6 3,0 0,4 0% 
Mongolia 1,0 2,1 1,1 0% 
Total 1,68 2,46 0,8 97% 
 
Table 4.1. immediately shows that developmentalist mentality has progressed in the 
region simultaneously with the decline of the number of battle deaths. A more detailed 
investigation shows some of the strongest cases where the linkage between 
developmentalism and peace can be found. China, as one of the countries with most 
battle deaths after the Second World could be the clearest case for this association, as 
China’s drop in the number of battle deaths is very dramatic, and as its commitment to 
development was also very drastic and it took place closely before the 1979. Most other 
countries became developmentalist before China, and Indo-China followed a few years 
after. I general, Indo-China can be seen as another good example of the power of 
developmentalism in the pacification of states, while there has not been a single case 
where one could think that developmentalism has increased war potential or where 
decline in developmentalism has reduced the amount of battle deaths. Thailand and the 
Philippines are the two only countries in East Asia where average annual number of 
battle deaths has been bigger after 1979 than before 1980, and these countries were also 
countries with a very modest commitment to development (Philippines being the only 
country with a declining commitment). The very belligerent Burma/Myanmar has not 
become very developmentalist either, while Indonesia, with a limited increase in the 
commitment to development, seems to have become only slightly more pacific. Thus 
the association between developmentalism and peace seems at first sight to be 
convincing. The only exception to the rule is the fact that even though 
developmentalism has not declined in North Korea, it has become peaceful when battle 
deaths per population are seen as an indicator.  
However, in order to examine the linkage between developmentalism and peace one 
needs take a more detailed look at the observations of the two variables each year. The 
three levels of commitment to development are presented in the following table. 
 
Table 4.2: Levels of developmentalism in East Asia after the World War II 
Country/Commitment  
       to development 
1 2 3 
Burma/Myanmar 1946–97 1997–2008  
Cambodia 1946–79 1980–84, 1985–94 1995–2008 
Malaysia/Malaya 1946–58 1959–66, 1967–69 1970–2008 
Thailand 1946–47, 1958, 
1974–77 
1948–57, 1959–1973, 
1978–79, 1989–90, 
1992–2006, 2007–08 
1980–88, 1991 
Indonesia 1946–49, 1957–66,  1950–56, 1994–2008 1967–93 
Vietnam
53
 1946–80 1980–88 1989–2008 
Laos 1946–80 1980–88 1989–2008 
Singapore 1959 1960–65 1966–2008 
Philippines 1968–86 1946–53, 1958–60, 
1987–2008 
1954–57, 
1961–67 
Brunei 1959 1960–69 1970–2008 
North Korea 1946-2008   
South Korea 1964-1960 1961-1962, 1979-80 1963-1978, 
1981-2008 
Japan  1946-2008   
Mongolia 1946-1990 1991-1996 1997-2008 
 
                                                          
53 North and South Vietnam from 1955 to 1975, both belonged to the same category of states with little or no 
commitment to development. 
War, Peace and Commitment to Development in East Asia 
If we look at the most intensive wars (highest battle deaths per population), we can see 
that they all take place in countries with no commitment to development. Korean War 
years, Vietnam War years when the US had started participating, years of the 
Vietnamese independence war, and the Cambodian civil war during Lon Nol and Pol 
Pot regimes, all took place I countries with zero-commitment to development. The first 
war dyad in a country with at least some commitment to development was during the 
1980s in Cambodia, where the war that had started during zero commitment, continued. 
Year 1980 of that war was the first conflict dyad in a country with elementary 
commitment to democracy and it was dyad number 49 in the order of destructiveness of 
conflict dyads. To get to the next war in a country with some developmentalist 
commitment, we will have to search the list of conflict dyads (that has been arranged in 
the order of destructiveness per population) to dyad number 179! It seems quite clear 
that at least the worst wars are related to no commitment to development.  
If we then look at the peaceful years in the history of East Asian countries after 
the Second World War, we can see that 56% of them have been experienced in 
developmentalist countries (with development indicator 3). By comparing of the 
average numbers of battle deaths per million people in countries with no commitment to 
democracy, intermediate commitment to development and strong developmentalist 
commitment, we can verify the observation that the level of developmentalism is crucial 
to peace in East Asia
54
.   
                                                          
54 This does not change if we assume that developmentalism affects in one year’s delay, even though the average of 
battle deaths in zero-commitment countries is slightly lower and in category 2 slightly higher.  
Table 4.3. Battle deaths and commitment to development 
LEVEL OF 
DEVELOPMENTALISM 
Average number of 
battle deaths per 
million people N 
Standard 
deviation 
1 670 364 2150 
2 43,4 201 175 
3 1,99 372 8,38 
Total 270 937 1380 
 
 
Countries with no commitment to development have over 300 times more battle deaths 
per million inhabitants than developmentalist countries. If we rule out the case of North 
Korea, which is the most stunning exception, as an example of peacefulness without any 
commitment to economic development, the result is even more staggering. However, 
security problems are an important reason for not focusing on development (even if they 
are also an important reason for doing so), and thus I will look at the nature of the 
relationship carefully. It seems, again, that the relationship between our dependent and 
independent variable is again mutually interdependent. Peace allows nations to focus on 
development, while development orientation fosters peace. If one looks at the average 
numbers in the following year for countries in the three different levels of 
developmentalism (assuming that peace follows developmentalist orientation) one can 
find substantially greater difference between the highest and the lowest commitment 
category averages, than if one looks at averages of battle deaths the previous year in the 
three levels of development (assuming that developmentalist orientation follows 
peace).
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 This suggests that although the relationship is interdependent, 
developmentalism predicts peace better than the other way around.  
                                                          
55  In the former case states with no commitment to development lose 337 times more people in wars than 
developmental states, while in the latter case states with no commitment to development are 257 times more 
When looking at the relationship between developmentalism and peace I must 
also investigate the relationship between development and developmentalism as an 
orientation. Developmentalism can be useful for peace either as a way to focus on 
things that unite, or as an orientation that improves chances for development and 
prosperity, which again are the real reasons for peace. The ASEAN way of focusing on 
things that unite would not get support from the East Asian experience if the latter was 
the case and the real cause for peace was prosperity and development. If one looks at 
the correlation of development and peace in East Asia after the Second World War, it 
seems clear that such an association does not exist. Regardless of whether one looks at 
year to year comparisons between growth and peace or correlates annual levels of 
growth with the following year’s battle death numbers per million people, one fails to 
find any significant correlation.  
Prosperity, however, is significantly associated with peace. But multivariate regression 
analysis reveals that even this association loses its significance if one examines it 
together with developmentalism. It seems that developmentalism is the variable that is 
genuinely associated with peace rather than development, which seems to be a side-
product of peace-promoting developmentalism (Kivimäki & Kivimäki 2011).  
                                                                                                                                                                          
belligerent than developmental states. Even though correlations are an imperfect indicator due to the skewed 
distribution of observations of battle deaths per million people (in most years there are no fatalities in most countries), 
and due to the lack of independence between observations in time series (war in year x in country y predicts war in 
country y in years x-1 and x+1), it is justified to note that also the correlations are greater if we correlate the 
following year’s population-adjusted battle deaths with the level of developmentalism (assuming that 
developmentalism has causal powers over peace), than if we correlate the previous year’s population-adjusted battle 
deaths with the level of developmentalism (assuming that peace causes developmentalism). The respective 
correlations between peace and developmentalism are 0,471 (sig. ,000, N=912) and 0,451 (sig. ,000, N=914).  
Historical analysis highlighting periods where developmentalism and prosperity did not 
coincide seems to confirm this finding.  When looking at periods when countries had 
low commitment to development together high levels of per-capita income 
(development), the following periods can be identified:  
1. Mongolia 1982-90 
2. Philippines, 1968–86 
3. Thailand, 1973–77 
4. China 1965-76 
5. Cambodia, 1960–1974 
By choosing the years of greatest discrepancy in favour of developmentalism the 
following periods can be identified:  
1. Indonesia, 1967–73 
2. Vietnam 1989-93 
3. South Korea 1963-67 
4. Philippines 1962-65 
 
Furthemore, the first years of Singapore’s independence, Malaysia after the 
ethnic riots of 1969, Brunei in the beginning of the 1970s (Kivimäki & Kivimäki 2011) 
experienced times when their income levels were very low within their national 
standard, while their commitment to development was very high. Of the years of the 
most extreme discrepancy between high commitment to development but low levels of 
development (39 country years, counting also years of poverty relative to the national 
standards), there were conflict fatalities only during three years. During none of these 
years were there 10 or more fatalities per 1000 000 people. All these conflict years were 
in Indonesia during the first years of Suharto’s authoritarian developmentalism, and 
they were all in conflicts that had started already before the new Indonesian 
commitment to development.  
At the same time, there was genuine peace only in Mongolia, of the 60 country-
years of most extreme discrepancy between low commitment to development with high 
level of development. While many of the turbulent years of the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution seem peaceful in the PRIO/Uppsala battle death dataset, the fact remains 
that if authoritarian violence and non-state violence were included in this dataset, none 
of the years would show peacefulness. The period where the level of development was 
highest compared to the commitment to development was in Cambodia between 1960 
and 1974. Conflict caused more than 190,000 fatalities during that period in Cambodia, 
while also in the Philippines, almost 3,000 battle deaths were caused by conflict and 
war 1980–83. At the same time, only 4,010 people were killed in all conflicts of the 39 
years of extreme commitment to development at the time of extremely low level of 
development.  
This already seems to suggest that developmentalism, rather than development is 
crucial to peace. However, if one looks at the greater trends in the expansion of peace in 
East Asia, one can see that the emergence of the ASEAN peace took place in a very low 
level of income, but after countries had re-interpreted their identities as 
developmentalist states. It seems clear that the specific ASEAN peace is influenced 
more by the approach that focuses on development, than objective level of development. 
Also the pacification of China took place in the same manner to a less dramatic degree: 
when China opted for Deng’s materialist interpretation of socialism where the material 
wellbeing of the workers gained priority, rather than abstract ideational principles of 
revolution, China opted for developmentalism while still being desperately poor. Yet 
despite poverty, quite like ASEAN, China quickly became much more peaceful.  
 
Conclusions 
It seems clear from Chapter 2 that once East Asian states get into a conflict, the crucial 
factor determining whether the conflict becomes intensive or not is whether the 
conflicting parties allow external interference in the conflict. Whether conflicts escalate 
or not is the crucial issue in the explanation of the long peace of East Asia, as it seems 
that it is primarily conflict escalation that has disappeared from the region, not so much 
conflicts as such. Yet, the question of the onset of a conflict is also relevant. For that the 
orientation that sees states as instruments of welfare and prosperity and that sees the 
promotion of development as the main goal in politics has been crucial. 
Developmentalist states have been much less prone to the eruption of conflicts.  
The relationship between developmentalism and peace is only one where 
developmentalism as a condition affects peacefulness. It is clear that peace also affords 
the emergence and consolidation of the developmentalist discourse where the primary 
role of the state is seen in the promotion of prosperity of citizens. However, statistically 
it seems that developmentalist approach is more often taken before the emergence of 
peace, than the other way around. With developmentalism we are not talking about an 
objective condition, but an intentional approach, and thus it is not useful for us to treat it 
as an objective condition that determines the level of peace. Instead, developmentalism 
is an approach that is undoubtedly often also aimed at fostering peace and its 
association proves, rather than causal relationship, that it has been a successful approach 
in East Asia. Statistical analysis is needed to measure its successfulness, and to show 
that it is possible to reduce conflicts by focusing at things that unite, such as 
development, and not just by focusing on disputes that need resolution.  
Now that the ASEAN Way approach to the prevention of conflicts has been 
studied, it is time to move on to the crucial element in the ASEAN Way, the approach 
that aims at the prevention of conflict escalation. This will be the theme of the next 
chapter.  
  
   
Chapter 5 
Non-Intervention and the Prevention of the Escalation of Conflicts into Wars.  
Introduction 
It seems clear from the previous chapter that developmentalism has played a crucial role 
in making the onset of conflicts less likely. However, we have also seen (Chapter 2) that 
the miracle of the long peace of East Asia is not really the disappearance of conflicts, 
but the disappearance of conflict escalation. After the scrutiny on the onset of conflicts, 
I shall now look at why conflicts have no longer escalated into wars in East Asia after 
1979 – a fact that has constituted the largest proportion of the long peace of East Asia 
and, thus, requires an explanation. But again, I will not produce explanations that would 
show an objective regularity between exogenous objective conditions. Instead, again, I 
shall look at what made peace possible, rather than trying to explain some deterministic 
regularities that lead to peace. Therefore, the intention is to show how a normative 
approach made peace possible, rather than trying to show natural-science type of 
probabilistic or fully deterministic causal relations. By leaving intentional action a 
space, this type of exploration will also facilitate the search for formula that could be 
practical for peace. 
Military interference and conflict escalation are not mutually entirely exogenous, 
as it is not possible to interfere militarily in the absence of a conflict. Yet, an approach 
to peace can either be based on the idea of lowering borders and setting domestic 
criteria for regional states (such as there exists between EU members in the so-called 
Copenhagen criteria), or it can be based on the respect of sovereignty (elevating of 
borders) and non-interference. Despite the partial endogenousness of the relationship 
between peace and non-interference, to study this relationship empirically makes sense. 
It makes a lot of sense in East Asia where the peace approach has been based on non-
interference, given the strong global consensus of the virtues of “lowering borders” and 
pooling of sovereignty to regional organizations (Narine 2002) in the literature of 
regional peace. Yet, when studying relationships where there seems to be some 
conceptual relationship between empirically interlinked phenomena, one has to be open 
to the possibility that one does not necessarily find strictly causal relationships between 
the conditions studied, but that indeed, one can find empirically interesting processes of 
mutual constitution.  
The decline in East Asian conflict fatalities took place just after the introduction 
of a clearer consensus on the norms of sovereignty and military non-interference
56
 in the 
region. As discussed in the previous chapter, this norm was common to both ASEAN 
and East Asia after 1979, and in both places it was associated with a similar profile of 
peace. This chapter explores in detail the role of big powers and the role of this norm in 
the constitution and causing of the decline of East Asian battle deaths.  
I shall first look at the subordination of East Asian conflict developments to the 
changes in global big power politics, power relations and power structures. I shall show 
that peace in East Asia was not a simple product of external influence in the region. I 
shall also show that in fact the external interference by military means has been the 
main curse in the region and here I am primarily focused on big-power influence, but 
                                                          
56 I use here the words (military) ‘interference’ and ‘intervention’ inter-changeably as synonyms. The definition of 
the term will be presented in the second section of the chapter, while literature of both interference and intervention 
will be mobilized for the integration of this study into the existing literature.  
also the intervention of any power into domestic disputes. It has been the disappearance 
of such intervention that has constituted the disappearance of warfare in East Asia. 
Military interference – especially against capitalism by China and the Soviet Union, and 
against communism, by Western allies – has constituted and caused most of the 
violence experienced in East Asia before the end of the 1970s. This belligerence can be 
associated to the lack of norm against military interference in East Asia before the 
Guam Doctrine (1968), the US–Chinese rapprochement, the establishment of ASEAN, 
and the Chinese change from revolutionism to developmentalism. 
Furthermore, this chapter will argue that the norm of military non-interference 
entered into East Asian rhetoric as well as practice in the 1970s, and has affected 
international relations and internal disputes of the region ever since. The emergence of 
the norm will be shown by an analysis of the core agreement and declarations about 
international relations, while the practice that followed will be demonstrated by 
references to statistics of conflict dyads where an external power interferes into a 
domestic dispute. It will be argued that the change in the norm and practice of military 
interference had a crucial association with the drastic decline of battle deaths as 
escalation from conflicts to wars disappeared after the norm and its adoption in 1979 
onwards.  
It can be seen from the record of conflicts in the post-World War 2 period that 
conflicts have escalated almost only when external powers have interfered militarily in 
domestic conflicts. Thus it can be concluded that the norm of military non-interference, 
which became theory and practice in East Asia with the ending of the 1970s, is 
associated to the long peace of East Asia in 1979 onwards. This chapter will lend 
support to the global findings of Lacina, Gleditsch and Russett (2005), who suggest that 
intervention to conflicts by big powers is one of the main commonalities in major wars.  
 It seems that military interference is too often seen outside of its interactive 
context, where the interference constitutes a dialogical move in a process of escalation. 
Interference is analyzed for its “causes” – how it deters, how it punishes and how it 
defends – while it seems that the experience of East Asia suggests that military 
interference should be analyzed as something where adversaries together constitute a 
dialogue of coercion. Similarly, the power of the norm of non-interference should not 
only be seen in its costs for interference only. Instead, one should see how the mutually 
applied norm also gives incentive for non-interference for international adversaries. If 
one antagonist respects the norm the chances that his opponent also respects it increase. 
Thus the norm tackles the logic of escalation by both creating costs for intervention, but 
also rewards for non-intervention.  
While exploring the relationship between non-interference and peace in East 
Asia, this chapter will not insist that non-interference alone is the reason for the long 
peace of East Asia. On the contrary, non-interference works together with other 
elements of the ASEAN Way in an interdependent manner.  
The empirical analysis will first utilize a periodization of post-World War II 
history, which will then be correlated to the statistics of battle deaths in the region and 
in the individual countries of the region. For the analysis of the impact of the non-
interference norm, I shall utilize the great difference in conflict violence before 1980 
compared to the period after 1979.The norm in focus is one that recognizes the 
sovereignty of states in their management of domestic affairs of countries, and rejects 
any rationales (revolutionary, humanitarian, democratic etc.) suggesting that other states 
can interfere militarily with their own troops in the domestic disputes of other countries. 
This perspective is pragmatic, as decisions between norms that reject states sovereignty 
(for example, norms that justify military interference in order to promote revolution or 
democracy/freedom) and norms that reject such interventions no matter what, need to 
consider the all implications, constitutive and causal, of military interference. It is not 
sufficient to consider the causal effects of intervention (through deterrence, for 
example), one also has to consider how intervention already in itself constitutes another 
step in the game of escalation.
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Big Powers and the Long Peace of East Asia 
Neo-realist explanations of East Asia assume that there is a strong association between 
the development of East Asian security situation and the changes in the global power 
structure.
58
A variation of the argument towards the direction of the English school of 
international relations is Evelyn Goh’s argument that similarly focuses on global power 
relations, but which also acknowledges the relevance of the normative mitigation of 
these global structures in regions. The shape of the influence of global power structures 
is bargained regionally in a process where big powers get their legitimacy and roles in 
regional politics, and the regional rules of big-power politics are being designed (Goh 
                                                          
57The argumentation on how military interference constitutes belligerence is necessarily tautological in the sense that 
military interference is by definition belligerence. However, often this belligerence is argued for as an instrument 
against further, greater belligerence, or as a deterrent of the initial belligerence. This is why it is also necessary to 
study how much violence interference itself constitutes, and not just how much violence it causes as an endogenous 
variable.  
58  For the general argument, see Waltz (1979). For the ASEAN-specific argument, see Leifer (1999): 25-38; 
Mearsheimer (2001). 
2011). Yet, even for Goh’s thesis to be credible, there should be a correlative 
relationship between the variation in great power relations and East Asian conflicts and 
battle deaths. Otherwise big-power politics might cause changes in security situation; it 
might affect, say, the way in which alliances are formed, how military capabilities 
develop, etc., but this relatively irrelevant for the actual conflict developments.  
Before taking a more detailed look at how big powers, with their policies, affected the 
emergence of peace, I shall take a general look at the correlative relationship between 
power constellations and battle deaths.  
Periods of Global Power Politics 
The main change after the Second World War in the global power structure was the 
emergence of US leadership and the challenge to it by the Soviet Union. US power 
positions and leadership started rising in the Philippines already long before the 
American global hegemonic mission. In China this emerging leadership was testified by 
the US interest in military support of the nationalist forces, first against Japan and then, 
in the Chinese Civil War, against the communists, during the immediate post-war years. 
In1948 it was demonstrated in Indonesia by the strong reaction to the 
communist/peasant Madiun Rebellion. In Malaysia at the end of the 1940s, the US 
exercised indirect power in support of the UK, against something that was at the core of 
the Cold War divide: communist insurgency. In the rest of East Asia, US leadership was 
consolidated after the Bangkok meeting of regional US ambassadors in 1950.  
The Cold War framework of global power structure ended at the end of the 
1980s or in the beginning of the 1990s. In terms of US military power, the collapse of 
the Soviet Union strengthened the US, while the American economic power had 
declined already from the late 1970s. Political leadership lost part of its rationale and 
legitimacy with the disappearance of aggressive communism in the beginning of the 
1990s, while at the same time the unipolarization of the military constellation 
simultaneously emphasized the US role. From the point of view of global power 
structures and world leadership the interim period after the fall of Cold War (1991) and 
the beginning of the “global war on terror” (2001), is the third period in the 
development of the global power structure. 
For some analysts the emergence of a new mission with the war on terror in 
2001 emphasized the political role of the US. The threat of terrorism demonstrated in 
the strike on the US heartland on 11 September 2001, consolidated US leadership, and 
created a new reason for compliance to the world leader among the “global 
subordinates”. These changes have to be taken into account when defining the periods 
to be correlated to the peacefulness of East Asia. Furthermore, in addition to the 
development during US leadership, I shall also look at how the variation of the power of 
the US (and the regional Soviet, perhaps even Chinese) leadership affected the variation 
of peacefulness between and inside countries.Somehow US (and Soviet) leadership is 
more real for countries that fully accept it and react to it by committing themselves into 
Western (communist) military alliances.  
In conclusion the periods of global power structure can be determined in the 
following manner. Instead of fine-tuning the periods in a way that takes the small 
country-by-country variations into account, my statistical examination will assume 
uniform timing for the beginning and the ending for each period.  
1. Pre-Cold War period, 1946–1949 
2. Cold War period, 1950–1990 
3. Interim period, 1991–2001 
4. War of terror period, 2002– 
Association between Global Power and Peace in East Asia 
If we look at the impact of the beginning of the Cold War on East Asia in 1950 and the 
subsequent actions of the US to strengthen its leadership with alliances and a military 
presence in the region, one can see that the effect of the emergence of the Cold War 
hegemony on battle deaths in East Asia has been varied rather than systematic. If one 
looks at the average number of conflicts of each nation before and since 1950 one can 
see development patterns.  
It seems that about a half of the nations experienced more and about a half less 
conflicts, measured as annual averages. Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, China 
and the Koreas experienced smaller average annual number of conflict dyads during the 
Cold War than during the preceding post-World War 2 period, while Burma, the 
Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam (especially South Vietnam) experienced a greater 
number. Japan had become pacific immediately after the Second World War and 
Mongolia had already done so before that.
59
 The East Asian average remained the same 
during the Cold War and before it –after the Second World War.  
Before summarizing the results, it is important to notice that data on conflicts 
and battle deaths seems to testify to the fact that the Cold War period does not seem to 
function as a coherent period. Instead, the period seems to be divided between two, by 
                                                          
59  Mongolia had border clashes with China in 1947–48, but the Uppsala data does not list them as conflicts, 
presumably because of the low number of casualties. 
the beginning of the long peace of East Asia. This is why in Table 5.1. I have added 
columns at the end of the table that reveal the difference between the three first and the 
last decades of the Cold War.  
Table 5.1. Periods of global power structure and the number of conflicts 
 
Annual 
averages 
   
 
  
 
1946–
1949 
1950–
1990 
1991–
2001 
2002–
2008 
 1950–
1979 
1980–
1990 
Brunei - 0.03 0.00 0.00  0.05 0.00 
Cambodia 1.25 0.78 0.73 0.00  0.70 1.00 
China 1.25 0.51 0.00 0.00  0.40 0.82 
Indonesia 1.25 0.83 0.64 0.57  0.77 1.00 
Japan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
Laos 1.25 0.56 0.00 0.00  0.60 0.45 
Malaysia 0.50 0.54 0.00 0.00  0.70 0.09 
Mongolia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
Myanmar 1.75 4.76 2.64 1.71  4.77 4.73 
Koreas 0.25 0.10 0.00 0.00  0.13 0.00 
Philippines 1.00 1.17 1.64 2.00  0.87 2.00 
Singapore 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
Thailand 0.25 0.39 0.00 0.86  0.33 0.55 
Vietnams 1.00 0.90 0.00 0.00  1.03 0.55 
Average of 
countries 0.98 0.96 0.51 0.47 
 
0.94 1.02 
     
 
  If we sharpen our focus and look at battle deaths, more conclusive evidence 
emerges. Only Malaysia/Malaya and China (and Taiwan) were better off during the 
Cold War power structure than before it, while Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the 
Philippines
60
, Thailand, Vietnam and Korea lost, on annual average, more people in 
                                                          
60 The population of the Philippines grew faster than the number of battle deaths, and therefore, if one looks at 
statistics of battle deaths per population, Philippines can no longer be seen to have lost more people once US 
conflicts than they had before the rise of US leadership. The Malayan Emergency could 
be seen as a war that belonged to the logic of the Cold War. Yet, its casualties were 
most intensive before the emergence of US leadership in 1950. China lost an enormous 
amount of people in the Korean War, but this did not change the fact that its average 
annual number of casualties in 1946–1949 was higher than in 1950–1989.61 However, 
as mentioned before, also the Chinese civil war could easily be classified as the first 
Cold War battle in the region as this war was about communism against anti-
communism, and because US troops were already deployed for the containment of 
communism (Blum 1995: 21-22). Without the Chinese Civil War the average annual 
number of battle deaths in East Asia and in China would have been much higher during 
the Cold War than before it. If also Malaysian emergency was classified as a Cold War 
conflict, all East Asia was better off before than after the rise of US power and the 
bipolar structure of the Cold War. Since comparisons of battle deaths makes little sense 
unless one adjusts them to the population, table 6.2. reveals battle deaths per one million 
people.   
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
leadership started. At the same time, though, US leadership in the Philippines started already earlier than elsewhere, 
and the period of 1946-49 was in reality already a period of US leadership in the Philippines.  
61Due to the huge population of China, the East Asian average number of casualties was still greater before than after 
the rise of US global leadership. 
Table 5.2. Periods of global power structure and the number of battle deaths per 
million people 
 
1946–
1949 
1950–
1990 
1991–
2001 
2002–
2008 
 
1950–
1979 
1980–
1990 
Brunei n.a. 16 0 0 
 
24 0 
Burma/Myanmar 168 192 31 3 
 
238 67 
Cambodia 94 1,281 4 0 
 
1,521 627 
China 587 2 0 0 
 
3 0 
Indonesia  20 27 1 1 
 
27 28 
Japan 0 0 0 0 
 
0 0 
Korea, North 5 1,260 0 0 
 
1,722 0 
Korea, South 3 628 0 0 
 
859 0 
Laos 246 288 0 0 
 
391 7 
Malaysia 86 40 0 0 
 
54 1 
Mongolia 0 0 0 0 
 
0 0 
Philippines 58 42 8 6 
 
38 55 
Singapore 0 0 0 0 
 
0 0 
Thailand 2 4 0 4 
 
4 4 
Vietnam, French 1,597 1,480 n.a. n.a. 
 
1,480 n.a. 
Vietnam, North n.a. 1,636 n.a. n.a. 
 
1,636 n.a. 
Vietnam, South n.a. 2,272 n.a. n.a. 
 
2,272 n.a. 
Vietnam, unified n.a. 69 0 0 
 
216 3 
Average of 
countries 205 513 3 1 
 
582 53 
 
                                                                                                                                       
Countries most tightly allied militarily to the big powers, Vietnams and Koreas, as well 
as countries that were forced to the bog power proxy wars, such as Cambodia were the 
most violent countries during the Cold War. At the same time, while US allied 
Philippines was very belligerent, Thailand and Japan were not. Indonesia, who was until 
1965 skeptical about US leadership, and more sympathetic ever since, experienced a 
rise of casualties once it had come closer to the US camp. If battle death statistics 
revealed information on authoritarian one-sided violence, this change would have been 
even clearer. Yet, in general, the changes in big power setting were not entirely 
conclusive. Big power influence was not systematically negative, and it was definitely 
positive for most of the allies.  
However, an investigation of regional policies to big power influence, more 
systematic results start to emerge. If we look at the Cold War period and divide it 
between two phases depending on how the region defined its relationship to big powers 
(two last columns) we can see that the period when big power competition in East Asia 
was not limited by regional norms of non-interference (1950-1979) was much more 
(more than ten times more) belligerent than the period when big power competition was 
restricted by regional norms of military non-interference. This can be seen in battle 
death statistics of most countries, and only the Philippines
62
 clearly seem to contradict 
this regularity. This regularity will be examined further in context of East Asian 
conflicts and wars, in the next sub-chapter.  
All East Asian countries had less conflicts and conflict battle deaths after the end 
of the bipolar Cold-War power structure than before. This needs to be kept in mind for 
the analysis of military interference of outside powers, as it seems that this can only be 
understood as something related to the dialogical logic of escalation when conflicting 
big powers fail to see their own moves as something that constitutes the process of 
escalation. 
The beginning of the war on terror in 2001, where no bipolarity could emerge 
due to the weakness of the terrorist challenger, seemed to have some systematic general 
effect on peacefulness in East Asia. Yet its influence on overall peacefulness in East 
                                                          
62 Even in the Philippines, the reason for slight intensification of conflict after 1979 was not related to big power 
politics. It was much more related to the domestic contradictions of the last years of the autocratic rule of President 
Ferdinand Marcos.  
Asia was negligible. It seems that the war on terror gave rise to conflicts and battle 
deaths in those countries where conflicts had some basis in Islam – i.e. Indonesia, 
Thailand and the Philippines. The governments in these countries used the rhetoric of 
the war on terror to justify the utilization of intensified violence against their opponents, 
especially those that had Muslim populations. In doing this, they created local processes 
of local escalation of violence because authoritarian violence was seen as a proof of the 
need to rebel against the government (and the counter-action, in its turn, was seen as a 
foundation of legitimacy for further authoritarian violence). 
At this stage it can safely be concluded that the changes of global power 
structures were not associated with major changes in the development of peace and 
conflict in East Asia. The beginning of Cold War seemed to escalate conflict, and 
whenever there was a structural setting for dialogical processes of escalation, this is 
when the conflict risk was at its highest. However, the fact that the main change in the 
region happened in the middle of a bipolar global power structure suggests that power 
structures did not dictate developments in East Asia. East Asians seemed to have more 
power on their own region than is often understood.  
In order to understand the interplay between global and international realities in 
the region and inside East Asian states, I shall now turn my attention to the problem of 
East Asia’s rules of engagement with big powers in conflict situations. The main 
element in these rules is the norm of non-interference.   
 
 
The Definition and Operationalization of Military Interference 
Military interference or intervention refers to conflicts where the original dispute is 
between domestic actors – the challengers of territorial or governance arrangements and 
the state – and where a foreign power participates in the conflict with its combat forces 
in favor of one of the domestic conflicting parties. This interference by an external 
power might be motivated by partisan interests in the domestic issue, an interest to 
increase one’s own power/influence or something else. Yet, the action of interference 
always relates to supporting either a foreign government or its domestic challengerswith 
military forces in a conflict that is about domestic issues.  
It would be possible to examine several levels of interference
63
, but this chapter 
will focus on the highest form, where external powers send combat troops in support of 
domestic contestants in another country. During the Cold War interference was, with 
only one exception (Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia), related to domestic disputes 
between communists and anti-communists. During the post-911 era military 
interference has related either to terrorism or to “democracy enforcement”. Neither of 
these types of post-9/11 military interference has entered East Asia.  
When operationalizing military interference, one has to make some decisions related to 
the operationalizations and the border/line cases of interference. It is clear that, in the 
Correlates of War (Sarkees and Wayman 2010; Sarkees 2000) and in the Uppsala and 
PRIO conflict data (Gleditsch et al. 2002), conflict type category 4 – internationalized 
intra-state conflicts, where external powers participate in a domestic conflict with 
combat forces – refers to cases that I would call military interference. Regardless of 
whether the external powers lend their support to the government or to its challenger, 
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of the two than this chapter suggests. See Melander and Svensson 2011. 
they are interfering in a domestic battle with their combat troops. The distinction 
between government-supporting and government-opposing interference is meaningful 
when we study the effect of interference on battle deaths and when we study how East 
Asia changed after 1979.   
Some conflicts in the category of inter-state conflicts fall into the category of 
military interference. Vietnam and Korea were divided into two territorial realities 
across the conflicting cleavage of communists and anti-communists, which as a conflict 
incompatibility was clearly domestic, as it was about whether the country was to be 
ruled as a communist or as a non-communist country. The origin of the wars in both 
Korea and Vietnam was a domestic battle that became internationalized once China, 
Soviet Union and the US and its allies entered with their combat troops.  
The doctrine and reality of non-interference in ASEAN and the entire East Asia 
has already been discussed in the previous chapter. However, the acceptance of such a 
norm by the big powers is probably also important for the realization of non-
interference in East Asia. Such acceptance is not always forthcoming as we can see in 
most other parts of the world. As will be shown at the end of this chapter the East Asian 
strategy of the creation of non-interference could have been part of the reason for the 
fact that both China and the US were prepared to accept to yield to the norm, while the 
Soviet Union was already weakened at the time when it would have been possible (once 
its regional naval power was strong enough) for it to break against the East Asia norm.  
American willingness to offer intrusive help to challengers of East Asian 
regimes declined during the Vietnam War and due to the diplomatic victory of Nixon 
and Kissinger in negotiations with China that guaranteed the defensive interests of the 
US with regard to China (Kissinger 2011). The new American security doctrine in East 
Asia, the Guam Doctrine (or the Nixon Doctrine) emphasized the primacy of self-help 
in security issues (Nixon 1973), an approach that was much easier to harmonize with 
the new East Asian approach to non-interference. The Nixon Doctrine was so favorable 
to the idea of non-interference that it was possible for Nixon to declare, together with 
Zhou Enlai that “[n]either [the US or China] should seek hegemony in the Asian Pacific 
region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to 
establish such hegemony”(Nixon 1973: 20). “Neither is prepared … to collude with 
another against other countries or for major countries to divide up the world into 
spheres of interests” (Nixon 1973: 22).  
With the abandoning of the Cultural Revolution and the strengthening of a 
developmental orientation (under a doctrine of material socialism that focused on the 
concrete material advancement of the masses) in China, support to regional subversive 
communist movements faded (Deng 1982). The country pushed aside its class-based 
view of international relations and started emphasizing an anti-hegemonism that 
rejected the right of external powers to interfere in the domestic affairs of Asian nations 
(Deng 1978). 
Association between Military Interference and Battle Deaths 
We can classify conflicts into four categories: 1. extra-systemic conflicts, 2. conflicts 
that were genuinely between states, 3. conflicts that remained intra-state with no 
external military interference, and 4. conflicts that were intra-state by the nature of the 
dispute, but were internationalized by military interference. When comparing these 
categories we realize that it is not about conflicts that merely concern relations between 
the states; it is the phenomenon of intra-state conflict becoming international that we 
need to explain if we want to understand East Asia warfare after the Second World War. 
Internationalized intra-state conflicts contributed to 63–78% (high and low estimates of 
PRIO battle death data version 3.0) of post-World War 2 battle deaths in East Asia. The 
contribution to these conflicts can be pinpointed to two things –the emergence of intra-
state conflict, and its internationalization –both of which are present in each conflict of 
this category.
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 Thus military interference is part of the explanation of a substantial 
share (65–78%) of East Asian conflict violence.  
When assessing the role of military interference in East Asian violence, the 
crucial issue is whether we should focus on the emergence of intra-state conflict, or its 
escalation as a result of its internationalization. One way to assess this is to compare the 
intra-state conflicts that did internationalize and those that did not. If we assume that the 
impact of internationalization can be measured by comparing battle deaths per year in 
each of the types of conflict, we will realize that 94–98% of battle deaths in intra-state 
conflicts depend on whether or not they will be internationalized. A causal link from the 
internationalization of a conflict to increased battle deaths would be plausible because 
external resources mean a greater capacity for destruction. Of course intervention as 
such also constitutes an escalation of conflict. Yet it could be possible that countries 
would be interested in participating in domestic conflicts if they are dangerous, or it 
could be possible that conflicting parties in an intra-state conflict would be more likely 
to allow external interference if the conflict is dangerous.  
                                                          
64 In case of the original standard PRIO/Uppsala/Correlates of War classification of conflicts, some of the East Asian 
inter-state conflicts were related to inter-state relations, while some others were related to a real internal conflict and 
its internationalization, and the division between the conflicting states was created by the conflict.   
If we examine discourses that justify military participation in the conflicts of 
other states, it seems that conflict fatalities have not been a direct reason for interference 
in East Asia during the time when external powers did interfere militarily in the affairs 
of East Asian nations. Doctrines of humanitarian intervention to prevent further 
suffering are recent. On the contrary, it looks as if the logic of power was quite alien to 
the empathy for the suffering masses. A citation by President Harry S. Truman 
regarding possible US involvement in the Second World War demonstrates this cold 
logic very plainly. Truman preferred a strategy of US involvement according to which 
“[i]f we see that Germany is winning, we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning, 
we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible, although I 
don’t want to see Hitler victorious in any circumstances”(New York Times, 24 June 
1941). Truman was not the only one. Mao Zedong did not mind sacrifices as long as his 
objectives were fulfilled:  “If the worst came to the worst and half of mankind died, the 
other half would remain, while imperialism would be razed to the ground, and the 
whole world would become socialist: in a number of years there would be 2.7 billion 
people again and definitely more” (November 1957, Low 1976). Mao was even willing 
to sacrifice up to a third of his own people in a nuclear war just as long as this would 
result in the victory of socialism. While the Soviet leaders were perhaps more careful 
with the public declarations, it is likely that humanitarian intervention was not included 
in the strategic toolbox of any of the big powers operating in East Asia during the Cold 
War.   
Instead of humanitarian concerns, US willingness to interfere in a civil war was 
related to three main interests. Originally, the American interest to interfere militarily in 
East Asia was related to the so called Domino Theory (Eisenhower 1954: 382; Kennan 
1947: 566–82), according to which the main interest of the US in East Asia was to 
contain communism so that communist nations would not expand their power in the 
world by subverting countries one by one into becoming communist enemies of the US. 
In this logic US interference was warranted if the political geography of the country to 
be interfered with was such that a communist victory was plausible, and if a US military 
engagement could hinder this. As such the rationale for interference was not directly 
sensitive to the intensity of the domestic warfare.  
The main institutions of military interference, the South-East Asian Treaty 
Organization, SEATO (Dulles 1980/1954: 155) and the Five Power Defence 
Arrangements, FPDA (Report of the Five-Power Military Conference 1954) were both 
motivated by the objective of preventing the geopolitical advance of China and the 
Soviet Union. While power politics played the primary role in this rationale of military 
interference, economic interests also featured in the calculations. Losing countries to the 
communists also meant losing access to valuable materials. The copper and tin of 
Malaya and the rice of several of the Indochinese countries were often mentioned as 
additional motives for attempting to prevent the dominoes from falling (see, for 
example William Lacy 1954).  
While the objectives of the Soviet bloc for engaging militarily in intra-state 
conflicts were freighted with ideology, the logic of Soviet and Chinese expansions of 
the communist sphere of influence and the defense of communist allies mirrored the 
Western position (Zhihua 2000; Yafeng 2008).Originally, this mutual geostrategic 
containment and expansion mainly utilized strategies of deterrence in the prevention of 
communist/imperialist aggression.  
According to Dulles,“[t]he greatest cause of war is miscalculation by an 
aggressor who thinks he can get away with something cheap and then all of a sudden he 
finds that he can’t, and if he had known in the beginning, he probably wouldn’t have 
tried it” (Dulles 1955/1978: 19). Although it is not very sensitive to the intensity of a 
conflict, it is easy to see how this logic of deterrence feeds into the intensity of a 
conflict. Both the Soviet Union (and China) and the United States saw each other as 
aggressors and both sides saw their own moves in this game of escalation as 
demonstrations of their own resolve, while seeing the moves of the other as aggression 
that constituted escalation, and thus required punishment. The unwillingness to see any 
symmetry between the communist and anti-communist power poles prevented both 
from seeing their own strategies as part of a process of interaction or as a mutual 
constitution of escalation.  
The original logic of containment at the beginning of the 1950s focused on an 
international power balance, but towards the end of the 1950s a more domestic 
orientation was assumed. The mechanism of the communist advance was no longer a 
massive attack like in Korea, but instead, the subversion of a domestic power balance 
by means of ideological manipulation and the indirect use of power (Zhihua 2000). The 
American counter-strategy was at first a similar interference in domestic political power 
battles. The American approach was to manipulate internal political structures by means 
of aid, bribery and covert operations, but this was later also supplemented by increasing 
direct military assistance to the anti-communist forces (Statler and Johns 2006). The 
first approach, with CIA sponsorship of the main anti-communist parties and candidates 
(Pauker 1990; Lansdale
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 1972), assassination plots against radical politicians 
(McGehee 1983)
66
, and finally direct military coups (Draper Report 1959; Lansdale 
1959), was still the containment of communism but on a new and different domestic 
level.
67
 
While this approach produced a drastic decline in battle deaths in the beginning, 
the number of battle deaths in internationalized intra-state conflicts started to increase, 
once military coups and direct military support for anti-communist domestic factions 
became fashionable (Nashel 2005). Military assistance with combat troops became 
more likely once the conflict had reached a certain level of intensity. This was one of 
the two ways in which the relationship between interference and intensity could be a 
progression from intensity to interference. The other was related to the rationales of 
receiving combat troops. The fact that military help was not accepted by the leaders of 
host countries until the situation was severe suggests that the correlative relationship 
between intensity and foreign interference could also be from intensity to interference. 
Leaders were sometimes interested in inviting intrusive US interference, but not one 
                                                          
65 Edward G. Lansdale, a CIA operative in the Philippines in the 1950s, and in Vietnam in the 1960s, describes 
openly the participation of the CIA in the presidential campaigns of Ramon Magsaysay in his book In the Midst of 
Wars: America’s Mission to Southeast Asia. Guy Pauker, a military intelligence operative and an academic specialist 
of Indonesia revealed the CIA funding of the Masjumi Party in the Indonesian elections of 1955 in a private interview 
with the author in Santa Monica, CA, in May 1991.  
66  Ralph B. Lovett, a former CIA station chief in Manila, revealed a secret CIA plan together with the US 
ambassador, Admiral Raymond A. Spruance to assassinate Claro Recto, an opposition contender for the presidency in 
the Philippines.  
67 The need to move to the domestic level of containment instead of operating on a more international, geopolitical 
level, was revealed first time in one of the meetings of the Five Power Defense Arrangements in 1954 (Report of the 
Five-Power Military Conference on Southeast Asia 1954).  
involving American combat forces unless there was a degree of seriousness to the 
situation. According to a Washington insider, Frances X. Winters (1988), President 
John F. Kennedy suggested to South Vietnam’s President Ngo Dinh Diem in November 
1961 that the US would send 700 ground troops to South Vietnam to assist in an anti-
communist counter-insurgency. President Diem did not accept the offer: “Vietnam does 
not wish to become a US protectorate” (Winters 1988: 36). However, after heavy 
fighting in 1962 and 1963 (and after the killing of Diem), US ground troops were 
welcomed in April 1964.  
The average intensity (fatalities per year) of intra-state conflicts that external 
powers do not enter into was just 11–42% (high and low estimates) compared to the 
intensity of conflicts that do attract external involvement. So the association between 
intensity and external interference is partly from high intensity to external military 
interference (and not the other way around). Yet, if we look at the timing of battle 
deaths, we shall realize that the intensity of conflict when external powers entered the 
domestic conflict was very low compared to the intensity that the entry of external 
powers introduced to a conflict. Thus, the association between intensity and interference 
is also – and as I shall show below – much more importantly from interference to 
intensity. The cases below are the greatest contributions to battle deaths in conflicts that 
have been internationalized. 
In Korea the conflict was aggravated by the presence of foreign combat troops 
from the beginning, as the country was already occupied by the Soviet Union in the 
North and by the US in the South when the communist rebellions started in the South. 
Communist uprisings had started in several places long before but the first massive 
incident happened on the island of Jeju on April 3, 1948.
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 Soviet and American troops 
left in 1949, and so the initial large-scale conflict between communists and anti-
communists in Korea started as a “domestic” Korean conflict. The offensive from the 
North started on June 25 1950 and the US-led UN counter-offensive started a few days 
later. Together with the Chinese involvement later on this drove the conflict into the 
most intensive (in terms of the absolute number of casualties per year) war since the 
Second World War. The military presence of international combat troops increased the 
capacity for destruction in Korea from the very beginning. As most comparable and 
reliable statistics reveal data on an annual basis, it is difficult to say how many 
casualties were caused before the Chinese and Americans entered the conflict. It is 
likely that the contribution of the external players was very substantial (bigger than in 
Vietnam). However, since there is no reliable way of knowing, I shall leave Korea out 
of the quantitative scrutiny of the overall contribution of the internationalization of 
intra-state conflicts in East Asia.   
In Vietnam the conflict started in the context of colonial domination. However, 
the battle against the communists in the South can be separated from the battle for 
independence – a conflict that started as an intra-state conflict. Up to 97.4% of the battle 
deaths of the Vietnam War were produced in the phase after the US entered with its 
combat troops, the Soviet Union had started assisting especially with the air defense of 
the country, and China had stationed mostly non-combat troops there. External 
                                                          
68 Surprisingly, Uppsala and PRIO datasets do not recognize the Jeju rebellion, which according to Baker (2009) 
wiped out 10% of the Jeju population, and according to a more modest estimate of the Correlates of War Project 
claimed 40,000 lives.  
involvement intensified the conflict 22 times, if intensity is measured by the average 
number of battle deaths per year in the conflict.  
In Cambodia, conflict also started in a colonial context. However, here too it is 
possible to separate the war of independence and the extra-systemic colonial fighting 
between the French colonial masters and the Khmer Issarak from the communist versus 
anti-communist Khmer Rouge War. The Khmer Rouge War in1967–1969 has often 
been coded as an intra-state conflict, even though US troops were operating in 
Cambodia at the time and the country’s leadership had already in 1965 turned to China 
and the Soviet Union for military assistance. However, since the main international 
involvement was mostly subordinated to the Vietnam War and not the Khmer Rouge 
War, the latter war is not at this stage considered internationalized. However, after 1969 
the conflict was internationalized both by the US and North Vietnam. At that time the 
communists received assistance both from China and North Vietnam, and due to the 
latter connection indirectly also from the Soviet Union (Mosyakov 2004). In this 
conflict the intensity (measured by average number of casualties per year) of violence 
increased 29 times after it was internationalized. Up to 98.5–98.8% (low and high 
estimates) of casualties of this conflict were produced during the international phase of 
the war.  
In Laos it is possible to separate colonial warfare from communist warfare. Also 
here there was a clear pause between the two, even if much of the same problematique, 
persons and groups were involved. The conflict started as an intra-state conflict in 1959, 
but was quickly internationalized by the neighboring Thailand the next year, and by the 
US in 1963. By the time, the roles of China and the Soviet Union in support of 
communist combatants were also important besides that of North Vietnam, which 
effectively occupied parts of the country for most of the conflict years. Up to 95% of the 
casualties were produced in the internationalized phase, even though the intensity of the 
conflict did not increase more than 61%. The intensity of the conflict increased further 
after the interference became more global and the resources of the Cold War enemies 
were mobilized for combat.  
Malaysia is a difficult case for an analysis of the internationalization of conflict. 
On the one hand, it is clear that the conflict related to the merger of Malaya, Singapore 
and North Borneo was greatly aggravated by the internationalization of the conflict by 
Indonesian “volunteers” and military forces. On the other hand, the conflict was not 
fully internal in the first place as the country was still occupied by the UK, which 
participated in the conflict as well as in the anti-communist counter-insurgency 
campaigns related to the Malayan Emergency. Reliable comparisons between internal 
and international phases of the conflict would not be possible in the same manner as in 
the cases of the Indo-Chinese countries. Even if it is easy to see that the 
internationalization of the conflict increases the intensity of the conflict, there is no 
original domestic phase that the internationalized phase could be compared to. Thus it is 
not possible to see how much the transition from internal to international cost in terms 
of human lives. It is just possible to see that the intensity of conflict declined once 
Malaysia barred international combat troops from its country. Furthermore, it is possible 
to see that the internationalization of internal conflict had its main effect on battle deaths 
only once there was interaction between two external antagonistic players: the presence 
of the UK justified Indonesian violence in Malaysia, while the presence of Indonesia 
justified violence by the UK. This logic was clearly present also in Indo-China, where 
the logic of proxy war between the US and the Soviet Union/China generated a lot of 
escalation.   
In Burma/Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia, China and the Philippines domestic 
conflicts did not get fully internationalized in the sense that the main conflict datasets 
do not recognize a substantial presence of external troops in combat operations. With 
regard to the Chinese civil war one could challenge this view
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, but in the other cases 
the (US) external military support was mostly of a nature that perhaps constituted 
secondary support (certainly in the Philippine and Thai struggle against communism: it 
did not constitute military interference in the sense that external troops were not in 
combat functions in domestic wars). Thus when assessing the contribution of the 
internationalization of intra-state conflicts in East Asia before 1980, we should 
remember that many of the intra-state conflicts did not internationalize. Yet, if we 
compare the number of battle deaths, we must also conclude that those conflicts that did 
internationalize were those that were most meaningful for the overall constitution of 
belligerence of East Asia in1946–1979. And of the internal conflicts that did become 
international, up to 97–98% (low and high estimates) of battle deaths took place after 
the external interference had started. Internationalization contributed to 95% of conflict 
intensity, if this can be concluded by comparing the phase before and after the 
internationalization of the conflict. Clearly military interference in intra-state conflicts 
was a major conflict problem in the belligerent East Asia prior to 1980.  
 
                                                          
69 US troops, that were in China to disarm the Japanese troops, also participated in the Chinese civil war in support of 
the nationalists against the communists (Blum 1999: 21-22).  
Mechanism of the Contribution of Interference to Battle Deaths 
While there is no consensusabout or even comprehensive analysis of the correlative 
relationship between military interference and conflict intensity, there are some case-
specific models of a plausible causal or constitutive mechanism behind the correlative 
relationship between conflict intensity and military interference. The starting point of 
these arguments is in the fact that increased external resources for destruction lead 
tomore battle deaths in conflicts. But the argument is much more sophisticated. 
According to Lyall and Wilson III the mechanized, clinical mode of battle (with the 
extensive use of air power) may be efficient in inter-state battles, but in counter-
insurgency this type of battle is not useful. Such counter-insurgency effort remains 
insensitive to the grievance that fuels rebellion, and might even strengthen the resolve 
of the people to fight (Lyall and Wilson III 2009). This mechanized, air-power-driven 
warfare is especially typical of democracies that fight wars in faraway places. These 
wars might be difficult to legitimize to the domestic constituencies, especially if they 
produce loss of life among the country’s own population. The effort to avoid own 
casualties, which tends to be the main reason for opposition to participation in distant 
wars, external interference tends to the mechanization of combat, and this again tends to 
power-intensive, low-manpower militaries. Such a war doctrine does reduce the number 
of own casualties, but at the same time it leads to high levels of indiscriminate violence 
inside the country where foreign troops are sent. As a result interference kills a lot of 
people that it is supposed to defend (Merom 2003; Mack 1975). Even though these 
mechanisms that link high intensity with external interference have been criticized in 
case studies for nuances (see e.g. Caverley 2009/10), it seems clear that all of the Indo-
Chinese conflicts tend to support the main gist of the argument: domestic critique of the 
war in the US pushed American administrations to greater hardware intensity and 
reliance on airpower, and thus to inefficiency in relation to conflict objectives, but 
intensity in terms of battle deaths per year. While there is less data and openly 
accessible analysis on the interference by socialist countries, one cannot rule out that 
also autocrats have political pressures from the people and from the bureaucracy and the 
military, if military interference results in many battle deaths on the side of the 
intervener. Thus the same logic of military myopia could play an important role also in 
the interference by the Soviet Union, China and North Vietnam. 
The above-mentioned “Military Myopia” argument is appealing in the 
explanation of the problem of military interference in East Asia, but it does not explain 
why the security elites of external powers wanted to engage in faraway intra-state wars 
in the first place. When looking at the arguments about anti-imperialism from the 
Eastern bloc, or the arguments about the falling dominoes or the Draper Committee 
argument about the need for the encouragement of the military elites of frontline 
countries, it seems clear that the reason why external powers were interested in 
interfering in domestic conflicts was related to the interaction of the interference 
between the global enemies, the US and the Soviet Union. Both considered their own 
moves in the game of global escalation as independent deterrents with causal effects on 
the utility calculations of the opponent. Showing strength was supposed to give 
disincentives to the opponent for aggression. However, both sides failed to consider 
their own moves as part of a process of symmetrical interaction. Without going into the 
debate about constitution and causality, the problem was that both sides considered the 
causal effects of their actions, but failed to see what their own moves constituted in the 
dialectical processes of escalation. Interference did not just cause something, it already 
was part of the escalation. 
After the Nixon (or Guam) Doctrine that emphasized a development orientation 
and regional and national self-help in security affairs (Nixon 1973), and after the 
ASEAN commitment to the same principles (ASEAN Declaration 1967) and finally 
after China’s move to become developmentalist rather than a revolutionary helper of 
international revolutions (Deng 1982), East Asia moved to a strategy whose impact on 
conflicts and battle deaths will be revealed in the following section.  
Association between Non-Interference and Peace   
The new approach of non-interference was clearly a major contribution to the fact that 
after 1979 conflicts did not escalate into war intensity. The number of average annual 
casualties in internationalized intra-state wars was reduced by 98.3–99.5% (high and 
low estimates). The only conflict where military interference took place was the conflict 
of the Cambodian government against the Khmer Rouge, FUNCINPEC and KPNLF, 
where the government was supported by Vietnam. Only once (in 1989) did these 
Cambodian conflicts escalate into a war intensity if we follow the low estimates of 
conflict related fatalities, while they were a full war during the entire time of 
internationalization if we follow the high estimates.  
If we look at the nature of military interference we shall find another feature that 
relates to the likelihood of conflict escalation. While military interference took place in 
32 conflict years against an East Asian government before 1980, this ended altogether 
after 1979. This is relevant as it seems that it is indeed an intervention against the 
government of the territory that is generally most closely associated with intensity of 
conflicts (Regan 1996). Not a single time did East Asians interfere the governments of 
other East Asian countries; nor did they allow extra-regional military interference by the 
big powers against East Asian governments (the case of Interfet in East Timor in 1998 
is a difficult border case, though). This is clearly significant to conflict escalation 
potential. If we look at the difference in the influence of support of vs. the opposition to 
governments regarding conflict escalation, we will realize that after the Second World 
War 31 times out of 32 dyads, when external military interference was opposing an East 
Asian government, conflict escalated into war intensity. However, only in seven of the 
20 cases of military interference in support of an East Asian government did the conflict 
escalate into a war.
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 Since all ten conflict dyads of internationalized intra-state conflicts 
were of the type where external (Vietnamese) interference was in support of rather than 
in opposition to the government, it is natural that conflict dyads were not as deadly.  
While it will not possible to trace the process in which conflicts do not escalate 
(it is not possible to observe a process that never took place), it is possible to try to 
understand how non-interference was possible, and how it was felt legitimate and 
acceptable as a foundation of the de-escalation of conflict in East Asia.  
While military occupation and strong limitations on a state’s monopoly of 
legitimate organized violence were the foundation of collective security in Europe, the 
East Asian way to peace seems to have been the opposite. This can only be understood 
in the historical context of the two regions. In Europe expansionist ultra-nationalist 
states had been perceived as the main security challenge in the Second World War, so it 
was natural that a curtailment of national sovereignty seemed an attractive and 
legitimate foundation of the terms of peace. However, since East Asian warfare was 
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internationalized inter-state conflict dyads were on war intensity if high estimates of battle deaths were used.  
traditionally(and certainly in the two main wars, Korean and Vietnamese) a story of the 
disrespect of national sovereignty, and since interference was always a multiplier of 
sufferings of war, it was natural for East Asia to find consensus in terms of peace that 
were based on a respect for sovereignty and non-interference. Non-interference might 
not be an objective, global recipe for peace. The success of a regional security regime 
depends, in part, on its legitimacy, which again is dependent on historical contexts. 
Legitimacy for non-interference is generated in the narratives of the past and the 
diagnoses of the problems of past wars. East Asian narrative and diagnosis of the past 
internationalized conflicts logically pointed to a strategy based on sovereignty and non-
interference.  
The fact that the East Asian military non-interference norm mainly disallows 
interference against (not so much in favor of) the government is due to the East Asian 
power political contexts (Jones 2012). An authoritarian, harmony-emphasizing culture 
has been crucial for the appeal of the non-interference principle (Neher 1994). 
Democratization has created pressures against the broad political principle of non-
interference (Neher and Ross 1995), but the core of military non-interference – the norm 
against sending troops to support a challenger of a fellow East Asian nation – is very 
much intact. There has been no military interference since 1990.  
The only way to explain the mechanism of the contribution of military non-
interference to peace in East Asia is to look at what interference no longer does to 
conflict escalation in East Asia. A very explicit ban on military interference has 
increased the political costs of interference in an economically very interesting area. 
This ban, together with the weakening of the Soviet Union in East Asia in the 1980s has 
ruled out Soviet military intervention. The Chinese and eventually also Vietnamese 
growing focus on development rather than revolution has discouraged Chinese and 
Vietnamese interventionism. Furthermore, the regional norm against interference 
together with the easing of the tension between China and the US in the 1970s has made 
it possible to keep the US and China out of any East Asian national defense of internal 
stability. Easing of tension has made it possible for China and others to allow US 
military limited role in East Asia, while allowing the US to accept the limits to its 
military role. While US military presence is acceptable, the US also accepts a limitation 
of its presence rather than an active combat role. This has been possible partly because 
of the fact that China has accepted to abstain from military support of communist 
movements in East Asia.  
Since interference and intervention ended already at the end of the 1970s, we 
cannot explain it only as a result of the ending of the Cold War. The regions own 
decisions to take a negative view of permanent military bases and zero tolerance 
towards military interference to help challengers of regimes have been meaningful as 
they have, as a very public orientation, created political costs for anyone willing to 
ignore this regional orientation.  
The de-escalation of conflicts by means of moving an external capacity to fight 
wars away from the region has not been an idealistic reliance on the power of norms, 
though. Creating normative costs has been just one of the elements. The other element 
has been the idea of reducing the incentive of foreign interference by denying access to 
the opponents of the potential powers interested in military interference. The main 
motive for the US to enter the Vietnam War was the presence of communist forces in 
the country. Similarly the main interest of the Soviet Union to help Vietnam was the 
presence of the US in South Vietnam. The norm of non-interference has constituted a 
situation, which has secured the defensive interests in de-escalation of all parties. In 
short it has had a major role for the long peace of East Asia.  
  
Chapter 6 
Face Saving and the Termination of Conflicts. 
Introduction  
While the decline in the number of East Asian battle deaths has been a positive 
development, the new East Asian approach to conflicts and interaction is not necessarily 
successful in its entirety. I have already shown how developmentalism has reduced the 
probability of the onset of conflicts, while non-interference has drastically contributed 
to the region’s ability to avoid conflict escalation. The emergence of peace in the 1970s 
does not therefore logically require that East Asia had adopted a new, successful 
approach to conflict termination. Exploration of the ratio of conflict termination to 
conflicts on the basis of the Uppsala conflict-termination data (data published in Kreutz 
2010), reveals that there has not been a significant positive change in the record of East 
Asian conflict termination after 1979.  
Empirical analysis does, however, show that East Asia’s approach to conflict 
termination has changed around the time that the number of East Asian battle deaths 
collapsed. But it is less certain that the new approach in all its elements contributed to 
the new peace. On the one hand, conflict termination approach has not managed to 
make conflict termination much more frequent. On the other hand, approach to conflict 
termination can have had an impact on East Asian conflict behavior: a pattern of 
conflict termination can reveal how countries perceive conflicts, conflict objectives and 
the conditions in which conflicts can be terminated. Thus, even if conflict termination 
has not become more efficient conflicts can have become less deadly if countries do not 
expect conflicts only to end in the total destruction of one of the conflicting parties. \ 
The two main changes in the East Asian approach to conflict termination were 
the near disappearance of military victories and the near disappearance of successful 
peace processes. Both changes were related to the overall change of approach in East 
Asia, from a confrontational, power-political approach that mobilized publicity and 
people for the victory in intra- and interstate disputes, into a more discrete, 
personalistic, indirect approach that rarely focuses on divisive issues such as disputes, 
but that rather focuses on the tackling of the grievances behind disputes and on saving 
the face of all parties of disputes.  
By using the Uppsala conflict-termination data (Kreutz 2010) we can summarize 
the pattern of conflict termination in the following manner:  
 
Table 6.1: Conflict termination before 1980 and after 1979 
 1946–1979 1980–2009 1946–1979 
(%) 
1946–1979 
(%) 
Peace agreement 7 2
71
 15 5 
Ceasefire agreement  
with conflict 
regulation 
1 4 2 11 
Ceasefire agreement 0 2 0 5 
Victory 13 3 27 8 
Low activity 23 25 48 68 
Other 4 1 8 3 
Joining alliance 0 0 0 0 
 
TOTAL 
 
48 
 
37 
 
100 
 
100 
 
                                                          
71 I discussed one of the two peace processes in Chapter 3 and concluded that the latest Uppsala data on the peace 
process of East Timor could be erroneous and that in fact the only peace process that was genuinely the reason for the 
disappearance of conflict is the Aceh peace process.  
Disappearance of Victories 
The first, potentially positive, transformation in the East Asian approach to conflict 
termination that can be seen reflected in the summary of Table 7.1 is the near 
disappearance of victories. For a more detailed analysis Table 6.2 lists the conflicts that 
have been terminated in a victory: 
Table 6.2 Victories in East Asia after the Second World War 
Conflicting party 1 Conflicting party 2 Conflict 
duration 
China Taiwanese insurgents 1947 
Burma/Myanmar APLP (Arakan Peoples Liberation 
Party), Mujahid Party 
1948–1961 
Burma/Myanmar BMA (Beik Mon Army, faction of 
the NMSP, New Mon State Party) 
1996 
Burma/Myanmar PNDF (Pawnguawng National 
Defence Force) 
1949–1950 
China Tibet 1950 
China Tibet 1959 
Indonesia Republic of South Moluccas 1950 
Thailand Military faction (Navy) 1951 
Malaysia CPM 1958–1960 
United Kingdom North Kalimantan Liberation Army 1962 
China India 1962 
North Vietnam South Vietnam 1965–1975 
Cambodia Khmer Rouge/FUNK 1967–1975 
Cambodia KNUFNS, Khmer Rouge, KPNLF, 
FUNCINPEC 
1978–1998 
China Vietnam 1978–1981 
 
During the belligerent period East Asian states often sought to humiliate their 
domestic challengers with a victory. This can be seen in the record of Chinese, 
Malaysian, Indonesian, Burmese and Thai approaches (Table 6.2). In most cases the 
enemy that was defeated and humiliated was an ethnic rebel organization, and the defeat 
often constituted a humiliation for the entire ethnic group. The conflict then continued 
as the ethnic group re-established the defeated ethnic militia
72
 or established new 
militant organizations,
73
 against the government. In the case of Thailand, the challenger 
was not always ethnic (or a political) group, but a faction in the military, but the 
response of the government was nevertheless one that did not aim at mutual benefit or 
“dignity for all” or tackling of grievances of the rebel constituencies. Instead the 
objective was power political, the intention was to defeat the enemy and make it 
incapable of retaliation. In Brunei the conflict against the North Kalimantan Liberation 
Army took place in a colonial context. Only in Cambodia (1998) did this practice of 
humiliating ones domestic enemies by means of military defeat continued beyond 1979, 
but not after the country joined the ASEAN. Also the conflict that was terminated by 
victory in Cambodia was one that had started already before the beginning of the 
peaceful phase in East Asia.  
The approach of seeking victory instead of offering face saving for one’s 
enemies was also applied to some conflicts with international enemies. Of these 
conflicts the Vietnam War had naturally the biggest impact on battle deaths, because it 
                                                          
72 The Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) reorganized itself after being defeated and continued its fight until 1981 (a 
good account of the Malaysian effort against it can be found in Mahathir 2011). the Republic of South Moluccas re-
established itself in the Netherlands; it still exists but is not fighting (Nikijuluw, 1999).   
73 PNDF (Pawnguawng Natioal Defence Force) was defeated, but its members returned to the battle ground as 
members of the Burmese communist Party or as members of the Kachin Independence Organization or Kachin 
Independence Army. APLP (Arakan Peoples Liberation Party) and the Mujahid Party were defeated as organizations 
in the very beginning of Burmese military dictatorship. However, many of the members of the two organizations 
established new organizations for the Rakhine/Arakan State Muslims. Conflict there has not ended so far (Pedersen in 
Kivimäki & Pedersen 2008). The crushing of Tibetan resistance was also more dependent of people than formal 
organizations, and thus discontent continued among the people that had been crushed in 1950 and flared up in a new 
armed clash in 1959 and smaller incidents ever since (Sperling 2004). 
was from the beginning driven to a power-political path where only a victory could save 
the face of a conflicting party (Anderson 2011). Only the conflict between Vietnam and 
China ended in a victory after the beginning of the long peace of East Asia. Even this 
conflict started before the peaceful period and the victorious side – Vietnam – had not 
yet become developmentalist, with respect of the non-interference principle, when it 
terminated the conflict victoriously.   
It would not be fair to claim that Indonesia did not aim at a military victory in 
Aceh at the turn of the century, or that Burma/Myanmar did not try to defeat its ethnic 
enemies and that the Thai or the Philippine army did not intend to suppress victoriously 
their separatist Muslim insurgencies in their countries even after the beginning of the 
peaceful period in East Asia. However, they were not obsessed about winning in the 
same way as the parties of the Cold War proxy wars were obsessed about defeating their 
enemies. There have been two positive changes that are reflected in the near 
disappearance of victorious conflicts.  
One of the positive changes is that developmentalism has penetrated conflict 
termination efforts. East Asian countries are often very simple-minded of the benefits 
for stability of economic development in rebellious areas, such as Tibet,
74
 Papua, Aceh 
(Husain 2007). As will be discussed in the final chapter of this book, developmentalism 
has not always been sufficient for the termination of intra-state conflicts in East Asia, 
                                                          
74 While the 1951 agreement between China and the disputed representatives of Tibet stipulated that “the purpose of 
the agreement was to enable Tibet to repel the imperialist forces and realize peaceful liberation, and to create 
prerequisites for Tibet to join the other parts of the country”, the White Paper on Tibet from 2011 defines the purpose 
of the Chinese policy in Tibet as unity, and the method as offering prosperity and development: “China implements 
the ethnic minority policy of promoting unity and achieving common prosperity and development.” (Chinese 
Government 2011) 
but it has been a better alternative than the simple-minded pursuit of military victories 
(Kivimäki 2012c). 
Developmentalist regional framing also helped East Asia get rid of its Cold War 
framing of inter-state relations and conflicts. The Cold War narratives of the inevitable 
victory of socialism or capitalist freedom dominated East Asian thinking of interstate 
relations and disputes until the 1970s and this affected conflict termination (see for 
example Anderson 2011). In a framing where the main contradiction of the world is 
between communism and capitalism, two fundamentally opposed political systems, the 
logic of relative power easily invades the thinking of international relations and portrays 
disputes as zero-sum games. Within such a setting, face saving is not feasible. Only 
once East Asia had developed a framing of their own in the 1970s could they be 
released from the zero-sum framing of international conflicts.
75
 The Sino–Chinese 
conflict in 1979 exemplified the transition. While the first phase of it was oriented 
towards the objective of a victory (even if not a total victory as the Cold War conflicts 
often were), this changed in the 1980s. Once the regional order consolidated in the 
1980s even the conflicts between Vietnam and China tended to fizzle away because of 
the concerns of economic development rather than resolution of disputes (Hood 1992). 
Even though negotiations failed to produce a peace agreement and even if the first phase 
of Sino–Vietnamese conflict ended in a victory rather than in a peace process, this 
conflict represents a case where the dispute was explicitly (even if not successfully) 
negotiated in the beginning of the conflict. 
                                                          
75 But since the transition in the approach to the termination of international conflicts was not drastic, one should not 
exaggerate this point.  
The other thing was the ending of populist, popular mobilization of conflicts. 
During the belligerent 1960s international relations, especially with regard to the US 
and China, or towards the perceived colonial powers or neo-colonialists were often 
driven by popular mass campaigns. Burma’s (“Quarterly Chronicle and 
Documentation”, The China Quarterly, no. 31, 1967: 217–219. and no. 34, 1968: 190–
191), Indonesia’s (“Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation”, The China Quarterly, no 
29, 1967: 196–7; no. 29, 1967: 225), Malaysia’s (National Chinese News Agency May 
20, 1969) and sometimes also the Philippines’s (van der Kroeff 1967) dissatisfaction 
towards Chinese support of communist subversion was demonstrated by officially 
sanctioned or at least officially tolerated popular action against the Chinese Embassy, 
Chinese property and ethnic Chinese. Similarly, Chinese dissatisfaction towards US 
policies in Vietnam, Soviet hegemonism, and anti-Chinese actions in Southeast Asia 
and even lack of support to Mao Zedong’s political thinking in Mongolia were 
demonstrated by Red Guard actions against foreign embassies (see Chapter 7 of this 
book).  
This pattern of people’s diplomacy often invited opportunities for regimes to 
release popular anger against foreign targets (Wright 1965). For governments that did 
not actively remove grievances that gave rise to rebellion, this was a tempting option. 
As will be shown in the following chapter, this option was taken at least by the 
Indonesian and the Chinese governments, and it contributed to the intensity of 
communist subversion in Southeast Asia during the Cultural Revolution as well as to 
the conflict between Malaysia and Indonesia in the 1960s.  
The following chapter will show that conflict resolution became very secretive 
and personalistic in the late 1960s and in the 1970s removing the option of 
popular/populistic diplomacy from the menu of the options of governments. Internal 
conflict pressures were supposed to be tackled by means of domestic development, 
while the diversion of domestic pressures against external enemies was explicitly 
condemned (Anwar 1994). Divisive issues were not supposed to be discussed in public 
and thus mobilizing masses for victory in a dispute became less common (Soesastro 
1995: iii-ix; Haller-Trost 1995). Yet, one should not exaggerate this change as it is clear 
that in the most recent maritime territorial disputes between China and Japan, as well as 
between China and the Philippines, popular diplomacy and arguments appealing with 
the rhetoric of victorious battles have once again been mobilized.  
Given that wars ending in a victory contributed to almost one-third of the battle 
deaths,
76
 and given that conflicts that were framed by the objective of victory (those that 
were terminated in a victory) were the most intensive conflicts in East Asia (with the 
highest number of battle deaths per year), it could be assumed that the near ending of 
victories in East Asia might have had its contribution to the long peace of East Asia.  
Disappearance of Peace Negotiation 
The other clear change that can be seen in the summary of changes in conflict 
termination in Table 6.1 is the near disappearance of conflict termination by peace 
agreement (Kivimäki 2008; Svensson 2011). While conflict termination by victories 
often tell something about the framing of the entire conflict, and not just about the 
approach to conflict termination only, the disappearance of successful peace agreements 
                                                          
76 This claim is based on a calculation from the Uppsala conflict-termination data and PRIO battle-death data (version 
3.0), according to which 32% of the casualties of the conflicts that were terminated after the Second World War in 
East Asia were from conflicts that ended with a victory to one of the conflicting parties. The number of casualties in 
victorious wars is bigger than the number of conflicts terminated in any other way.   
probably tells more about the approach to divisive issues such as conflict disputes. 
Table 6.3 lists the conflicts that have ended in peace negotiation. Only one or two of 
them are from the peaceful period in East Asia.  
Table 6.3 Successful termination of conflicts by peace agreements 
Party 1 Party 2 Year (of the conflict) 
France Thailand 1946 
Netherlands Indonesian nationalist and 
communist militias 
1946–1949 
France Vietminh 1946–1954 
Laos Pathet Lao, Neutralists 1959–1961 
Indonesia Netherlands/Supporters of 
West Papuan Independence 
1962 
Indonesia Malaysia (and the UK) 1963–1966 
Laos (and 
the US) 
Pathet Lao 1963–1973 
Indonesia Fretilin
77
 1997–1998 
Indonesia Free Aceh Movement 1999–2005 
 
Most of the wars in East Asia (with Laos 1959–61 and 1963–1973 being the only 
exception during the belligerent period) that ended with a negotiated solution tended to 
be wars of decolonization and re-colonization after the Japanese occupation.
78
 They 
were possible to negotiate as the concept of colonialism was already unsustainable 
economically and politically. If we look at the origin of the ASEAN peace (discussed in 
detail in Chapter 7) we can also see that peace processes of these wars were dominated 
                                                          
77 See footnote 1 of this chapter for a reservation of the coding of this conflict termination.  
78 While the Franco–Thai War after the Second World War (and during it) was not directly related to colonialism of 
Thailand, which was never colonized, it was related to the return of the French colonial occupation in Indo–China 
(see,Tully 2002: 327-49).  
by extra-regional powers.
79
 Once the ASEAN way of settling conflicts emerged, explicit 
negotiation on disputes became rare and the explicit focusing of disputes was felt alien 
to the region (Soesastro 1995; Snitwongse 1998). The difficulty of negotiating on peace 
could be clearly seen in the original ASEAN countries, and later in China, while 
Northeast Asia seems to have been a bit more open (though no more successful) 
towards tackling disputes head on. Recently, there have been several processes 
suggesting that the East Asian shyness towards explicit tackling of disputes could be 
overcome. Yet, peace negotiation to resolve disputes during the long peace of East Asia 
often still tends to be driven, or at least considerably influenced, by external powers. 
The Six-party Talks have a strong American fingerprint,
80
 while the explicit negotiation 
on the Cambodian conflict was also externally driven by the UN (see UNAMIC, 
undated).     
With the exception of the war in Laos (1963–1973), none of the cold war proxy 
wars with US combat troops were negotiated successfully. The framing of those wars 
was power-political, and thus about relative gains. Such wars tended to end in victories 
if they were to end. The disappearance of the Cold War framing of international politics 
and the emergence of a more regional framing in the late 1960s and in the 1970s 
probably contributed to the decline in battle deaths and the emergence of the long peace 
of East Asia.  
                                                          
79 The influence and manipulation by the US in the failed efforts to settle the Malaysian Confrontation have been well 
documented by the US Ambassador at the time, in Jones, 1974.  
80 Several studies close to the US administration testify at least to the perceptions of the dominant American role in 
the Six-party Talks. See, for example, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate 2006. 
The near disappearance of explicit conflict resolution in East Asia is related to 
three elements of the ASEAN Way of conflict prevention. First, it is related to the effort 
to focus on things that unite rather than on things that divide. Disputes divide and thus 
they are difficult to deal with. When Ahtisaari was mediating the conflict in Aceh in 
2004, he often had to initiate discussions on issues that the conflicting parties were “too 
polite” to raise. For example the issue of a fair administering of the revenue sharing 
from the natural resources of special province of Aceh was not raised by the 
independence-minded Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM, Free Aceh Movement). Thus this 
issue needed to be brought on the negotiation table by the mediator even though it was 
undoubtedly one of the central issues of discontent for the GAM (discussions with the 
mediators, especially President Martti Ahtisaari April 2004).  
The other reason why disputes are often not dealt with is the strategy of 
addressing concerns of rebel constituencies (or dissatisfied neighboring nations) by 
addressing their grievances. Instead of negotiating with the Papuans or the Muslim 
rebels of Southern Thailand, or the main independence-minded people of Tibet, 
governments try to satisfy the needs of the constituencies of these rebels. In this way the 
government does not need to lose face by recognizing rebels as legitimate actors in the 
conflict problematics, but they can make compromises just like in negotiations 
(anonymous interview data).   
Thirdly, the strict interpretation of non-interference has made it difficult for 
other states or other external actors to offer good services mediation or arbitration in 
conflicts where the government of an East Asian country is a conflicting party. Yet, as 
one of the leading Southeast Asian mediators and peace negotiators, Ambassador 
Wiryono Sastrohandojo said in 2007, “you cannot play ball and be the referee at the 
same time”. Conflicts where the government is a conflicting party often need external 
“interference” and this is difficult in East Asia. However, Malaysia has recently played 
a constructive role in the mediation and facilitation of several conflict resolution efforts 
(Razak 2011), while Indonesia has allowed two NGOs to mediate in the Aceh peace 
process (Hasan 2007) and the Philippines has allowed Indonesian and Malaysian 
mediation and facilitation of peace talks in two of its conflicts (Misuari 2010).  
The difficulty of East Asian governments to tackle their disputes head on in 
explicit peace negotiation is likely to be a problem for East Asian stability. This is 
especially the case in disputes where the ASEAN Way does not fully function, for 
instance in the maritime territorial disputes. There one would have to resolve the 
disputes eventually the disputes. As things are now conflicts end in inaction, which 
allows face saving for conflicting parties, but which also fails to settle the dispute.  
The near disappearance of successful peace processes has not meant that peace 
is not negotiated at all. It seems that there are initiatives to revive the tradition of peace 
negotiation in East Asia. While in the North (in Six-party Talks), such initiatives are 
often lead by the United States (but also South Korea and China, for example), the 
experience of a successful peace process in Aceh has energized many emerging fragile 
peace processes in Southeast Asia. The main Indonesian architect of the Aceh peace, 
Vice President Jusuf Kalla has also managed to negotiate peace in Poso and in Ambon. 
Neither process actually ended violence as it had already ended before. This is why 
these processes are not coded as successful peace processes despite the fact that they 
dramatically consolidate the existing ceasefire and created the political terms for it. 
Furthermore, the Philippines has managed to negotiate two peace agreements with its 
Islamic opponents on the Island of Mindanao. Yet these agreements did not end 
violence on the island and therefore they are not coded as successful peace process. 
Finally, also Myanmar has managed to negotiate on peace in the spirit of dignity for all 
(rather than victory for some and defeat for others). The 2007 National Convention 
process qualifies as a massive peace negotiation process, but there, the fact that the 
government was playing and acting as the referee too, hindered the feeling of ownership 
of the negotiated constitution from the ethnic groups who participated in the negotiation 
process (Kivimäki 2008a).  
Since the revival of the tradition of peace negotiation is still only an unfinished 
process, it cannot be studied empirically. I shall, however, return to the promise of the 
recent efforts in peace negotiation in the more speculative final chapter, which not only 
concludes the findings of this study on the pillars of the long peace of East Asia but also 
speculates about the future prospects of this still fragile peace.  
  
Chapter 7 
Generation of the Successful ASEAN/Chinese Approach 
Introduction  
The previous chapters have revealed a systematic correlative relationship between the 
elements of the ASEAN Way and the decline in conflict and battle deaths, while 
previous studies have shown how these elements might serve peace in current Southeast 
Asian interaction (see for example, Acharya 2001). The success of the ASEAN Way has 
often been attributed to the commitment of the political elites to these principles but 
also to the feeling of ownership to these principles (Acharya 2001; Kivimäki 2001). 
Such commitment and feeling of ownership is then explained as the foundation of 
common East Asian identity and perception of common interest (Ba 2011; Acharya 
2001). What has remained unclear is the reason why these elements of conflict 
management have become owned by the East Asian elites, and how the commitment to 
them has been generated. The present chapter will tackle this omission in the existing 
research by going to the genesis of ASEAN transition to the ASEAN Way and the 
genesis of the Chinese transition to non-interference, developmentalism and face saving. 
It will uncover the background of the success of the ASEAN Way – how it was 
generated, and how this formula for peace gained support among regional leaders and 
how the East Asian commitment to and ownership of the ASEAN way emerged. Since 
this development took place in two separate historical processes, one in Southeast Asia 
at the end of the 1960s, and one in China in the 1970s, I shall divide this chapter into 
two, one part for each historical process. 
The chapter does not seek explanations that could associate the success of the 
ASEAN Way to beneficial exogenous conditions. Instead, it uses Rogers Smith’s idea 
of generative causality, where causes and effects are not exogenous, but part of a 
common historical context (Smith 2003). Effects are not deterministic or probabilistic 
responses to external conditions. Instead, they follow logical historical processes, where 
social and historical contexts have causal powers as they give sense to certain 
conclusions. In this chapter the crucial mission is to explain the historical context where 
the ASEAN Way started making a lot of sense for China and for Southeast Asian states 
and elites. Success was generated by motivating the commitment of the East Asian 
elites to the ASEAN Way and by giving an indigenous sense to the ASEAN formula of 
conflict prevention. 
Origin of the ASEAN Way in Southeast Asia 
ASEAN was initiated by five nations: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore 
and Thailand. Yet, it was established largely as a response to the difficult relationship of 
two of the founding members, Indonesia and Malaysia. The greatest change in ASEAN 
interstate relationships was indeed needed for the relationship between these two 
countries. This is why special attention is devoted to the transformation of the 
relationship between Malaysia and Indonesia: the change in the relationship between 
Malaysia and Indonesia reflects best the genesis of ASEAN pacification. This is not 
meant to signal a claim that only Malaysia and Indonesia were important for the 
establishment of ASEAN, on the contrary; Thailand and the Philippines, but certainly 
also Singapore had their important roles in the Southeast Asian regional transformation. 
However, focusing on the biggest transformation could make it easier to observe the 
change in the Southeast Asian approach to conflicts and the result of that change.   
As the first step, this part will analyze the problems that ASEAN sought answers 
to. For the relationship between the two most belligerent nations before the 
establishment of ASEAN, these problems were related to the Malaysian Confrontation 
in 1963–1966, and the failure to resolve it by using standard best practices of conflict 
resolution. It was the commonly experienced problems that gave rise to two of the 
principles of the ASEAN Way: non-interference and developmentalism. Because of the 
heavy Western pressure these efforts were perceived as alien, and they failed to gain the 
local commitment and the feeling of ownership among the Southeast Asian nations. 
However, after several international efforts, a different, more local approach to the 
resolution of the confrontation was eventually adopted. The principles of this approach 
were later generalized to Southeast Asian interstate relations and this led into the 
establishment of the Association for Southeast Asian Nations – ASEAN – in 1966–67. 
The new approach might have been less orthodox from the dispute-resolution point of 
view, but it nevertheless managed to gain regional commitment to the ASEAN Way. 
The new approach succeeded in creating a regime of interaction that could become a 
basis of conflict prevention in decades to come. This regime could later be copied by 
East Asia with the same results of peacefulness.  
The Malaysian Confrontation 
The Vietnam War and Indonesia’s anti-neocolonialist campaign against the 
establishment of an independent, pro-British Malaysia (by merging Malaya with 
Singapore, Sabah, Brunei and Sarawak) framed the Southeast Asian political life in the 
mid-1960s. The latter campaign also involved the Philippines that had an overlapping 
territorial claim with the emerging Federation of Malaysia. Thailand was one of the 
nations that offered its good services for the resolution of the ‘Malaysian 
Confrontation’. While the Vietnam War was a more global conflict, with the Soviet 
Union supporting the communists and the United States supporting the Saigon regime, 
the Malaysian Confrontation involved the Southeast Asian countries that later 
established a cooperative regime which successfully tackled the disputes that the 
countries were to face.  
The Philippine resistance of Malaysia was non-military, and concentrated merely 
against the idea of including North Borneo into the federation as the State of Sabah. The 
Indonesian opposition, however, was more fundamental and involved many military 
strategies. Yet both countries were prepared to aim at a victory against a colonial creation: for 
the Philippines the victory was to be limited (Sabah), while Indonesia aimed ‘to eat raw-
mengganjang’, or to Crush Malaysia, which then became the name of the conflict. There was 
no room for consensual dialogue aimed at saving everybody’s face in the conflict – something 
that was so typical of conflict resolution in the Southeast Asian societies. Furthermore, the 
objectives of both the Philippines and Indonesia demonstrated a lack of any respect to 
Malaysia’s internal affairs or national sovereignty – principles that characterized the ASEAN 
approach to security. The commitment to the idea of non-interference and the norm of 
respecting sovereignty emerged after the Confrontation as an antithesis to the approach that 
had created trouble to the region. Commitment to non-interference was a product of this 
historical context where intervention had caused hurt to all states of the region. Obviously the 
Vietnam War that escalated by the interference of external big powers also emphasized the 
need for a regional norm according to which sovereignty of regional countries had to be 
respected.   
The official grounds for the Indonesian leadership rejecting Malaysia were based on its 
being an undemocratic merger orchestrated by the feudal Malayan elites and the neo-
colonialist United Kingdom (Indonesian Embassy undated; Indonesian Embassy 1964). As a 
proof of the fact that the establishment of Malaysia did not bring about real de-colonization or 
real independence for Malaysians, Sukarno pointed to the request by the United Kingdom to 
retain military bases in Malaysia (Sukarno 1964).  
The fact that Malaysia’s establishment was supported by Indonesia until the end of the 
confrontation with the Dutch to decolonize Irian Jaya indicates that there were other motives 
for the Malaysian Confrontation than those presented in public. According to the American 
Ambassador in Malaysia (Baldwin 1984: 109), Sukarno, a charismatic revolutionary leader, 
needed a conflict for the support of his power. Conflict and struggle were needed as an 
essential part of the function of the state in order to justify its leadership by a revolutionary 
figure. Concentration on economic problems would have been necessary for the tackling of 
grievances that motivated desperate, violent popular action, but this was inconsistent with the 
political identity of Sukarno. If bringing economic development was expected from the state, 
revolutionary leaders like Sukarno were no longer needed for the management of state affairs. 
Sukarno could not tackle economic problems and compensated this deficiency by articulating a 
revolutionary reality where economic rationality did not exist. This he did, for example, by 
refusing to nominate a single economist to the team which was to design the government’s 
Eight Year Overall Development Plan and then praise the product of the team for being ‘rich in 
fantasy’ (Feith, 1963: 83). 
However, the people of Indonesia did experience the economic realities and the fact 
that they did not have enough food to eat made them grievant. While tackling economic 
conflict grievances was not compatible with Sukarno’s revolutionary political approach, 
popular anger had to be channeled away from the political leadership to imperialist and 
colonialist conspirators. 
Once the Netherlands had left Irian Jaya, Indonesia did not have such conspirators on 
their own soil. In the absence of domestic battles of liberation, Indonesian revolutionary 
leadership needed to move on to expansionism and adventurism abroad (Pauker 1963). This 
was essential to contain the problems that were caused by the incompatibility of the 
revolutionary approach with the focus on tackling economic problems head on. 
Confrontational nationalistic discourse had to be created as logic that accommodated 
Sukarno’s continued leadership and redirected grievances to actors outside the national 
political elite (Poulgrain 1999).  
The hurt caused by the revolutionary state ideology and the neglect of developmental 
responsibilities of the state gave rise to the regional commitment to the main element in the 
prevention of the onset of conflicts of the ASEAN Way. After the Malaysian confrontation (and 
the rule of President Sukarno in Indonesia) development was considered as a responsibility of 
regional states in order for the region to avoid diversionary wars, where popular dissatisfaction 
emanating from economic trouble was channeled to aggression against other regional states. 
Again the common experience of a problem generated the commitment to a regional remedy.  
The conflict behavior was based on the Indonesian mass support of President 
Sukarno’s confrontational policies. Just as in China during the Cultural Revolution, Indonesia 
waged war by mobilizing voluntary fighters by using the Defense Force organization and the 
Communist Party organization. Later, also the military personnel were covertly used to support 
the ‘spontaneous’ people’s militias. The solidarity of the people was maintained by strict 
control of the media for the purpose of constructing nationalistic myths against Malaysia and 
concealing the weaknesses of the Indonesian claim, revealed by the negotiations with the 
Malaysian politicians. The records of Bangkok meetings show that the Malaysian delegation 
was able to discredit Indonesia’s arguments against Malaysia rather convincingly and that, in 
direct negotiations, it was very difficult for the Indonesians to sustain any grounds for their 
claims (Record of the 1st Meeting of the Political Committee 1964; Memorandum on Tri-
partite talks 1964; USIS 1964). Yet in public they were always very confident of the justification 
of their cause.  
International pressure on the prevention of further violence between Malaysia and 
Indonesia was focused on efforts to resolve disputes about Malaysia’s establishment. 
However, the focus on narrow conflict resolution did not tackle the contextual realities of the 
conflict. If Indonesia needed a struggle, no dispute resolution could end such a struggle, unless 
the identity of the revolutionary state of Indonesia was altered. The initial efforts to solve the 
conflict involved US-mediated negotiations between the conflicting parties in the so-called 
Manila Conference on July 29 –August 5, 1963, in the so-called Tripartite talks in Bangkok on 
February 5–9, 1964, and in the Tokyo Negotiations on 18–July 20, 1964. Furthermore, popular 
referendum was used twice to determine the will of the people in the areas that – according to 
Indonesia – were reluctant to join Malaysia. Furthermore, the mediation effort used third 
party advice from a group of eminent experts from Afro-Asian governments. Finally, also 
coercive persuasion was used. A presidential envoy, Robert F. Kennedy, was sent to deliver 
President Sukarno a threat of a US military involvement in case Indonesia did not stop its 
aggression. All these means of conflict resolution testify openness from the conflicting parties 
to focus on the problems and to accept external help. Furthermore, they exemplify the 
standard diplomatic tools and best practices of conflict resolution. However, none of them 
worked. Instead, the ill-advised, narrow-minded focus on conflict resolution and the reliance of 
the standard international tools of crisis management just created alienation among Southeast 
Asian countries. Developmentalism was needed to tackle the root causes of conflict, while 
empowerment of regional efforts were needed to gain local ownership of peace, and to avoid 
the alienation of Indonesian elite from the internationally dictated conflict management 
approaches.   
The publicly announced reasons why the solution formula of the Manila Conference – 
a UN monitored referendum – failed to satisfy the Indonesian party were two technical 
problems of the arrangement. First of all, Indonesian observers of the plebiscite were refused 
an entry to Malaysia by UK customs officials from the very beginning of the process. Some of 
the Indonesian observers were working for the Indonesian intelligence establishment and had 
to be changed before the Indonesian delegation could enter the country. Second, British 
officials announced the unification of Malaysia already before the UN had announced the 
results of the plebiscite on  September 14, 1963 (Harriman 1969; see also Suwito of Indonesia 
in the Record of the 1st Meeting of the Political Committee 1964).  
Yet it was more probable that the reason for not accepting the result of the plebiscite 
was rather the fact that Indonesia as a revolutionary state simply did not appreciate the 
outcome of it. Indonesia had no culture for respecting the voices of ordinary people and 
therefore it was not difficult for President Sukarno simply to ignore the referendum result 
once it turned out to be against Indonesia’s interests. Contrary to the predictions of the 
Indonesian political elite, the merger was supported by an overwhelming majority of 
Malaysians (Jones 1974). Thus Indonesia rejected the result despite earlier promises. It was 
obviously easy for Indonesia to backtrack from its promises as it seemed that Indonesian 
leadership was not really committed to the process of the negotiation. Despite the best 
practices, Indonesia did not feel ownership to it, and thus it was politically possible for the 
revolutionary leadership to backtrack on explicit commitments in the process. More 
importantly, despite the economic grievances, due to the revolutionary political discourse, 
reckless moves in the negotiations were not even condemned by the Indonesian people, who 
seemingly supported President Sukarno’s adventurism (Mackie 1974). 
The next problem in the negotiations was a dispute of whether substantial peace 
negotiations could be resumed before the withdrawal of Indonesian military and volunteers in 
the area (Memorandum on Tri-partite Talks 1964; Record of Ministerial Meeting 1964). At the 
beginning of the negotiations Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Subandrio was willing to accept an 
agreement where Indonesia would have withdrawn from the area. Later however, the 
Indonesian stand became more determined after the meeting and it was declared that only 
the removal of colonialism could make the volunteers withdraw. This, again, in the Indonesian 
interpretation would have meant that political negotiations would have needed to be 
concluded successfully before militias would leave (USIS 1964; Record of Ministerial Meeting 
1964).  
Bangkok negotiations were also made more difficult by the lack of effort in searching 
for a face-saving formula for Indonesia. If Indonesia had to yield and withdraw, it wanted 
Malaysia to make some concession, too. Without this, the revolutionary Indonesian leadership 
would have lost face and credibility as the leaders of a struggling revolutionary state. At the 
same time, Malaysia and the UK wanted to avoid the impression that the Indonesian military 
aggression could be rewarded in any way.
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 In the Tokyo negotiations, Indonesian negotiators 
also pointed to the humiliation caused by the Malaysian–UK declaration of the federation 
without a warning or prior negotiations or without waiting for the UN referendum results. For 
Indonesia, face-saving was clearly a major problem. According to Indonesia’s Foreign Minister 
Subandrio, Indonesia would have been a ‘laughing stock’ had it not pursued a confrontation 
(Record of the 1st Meeting of Heads of Governments 1964). The problem of international 
insensitivity towards the need of Indonesia to get a dignified solution added to the motivation 
of regional elites to commit to norms of face-saving in conflict resolution. Without such a norm 
Malaysian confrontation would have continued, and all regional powers saw how 
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unacceptable that would have been.  
Finally in the last process of peace talks in Tokyo, Philippine President Diosdado 
Macapagal came up with a solution that an eminent Asian–African group would be invited to 
give advice on how to settle the issue. This could have been a face-saving option for Indonesia 
because the solution could not possibly be affected by ‘the colonialists’; in this way also 
Malaysia would be more of a Southern, as contrasted to Imperialist, creation (Record of the 1st 
Meeting of Heads of Governments 1964). This suggestion was problematic, however, since it 
did not define whether Indonesia had to withdraw before the African–Asian group would start 
its consideration (Record of the 2nd Meeting of Heads of Government 1964). Yet at the 
meeting of the heads of state in Tokyo, Indonesia’s President Sukarno accepted to honor the 
advice given by the group: ‘[W]hatever decision or suggestion the commission makes, I shall 
accept’ (Record of the 2nd Meeting of Heads of Government 1964). Later however, after having 
consulted with the radical sectors of the Indonesian bureaucracy, Sukarno rejected the 
Macapagal formula (US Embassy 1965). Clearly, again, the lack of local ownership together 
with the radical political climate in Indonesia made it easy and necessary for Sukarno to 
backtrack on his promises in negotiations.  
None of the measures of the initial negotiation process helped solve the disputes 
behind the conflict. Nor could they reduce the tension or the underlying dissatisfaction, which 
gave rise to the disputes. Most of all these measures failed to please the radical Indonesian 
masses whose determination was sufficient to sustain the conflict. However, commitment of 
the elites was also lacking. On that level it seemed that the main problem of the internationally 
accepted best practices of conflict resolution was that they were not adjusted to the local 
political and cultural contexts.  Thus they could not generate commitment or the feeling of 
ownership among the regional political elites.  
The Genesis of the ASEAN 
While the conflict resolution processes in Manila, Bangkok and Tokyo had failed, 
fighting in Borneo de-escalated eventually in late 1965 and early 1966, because of 
factors unrelated to the resolution process. It is perhaps meaningful for the ASEAN 
style of conflict prevention that the conflict that gave rise to ASEAN was never 
resolved, while the efforts of explicit peace negotiation only turned attention to things 
that divided the conflicting parties.  
Instead of peace negotiations, structures of conflict were transformed by 
changing the identity and power constellation in Indonesia and by altering the rules of 
interaction in Southeast Asia.  Indonesia’s approach to conflicts changed as a result of 
an internal political transition. Pressures against the government had grown too great for 
the political elite to manage by means of channeling frustration to international 
adventurism, and Indonesia experienced a short but bloody civil war. As a result, anti-
communist forces within the military emerged as winners. The victorious political elite 
were identified as the opposing pole to the revolutionary leadership. Suharto, the new 
president, gained his legitimacy as the person who rescued Indonesia from communism 
and the dominance of China.  
From this political platform it was much easier for the new leadership to take a 
different approach to economic grievances and to the reformulation of the identity and 
function of the state. As opposed to the dangerous revolutionism, the function of the 
New Order state was to be a vehicle of prosperity and economic development. If this 
was the new role of the state the old revolutionary political elite became obsolete. The 
new rationale for the state offered also personal benefits for the new leaders. This is 
why the new elite could be kept loyal to the new, developmentalist interpretation of the 
state. Tackling economic grievances was important for security, and thus the military, 
which had a primacy for security, had to be involved. Giving the military a role in an 
economy that tended towards a degree of corruption was beneficial for the individual 
top officers, and thus individual interests of the elite soldiers consolidated the stability 
of the developmentalist state-ideology on the top levels (Anderson 1983). On the level 
of ordinary people, a system that finally explicitly dealt with popular economic 
grievances consolidated the stability of the New Order for decades to come. 
Internationally, the new setting was also more stable than the old one. External 
adventurism was no longer needed for the leadership to stay in power and domestic 
economic development required international stability rather than conflict.  
Yet the risk of further confrontation with Malaysia was there. The nationalist, 
anti-communist army, with the exception of some key officers at the Army Strategic 
Command and the Army Intelligence, had been supporting the Confrontation
82
 and all 
the disputes related to it were still unresolved. The new, more stable Indonesian state 
identity and power balance had to be translated into acceptable regional power 
constellation. For this, new ways of communication between nations were needed. 
These new ways had to be such that regional states could relate to and feel ownership of 
them. A setting where leaders could break their promises as easily as Sukarno could, 
would not bring about regional stability.  
The process towards a regional conflict transformation regime was initially 
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motivated on the Indonesian side by the pain caused by a long period of confrontations 
and disregard of economic problems. Furthermore, it was motivated by an elitist interest 
in containing the popular pressures with something else than foreign policy adventurism 
(Habib 1991; Hasir 1991). At the peak of Konfrontasi, as early as in 1964, General 
Suharto, head of KOSTRAD (Army Strategic Command),  
“formed operation OPSUS to find contacts in Malaysia who were in favor of 
ending the confrontation. The special operation was led by a close Suharto 
associate, Ali Moertopo, from army intelligence who established contacts with 
Des Alwi, former Prime Minister Syahrir’s adopted son, then living in exile in 
Malaysia... Des Alwi knew several Malaysian leaders intimately, including 
Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak, and was therefore able to liaise 
effectively between the OPSUS officers and the appropriate Malaysian 
leaders. OPSUS was exclusive and secret, its activities confined to a few 
intelligence officers with close links to Suharto.” (Anwar 1984: 29–30) 
The operation lacked any resemblance with open international best practices of 
conflict resolution and, instead, it could possibly have been defined as treason by some 
international standards. It was an operation where military officials took contact with 
the enemy officials without the knowledge of their superiors. However, the personalistic 
manner that Sukarno dealt with the issue resonated with the local authoritarian 
practices, and traditional Asian ways of dealing with problems. Promoting the feeling of 
ownership of this kind of practices was in the interests of the Southeast Asian elites, 
who were not, at the time, keen on developing practices of transparency and 
accountability in the region.  
The starting point of this way of handling of conflict negotiation that I call the 
ASEAN Way had to be personalistic rather than transparent, accountable and 
institutional. Personalistic approach made the operation successful and locally owned by 
the Southeast Asian political elite. Emphasizing the importance of personal 
relationships between elites played to the advantage of the persons in the elite, and thus, 
linking peace-making with the interests of the political elite, helped emphasize the 
common interests among  elites.  
Peace negotiation also took place unofficially in total secrecy. Not even the head 
of the Army Intelligence was fully aware of the details of the operation that his pro-
Suharto subordinates were running. In the creation of contacts, associates of Suharto 
used a former Indonesian Prime Minister’s adopted son who lived in exile in Malaysia. 
Because of the elitist nature of political governance, his family relationship to the 
former Indonesian Prime Minister gave him personal access to many Malaysian 
politicians including Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak (Pour 1993, 
262; Anwar 1994: 29–30). The emphasis of secret diplomacy in ASEAN cooperation 
helped contain the democratic pressures from the ASEAN population, and was thus 
useful for the ASEAN elites. Democracy would have limited the elite powers by 
creating institutions of transparency and accountability. By creating practices of 
secretive regional dialogue, however, the ASEAN elites managed to associate positive 
peace-making and regional resilience with the anti-democratic power interests of 
ASEAN elites.  
The process in which power moved to the supporters of dialogue with Malaysia 
generated the third element (in addition to personalism and secrecy) of the ASEAN 
Way of conflict management: the idea of face-saving in conflict prevention. After 
Suharto gained a dominant position in the Indonesian political administration on March 
11, 1966, the secretive and personalistic peace process with Malaysia became part of the 
official Indonesian policies. It was then also broadened to involve not only the 
Malaysian–Indonesian Army intelligence circles closest to Indonesia’s ruler General 
Suharto and Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak, but also some anti-
Communist elements of the so-called Crush Malaysia Command of the Indonesian 
Defense Forces (Habib 1991; Pour 1993: 265–66). On the level of personalities, this 
broadening was based on the activity of a pro-Suharto official at the Indonesian Foreign 
Affairs Department, Brigadier-General Supardjo Rustam. A former Sukarno-appointed 
military attaché to Malaysia, Brigadier-General Supardjo was able to have personal 
access both to President Sukarno and his loyalists and to the core group of the peace 
process at the Indonesian Army Intelligence. Another important link was Sunarsono, an 
anti-communist Brigadier-General, who was the head of the political section of the 
Sukarno-nominated Crush Malaysia Command. With these two links between the core 
group and the old Indonesian confrontationists it was possible to work out, in 
cooperation with their Malaysian counterparts, a formula that enabled the Indonesian 
defense forces to abandon the confrontation while allowing the politicians who had 
favored the arguments for the confrontation to save face (Anwar 1994: 38–41).  
The element of face-saving agreed with the Southeast Asian mentalities and 
made parties involved in this peace-making more committed to the process of bridge-
building. Later, when looking at the measurable patterns of conflict management in 
Southeast Asia and East Asia, it can be seen that this element of face saving translated 
into a practice, where wars no longer ended in victories over enemies (Kivimäki 2011; 
Svensson 2011). Instead, the Southeast Asian and East Asian practice developed into a 
direction where even the weaker party was allowed to withdraw from conflicts without 
humiliation. Conflicts in Southeast Asia, and later also in the entire East Asia, tend to 
fizzle out without clear declarations of victory (Svensson 2011). In the new millennium, 
the principle of face saving has also been reflected in the peace processes of Poso, 
Ambon and Aceh, as well as in the several attempts to establish dialogue between the 
conflicting parties in Papua, where explicit peace negotiations have been motivated by 
the objective to find ‘solutions dignified for all’ (Husain 2007: 117).  
Later, the diplomatic process formalized the normalization of relations between 
Malaysia and Indonesia. In May 1966, a high-level delegation led by Adam Malik, the 
Indonesian pro-Suharto foreign minister, had a secret meeting with an equally high-
level Malaysian delegation under Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak, 
Indonesia’s original Malaysia-contact, in Bangkok negotiations. On June 6, 1966 
Indonesia officially recognized Singapore and on August 11, Malik and Tun Abdul 
Razak signed a normalization agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia. With the 
exception of Foreign Minister Adam Malik, a close friend of Suharto’s, the people 
involved in the peace process were the same despite their changing institutional 
statuses. Due to the pro-Sukarno sentiment among the bureaucracy of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister Malik kept most of his own institutional staff at the 
Foreign Ministry in the dark and continued working with the Army Intelligence people 
and Brigadier-General Sunarsono (ibid.: 41–42).  
Even if the ending of the Malaysian Confrontation was a negotiation process 
technically separate from the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations, ASEAN, it can be argued that the latter was based on the personal relationships 
and solution principles of the peace process of the former negotiation process.
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The process of establishing ASEAN was merely a generalization of the 
procedures, practices and agreements reached in the negotiations on the Malaysian 
Confrontation. The need for a more general arrangement was already articulated and 
agreed upon during one of the Confrontation related meetings in 1966. The initiative 
came from Adam Malik, Tun Abdul Razak and Thailand’s Thanat Khoman, who 
decided that closer regional cooperation was necessary to prevent the recurrence of 
confrontations between countries in the region (Anwar 1994: 50). According to an 
advisor of a former Indonesian President, ‘Indonesia’s move towards ASEAN was 
therefore, inextricably linked to the confrontation policy of 1963–65, for above every 
other consideration, the new regional policy was designed to undo the damage that 
confrontative phase had done to the country’ (ibid.: 57; Anwar 2000). One of the key 
persons in the Confrontation negotiation, Brigadier-General Supardjo Rustam, further 
claims that the ASEAN was established because regional cooperation had to be 
something colossal to erase the memory of the confrontation.
84
  
In the negotiations concerning the establishment the ASEAN, the three ministers 
of Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia took key roles. In Indonesia, the main role was 
played by Foreign Minister Malik and the ASEAN was at times called ‘Malik’s Club’ 
by the former supporters of confrontational foreign policies (Gordon 1969)! At the same 
time Malik himself emphasized the role played by his personal associates at the 
Indonesian military intelligence (rather than the institutional staff at the Foreign 
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The contribution to security of the establishment of the ASEAN has arguably 
been in the development of the diplomatic practices rather that in the content of explicit 
agreements. The Bangkok Declaration of August 8, 1967 as well as the Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation (TAC) of 1976 highlight many important principles, but do not really 
commit the nations into anything concrete, except to the commitment of not insisting on 
commitments that compromise sovereignty of their fellow ASEAN members. The 
contributions of the agreements are in their role as a foundation of a regime of 
continuing negotiation based on personal relationships and strong sense of ownership. 
Kindly this ownership could be explained by referring to Southeast Asian experiences 
of warfare and distraction caused by interference and lack of communication. More 
cynically, the ownership of the regional consensus could be understood through its 
connections to personal interests of the elite. While developmentalism was directly 
beneficial for corrupt leaders and militaries, personalistic ASEAN ties consolidated this 
beneficial domestic order, and offered a non-intrusive external environment. 
The same personalities that had negotiated on Malaysian Confrontation 
continued to be central for the resolution of regional disputes for decades. Almost two 
decades after the Malaysian Confrontation it was the same Ali Murtopo, who first (on 
behalf of Indonesia) had negotiated the territorial dispute on Sipadan and Ligitan 
Islands with Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mohammad Mahathir in September 1985.  
Suharto is another example of personalities that continued in his role as a peace-
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broker in regional disputes. When mediating in 1987 in a diplomatic dispute between 
Singapore and Malaysia over the policies towards Israel, Suharto emphasized the 
similarity of the economic interests of ASEAN states: in addition to press statements, 
Suharto demonstrated the link between the destinies of the two countries by driving the 
road that physically connected the two countries whenever he needed to move from 
Malaysia to Singapore (Strait Times, December 30, 1987). Thus Suharto was central to 
the boosting of the perception of common interest between Malaysia and Singapore.  
Personalistic diplomacy broadened considerably from the highest political elite 
towards intellectual elites in the 1980s. Private visits and academic conferences are still 
widely used in a personalistic way as forums for ASEAN brainstorming and confidence 
building (Busse 1999: 50–51). The so-called Jakarta Informal Meetings on territorial 
disputes at the South China Sea during the first half of the 1990s between ASEAN (and 
after 1991 also with the PRC) diplomats and politicians, for example, represent a rather 
‘institutionalized’ form of informal personal relations. These negotiations have 
produced the most concrete results so far in dealing with the overlapping claims to 
Spratly Islands. For example the PRC’s suggestion on shelving the sovereignty issue 
and cooperating for the exploration of the natural resources of the Spratly Islands was a 
product of these informal negotiations. 
Secretive handling of disputes has also survived the tests of decades in ASEAN. 
When the Indonesian military started to investigate ‘foreign activities’ around the 
islands of Sipadan and Ligitan between Indonesia and Malaysia during the initial phase 
of the dispute about the islands, ‘both Malaysian and Indonesian governments tried to 
play down the incident discouraging press coverage and no clear account of the events 
was given’ (Haller-Trost 1995: 4; see also Strait Times, July 7, 1982; Asiaweek, July 23, 
1982). The clear rationale behind this secrecy was the elite effort to prevent negative 
popular sentiments. The centrality of this objective is also demonstrated in the fact that 
ASEAN countries institutionalized their dissemination on conflicts in a way that 
enabled the control of negative publicity. In Indonesia, for example, General Ali 
Murtopo, one of the main characters of the resolution of the Malaysian Confrontation 
and the establishment of ASEAN, was Indonesia’s minister for information during the 
early days of the dispute regarding the ownership of the Sipadan and Ligitan Islands.  
When the ASEAN regime is seen as a solution to conflicts like the Malaysian 
Confrontation, the strategy of downplaying disputes in public debate makes a lot of 
sense: the conflict behavior consisted mainly of activities by popular militias 
encouraged and supported by public elite agitation. Restrictive publicity on disputes is 
also rationalized on grounds of diplomatic prudence: playing down of disputes simply 
means that you avoid washing your dirty linen in public (Soesastro 1995: iii–ix).  
The dispute on Ligitan and Sipatan rose again after Indonesia had discovered 
that Malaysia had built some tourist facilities on the disputed islands in 1991. After the 
protests behind the scenes by Indonesia, the Malaysian government cancelled its 
program of upgrading tourist facilities in the area, dropped the area from their list of 
nature reservoir development plan and rationalized both moves publicly on grounds of 
not harming the mutually beneficial relationships between Malaysia and Indonesia 
(Business Times, Singapore June 5–8, 1991). The negotiation process was consciously 
kept out of sight of publicity (Habib 1991). The elite-led process continued with a 
ministerial meeting in 1991 and with meetings of the heads of the states in 1992, 1993 
and 1994 (Haller-Trost 1995: 29). Instead of public washing of the dirty linen, the 
countries handled the dispute behind the scenes.  
With secrecy and personalism also face-saving has been possible in ASEAN 
diplomacy. In dispute settlement, issues are often avoided, and they are not brought to 
the publicity for the benefit of the face-saving of individual politicians (Kurus 1995: 
409). Also consultations before publicizing initiatives are often based on the rationale of 
saving faces of individual politicians (ibid.: 410). The principle of face saving was 
central in the negotiation of the territorial dispute between Malaysia and Indonesia on 
Sipadan and Ligitan Islands, according to the Indonesian media that explained that the 
‘bilateral talks should lead to a compromise to achieve an acceptable solution without 
either party having to lose face’ (cited in Haller-Trost 1995: 33). 
Generation of Success in the ASEAN Way 
The early efforts to tackle Malaysian Confrontation in the externally dominated 
negotiation processes during the Confrontation did not only fail to address the main 
sources of the Confrontation (such as the neglect of economic development in 
Indonesia); it also failed to convince the conflicting parties of the fact that the resolution 
mechanisms (mediation, referendum, external advice) were legitimate. The mechanisms 
failed to relate to the indigenous “normative pre-agreements” of Southeast Asian 
societies.  
The very reasons why the initial conflict resolution failed also unveil the generation of 
the success of the later negotiation process. At least to Malaysian and Indonesian political 
elites the narrative of the Malaysian Confrontation generated the legitimacy of the ASEAN 
Way. The narrative of Sukarno’s disregard of economic trouble and the narrative of the 
consequences of such neglect constitute the ASEAN legitimacy of ASEAN developmentalism. 
Due to this narrative it is not possible for people to rebel even against autocratic governments 
that try to offer prosperity to their citizens. Governments were illegitimate only if they could 
not perform well and deliver development. Neither was it acceptable for the political elite to 
channel popular frustration by blaming other countries for the economic misery of their own 
country’s population.  
Due to the partisan interests, the ASEAN elites have had a strong commitment to the 
anti-democratic aspects of the ASEAN Way. For decades they were also successful at 
convincing their people to believe that the ASEAN Way reflected indigenous Southeast Asian 
conflict management culture. Southeast Asians generally felt that the ASEAN way of dealing 
with conflicts was their own way and that it was based on the societal values and normative 
pre-agreements of Southeast Asia. As a result, despite of existing disputes, ASEAN countries 
have been able to avoid the escalation of conflicts. More recent pressures towards 
institutionalization have modified the ASEAN Way in the 1990s, while the process of 
democratization in ASEAN societies has presented a more fundamental challenge to the 
survival of personalism and secret diplomacy. 
The historical analysis of the transition of ASEAN (and especially Malaysia and 
Indonesia) from belligerent to peaceful does not reveal any mechanisms of peace that could 
simply be reduced into some objective elements. Instead, material conditions, such as poverty, 
afforded alternative approaches that then together lead into different outcomes. Taken the 
crucial role of the decision between revolutionary or developmentalist orientation and the 
norms of regional cooperation one cannot reveal any mechanisms of peace that could neatly 
explain the correlative relationship from a condition analytically independent of the peaceful 
to the dependent variable – peace. Instead, feeling of ownership of regional communication 
and interaction already implies a more positive relationship to peace than lack of such feeling. 
On the one hand, material realities do not dictate Southeast Asia’s destiny, because poverty, 
for example, seemed to serve both the belligerent revolutionary order and the 
developmentalist transition. Different approaches to the material realities clearly produce 
different outcomes. On the other hand, power context, culture and history constrain the 
approaches that leaders and nations can adapt to the material realities. Due to existing power 
context it would not have been possible for the revolutionary elite of Indonesia to assume a 
developmentalist orientation. As soon as the state would have been seen as an instrument for 
development, people with a revolutionary identity would have become illegitimate as leaders, 
while economic technocrats would have been able to claim a greater role in state 
administration. Only an experience of economically insensitive leadership, which involved a lot 
of hurt and economic grievance could legitimize authoritarian, developmentalist, but corrupt 
elite that delivered prosperity at the expense of democratic participation.  
Because of the historical experience of foreign powers intensifying conflicts in 
Southeast Asia, the ASEAN elite could consolidate strict norms of non-interference: while 
protecting people from conflicts that they had experienced in the past it now also protects the 
elite against pressures of democratization.  
Finally, only through the cultural context of respect for face-saving could ASEAN 
consolidate an order that valued secret personalistic exercise of power that may have served 
the interest of indigenously legitimate peace. Thus we should not be looking at simple 
independent and dependent variables when the explanation of the long ASEAN peace moves 
from established correlative relationships to the analysis of mechanisms that make these 
correlative regularities understandable. Nor can we simply look at the mutual constitution of 
peaceful identities and peaceful policies or facilitating material realities and discourses. The 
analysis of the genesis of ASEAN peace seems to suggest that we need to look at the dialogue 
between material realities and approaches to these. However, these approaches are 
conditioned by the legacy of history, power structures and cultural, collectively constructed 
realities. Only by fully understanding the following five points can we understand the 
mechanisms with which ASEAN keeps Southeast Asia peaceful (even if not democratic).  
 1. Why development was objectively needed (poverty and dissatisfaction as threats of 
state legitimacy, bankruptcy of revolution), 
2. Why the new Indonesian leadership was in a position to give it (technocratic identity of 
the opponents of revolution),  
3. Why it was possible and useful for the new leadership to prioritize development as an 
instrument of security (corruptive interests of the military), 
4. Why the other ASEAN national political elites (and the US) felt that it was in their 
interests to consolidate this developmentalist national regime by means of locally 
legitimate regional norms that insulate developmentalist Southeast Asian states from 
external interference (regional elite power interests as the carrot), and 
5. Why the people of Southeast Asia found all this acceptable (prosperity as 
compensation for the lack of self-expression).  
 
While the norms and styles of international relations in ASEAN might be different from 
the norms in some other parts of the world, they are suitable to the historical context of 
Southeast Asia (and East Asia). Similarly, while the ASEAN recipes of addressing 
causes of conflict might differ from those elsewhere, the ASEAN Way of addressing 
conflict grievances and conflict opportunities tends to be culturally and historically 
suitable to the area in which the ASEAN Way has been applied (East Asia). For 
example, the rule of military non-interference is more suitable for Southeast Asia where 
the history of Chinese export of communism and the US subversion and fight against 
communism have made the region a battle field of external powers, than it would be for 
Europe, for example, where the conflict problematique has been perceived to have 
revolved around the problem of uncontrolled ultranationalist authoritarian leaders.  
Similarly, conflict structures that need to be addressed in Southeast Asia, where 
(with the exception of the Philippines, see Chapter 2) the legitimacy of states and the 
popular expectations from regimes are more closely related to development output than 
popular participation, are different from those in Northern America. Thus, it seems that 
rather than being caused by simple universal conditions, the ASEAN Way seems to be 
bound to the cultural and historical contexts of Southeast Asia. Therefore, the 
explanation of the mechanism of this peace will require historical analysis, which aims 
at drawing from the difference between historical context and policy orientations before 
the beginning of the long peace of ASEAN, and the contexts and policies after this 
peace had started.  
China and the Spread of the ASEAN Way to the Rest of East Asia 
Just like the Malaysian confrontation was the problem that generated the rationale for 
the new developmentalist consensus that respected sovereignty and prudence, radical 
experiments of the Great Leap Forward (1958–1961) and the Cultural Revolution 
(1966–1976) were the sources for pragmatism of Deng Xiaoping from 1979 onwards. 
However, while the struggle between the bankrupt policy line and the new consensus in 
Southeast Asia was international, that struggle in China was mainly national even if it 
was much affected by international developments that demanded different political 
approaches nationally.  
China’s change was dominant to the change of Northeast Asia, as the rest of 
Northeast Asia had been peaceful already since 1945 and 1953, and it affected 
peacefulness in Southeast Asia, too, when China moved from insurgency-exporting 
factor into a responsible, stabilizing factor.  
However, another change in Vietnam (then not yet a member of ASEAN) in the 
1980s was needed for the transformation of Indo-China into the same East Asian 
pragmatist, developmentalist, non-interference regimes, which did not aim at 
humiliation of their enemies, but respected, at least more than before, face saving and 
dignity for all. This change could also deserve a subchapter. However, since it did not 
happen in the same historical period of the late 1960s and 1970s, and this change was 
much more affected by the ending of the Cold War (economic necessities related to the 
decline of Soviet willingness to aid Vietnam) than changes in East Asia, and since it 
was also affected by the example and attraction of the ASEAN Way, whose origin has 
already been explained, Vietnamese transition is (as are the transformations of Japan 
and South Korea into developmentalism in the 1940s and in 1950s respectively) left out 
of the focus of this book.   
Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution and China’s Transition to 
Developmentalism 
The Great Leap Forward was an ideologically-oriented economic campaign that 
intended to transform China’s economy into modern communist economy. Cultural 
Revolution, again, was a campaign to purify party leadership, the military and the state 
bureaucracy from incorrect thinking and socialize China to the correct line of Mao 
Zhedong’s thinking. Originally this campaign started as an educational project, but once 
it was met with resistance within the implementing sectors of the state bureaucracy, the 
programme spread to various other theaters of power battle.  
Neither campaign was anti-developmentalist in the sense that they did prioritize 
economic development. Originally, the intention of the first campaign was to increase 
production while the limits of Cultural Revolution were carefully drawn by Zhou Enlai, 
in a way that it would not hamper economic development (Chong-Do Hah 1972: 200). 
However, in both campaigns, development was not a material, but an ideological goal, 
the intention was not to produce prosperity as China defines it now, but a modern 
communist economy. A New Year’s editorial of the People’s Daily in 1967 summarized 
this position in the following manner:  
“Some muddle-headed people counter-pose the revolution to production and 
think that once the Great Cultural Revolution starts, it will impede 
production. Therefore, they take hold of production alone and do not grasp 
the revolution. These comrades have not thought through the question of 
what is the purpose of farming, weaving, steel making. Is it for building 
socialism, or is it for building capitalism?” (Quarterly Chronicle and 
Documentation. China Quarterly No. 30 (Apr. – Jun.), 1967, p. 198) 
The difference between the position that regards growth as a value in itself, and the 
position where revolution and socialism are primary, could be seen as the main dividing 
line in Chinese politics of the 1960s and the 1970s. According to Lieberthal (1975: 1), 
the main political division in China was between “radicals” and “pragmatists.”86 The 
                                                          
86 The main radicals in the 1960s were Lin Biao, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen, 
and according to many, Mao Zhedong himself, while the main supporters of economism in the 1960s were Liu 
Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and Peng Zhen and in the 1970s Deng Xiaoping, Zhou Enlai, and Ye Jianying. While the 
personified power battle is important for the understanding of the battle between pragmatic and radical discourses, it 
would be a mistake to follow the power battle simply from the point of view of personalities. Deng and Liu, two 
leading pragmatists, for example, originally supported the Great Leap Forward (Dittmer 1977, 686), while Zhou, the 
former, [… are] “fundamentalists who insist that China must not sacrifice revolutionary 
values on the altar of economic development”. The position where economic 
performance was highlighted at the expense of revolutionary principles was often called 
economism in the radical discourse. According to a radical editorial of the Peking 
Review during the Cultural Revolution, China’s leaders belonged to the former group: 
“Our great leader, Chairman Mao, has long ago thoroughly criticized and repudiated 
economism.” (“Quotations From Chairman Mao Tse-tung On Opposing Economism”).   
The famine after the Great Leap Forward, generated a lot of critique against 
Mao’s economic policies and lead to the shifting of economic and bureaucratic power to 
the benefit of pragmatic technocrats, most notably Premier Liu Shaochi and Deng 
Xiaoping in the beginning of the 1960s.  However, the original critique of Mao was not 
based on the fact that his policy did not prioritize development, as it was against his 
inability to understand the objective laws of economy. The Great Leap Forwards was 
after all supposed to make production more effective, not to paralyze it. Yet, most 
scholars agree that even at the outset, Mao’s objectives were primarly political, not 
economic (Perkins 1967: 33), and the debate about ‘economism’ emphasized the 
contradiction between these objectives and development. Once there was a power battle 
between Mao and Liu, it was natural that attacks were made against economistic 
prioritization, and that ideological, revolutionary rhetoric was mobilized against rational 
economic policies. As was discussed earlier in the context of Indonesia, prioritization of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
main pragmatist of the early 1970s supported the Cultural Revolution (Perkins 1967; Neuhauser 1967). It was not 
realistic for these people not to support radical lines in certain phases of political struggle, as more pragmatic 
discourses would not have resonated with the pre/agreements of the argumentation of the time. This is why it is easier 
to formulate discourses or cultures and follow their development rather than following individual politicians and their 
political arguments. 
economic growth became seen as treacherous (revisionist). According to Jian Qing, 
Mao’s wife, and one of the leading figures of the Cultural Revolution, on December 26, 
1967, economism was an “evil road” linked to the temptation of “pursuing only 
personal and short-term interests”. It constituted “the conspiracy of issuing the ‘sugar-
coated bullets’ of economic benefits . . . to corrupt the masses’ revolutionary will” 
(Bridgham 1968, 8–9). 
Economic realities, the fact that people were rather naturally programmed to 
prefer eating to starvation, affected the competition between the discourse that 
prioritized development and the one that prioritized revolution. The commonly 
experienced problem of lack of appreciation for economic development generated 
legitimacy for policies that emphasized development, while the common experience of 
the Cultural Revolution became a commonly experienced indication of the fact that 
abandonment of developmentalist preferences and emphasis on revolutionary spirit are 
not a viable solution to economic problems. Yet, economic hardship did not cause 
developmentalism, as can be seen from the fact that the power battle after the Great 
Leap Forward ended to the benefit of the radicals, and gave rise to another radical 
campaign, the Cultural Revolution.  
Furthermore, in addition to lesser commitment to development, the starting point 
of the two radical campaigns was ideological rather than scientific in the sense that the 
campaign was advised by realities of the Maoist dogma rather than realities as they were 
experienced. Otherwise it would be difficult to understand how the campaign could be 
implemented despite the fact that it created negative growth and large scale famine with 
18–45 million fatalities. The fact that the defenders of this ideological line still in 1967 
(ibid.) and even in the 1970s (Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation, China 
Quarterly No. 43, (Jul. – Sep., 1970), 171–188)
87
 used the term Great Leap Forward as 
a positive model suggests that truth about it was not searched from empirical 
observation but from dogma: while radical Maoists were willing to sacrifice for 
revolution, they could not think that an economic program that starves members of the 
proletariat to death is a model, unless they had closed their eyes of empirical 
observation and simply looked at how the campaign fitted into an ideological position: 
revolutionary economics is good for growth because Mao says so, even if experience 
speaks against it. According to an editorial of the revolutionary newspaper Red Flag, 
“Revolution can only promote the development of the social productive forces, not 
impede it. This is a Marxist-Leninist truth, a truth of Mao Tse-tung’s thought.”  
After the misery of the Cultural Revolution, there was a common experience of 
the bankruptcy of a policy that fails to recognize material realities of the economy, and 
simply insists doctrinal realities instead. This generated legitimacy in the Chinese 
version of developmentalist discourse for the doctrine of “seeking truth from facts not 
from ideology”. This doctrine originates from Mao (1941) and was partly justified by 
this origin, but it was lifted up as a pragmatic starting point to economic management 
and other sectors of politics by Deng in a keynote speech to the Third Plenary Session 
of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (Deng 1978b). This 
doctrine, was an alternative to the doctrine according to which “whatever documents 
Comrade Mao Zedong read and endorsed and whatever he did and said must always 
                                                          
87 According to the analysis of the chronicle, the use of Great Leap Forward as a positive model in argumentation for 
policy lines was in decline.  
determine our actions, without the slightest deviation”. 88  (“The Two Whatevers” 
doctrine). Instead, guidelines and truths were to be searched from empirical evidence of 
the objective reality. This gives Chinese developmentalism a content that differs from 
the dogma-driven developmentalism, where development could simply be imagined, 
wherever the dogma said that the policy followed was correct for the achievement of 
development. In practice this meant that Chinese developmentalism joined the ASEAN 
approach to development by accepting some of the same standards for assessing and 
evaluating economic performance. This meant a radically new kind of realism to 
substitute the rosy pictures of previous Chinese superiority in many aspects of politics. 
According to a chronology of Chinese documents (BBC 1978, 5890; Hook, Wilson and 
Yahuda 1978a:  945) “Chairman Hua was reported by a Japanese agency as having told 
Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda on August 12, that China’s economy was still 15 to 20 
years behind those of advanced industrial countries, although it had grown by 24 per 
cent in the first half of this year.”   
Thirdly, the rift between radicals and pragmatists was related to the 
consequential logic of development. According to Chong-Do Hah (1972) the rift 
between experts, knowledgeable of this “objective logic” (pragmatists, economists) and 
the “reds” (radicals) was the deepest during the Cultural Revolution. As supporters of 
the view according to which the truth about development should be sought from 
empirical experience rather than from a dogma, the pragmatists were naturally more 
inclined to accept the existence of the objective consequential logic of economic 
development and to follow the policies that were known to causally produce 
                                                          
88  This radical doctrine of the two whatevers was published by an editorial of the People’s Daily, “Study the 
Documents Well and Grasp the Key Link'”, February 7, 1977. 
development for the proletariat. Once the power political struggle between the radicals 
and the pragmatists had been won by the latter group, it was possible for the National 
Peoples’ Congress to be informed by the Chairman of the Party that despite the priority 
that has to be given to politics in political administration, there are objective laws of 
production that should not be contradicted (Hook, Wilson and Yahuda 1979a). Experts 
of material objective consequential logic were to some extent above politics even if they 
needed to work under political guidance, as Liu Shaochi had suggested (Chong-Do Hah 
1972: 195). They should be endorsed even if they lacked commitment to Mao’s 
thoughts as Deng Xiaoping has said: “[W]e should even cherish and praise those 
specialists without a socialist consciousness." (Gittings 1976: 493).  
While the Cultural Revolution to some extent purged most of China’s economic 
technocrats it created a political reality where pragmatic technocrats did not matter 
much (Diao 1970). The situation was very similar to the one in Sukarno’s Indonesia, 
where economic plans were “rich in fantasy”, but poor in realism. Yet, people did feel 
the hunger and this common experience formed a common diagnosis of a problem, 
while the radical solution to the lack of economic expertise of the Cultural Revolution 
(denial of the need for economic expertise) formed a common perception on how this 
problem could not be solved. This helped generate legitimacy for Deng’s meritocratic 
element of developmentalism after 1979.  
Details of the struggle between reds and experts regarding to the perceptions on 
the objective realities of the economy further explain the details of the Chinese 
developmentalist orientation.
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 The first battle between the pragmatists and radicals, 
                                                          
89 I have identified the main differences between the pragmatic and the radical positions from the critique of Deng 
Xiaoping of “ultra-leftism” as documented by Gittings (1976; 1979), and from Lieberthal (1977) and Dittmer (1977). 
was about the role of incentives in agricultural production. Radicals hesitated to extend 
incentives that would encourage workers to be more productive, as they felt this would 
introduce capitalist structures of competition. However, critics of the Great Leap 
Forwards that had introduced collective agriculture and banned private plots and the 
centrality of small result-oriented production teams felt that incentives were not only 
efficient in the encouragement of higher productivity, but also in line with the Marxist 
idea of defining the deserved receipt as a function of one’s amount of work.90 Reference 
to original Marxist and Maoist sources of legitimacy were important for the 
developmentalists in the discursive battle against radical discourses. Without Maoist 
correctness it was very difficult to gain legitimacy for policy approaches. The system of 
incentives was popular among rural people and it showed its effectiveness in the 
beginning of the 1960s. Local popularity was important for the power battle between 
radicals and developmentalists as it brought the local regional military and civilian 
organization on the side of developmentalist argument (Domes 1977). The debate on 
incentives was important for the birth of Chinese developmentalism, as it enabled the 
supporters of incentives relate to the global markets, where incentives were an essential 
element.  
Another central element in the pragmatic perception of the objective realities of 
the economy was related to the need to import technology in order to modernize 
Chinese economy. Related to this was the need to have financing, in terms of loans and 
foreign investments that could enable technology purchases. While the radicals 
                                                          
90 This was the argumentative strategy of all Deng Xiaoping’s arguments for agricultural incentives. However it was 
perhaps best explicated in Deng’s document “On a general programme of work for the whole party and the whole 
nation”, October 7, 1975 (partly reproduced in Gittings 1976). 
emphasized the need for self-sufficiency, the pragmatists felt that modernization was 
not possible without an injection of imported technology. It was also important that the 
military leadership was involved in the battle between the two lines. In the beginning of 
the 1960s, military leaders were divided between the “experts” who felt the need to 
modernize the military hardware, and the radicals who emphasized the purity of 
peoples’ warfare that did not need much equipment.91 The conflicts in 1969 with the 
Soviet Union and in 1979 with Vietnam, however, injected a reality check for the PLA, 
showing that China needs new technology to survive in its strategic environment. The 
need for military modernization, together with the obvious need to improve the 
technical quality of the PLA personnel generated a situation where especially the central 
military leadership took the leadership in the drive to import-assisted modernization 
(Domes 1977).   
Again the question was about the primacy of doctrine and purity of 
revolutionary spirit vs. efficiency of economic development. It is difficult to see why 
pragmatism won over radicalism in this detail of a policy conflict, but suddenly, when 
critique escalated against the Gang of Four soon after the death of Mao, one of the main 
claims against the Gang was that they were sabotaging China’s foreign trade (Hook, 
Wilson and Yahuda 1977a: 204), as if trade had always been accepted as a positive 
thing. It is more likely that the general victory of expertise over revolutionary spirit as a 
guide of state administration contributed to the victory of expert opinions on technology 
imports, too, rather than trade support having had an independent victory over 
isolationist interpretation of self-sufficiency.  In any case the need to have trade is likely 
                                                          
91 This division was evident in a twenty-day conference on political work in the army in the General Political 
Department of the PLA in January 1966 (Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation 1966a). 
to have been one of the key issues why Chinese developmentalism also contributed to 
the pacification of East Asia. Subjective sensitivity towards technology importations 
clearly made China more willing to have good relationships with the major sources of 
technology: Japan, the US and Europe.  
While it is relatively easy to trace the developments that generated legitimacy 
for Chinese developmentalism, it is not possible to explain the victory of the groups 
promoting the developmentalist line. The century of humiliations from 1839 to 1949 
and the glorious victory of the revolution in 1949 were sources that the radical self-
sufficiency supporters and supporters of a rebellious international policy could draw 
from. The victory of developmentalist discourse in the power battle was partly 
determined by the purely discursive battle that has been analyzed above. However there 
were undoubtedly voluntary moves and motives, too, that will never be revealed behind 
the victory. Why did Mao change his view about Deng Xiaoping so many times? Why 
did the radicals and Mao abandon Lin Biao? Why did Hua Guofeng and his leftist secret 
police move against the Gang of Four, and why did he then yield to Deng in his 
economic policies? These are all questions that are relevant for defining why 
developmentalism won, but that cannot be answered on the basis of an analysis of the 
discursive battles in China. In addition to choices related to secret elite politics and 
simple individual voluntary choices, accidental events had their influence. What if Zhou 
Enlai had not died before Mao? What if Mao had died already in the 1960s (when Liu 
Shaoxi was stong, or only once Lin Biao had gained the upper hand)? Also the 
strategies of mobilizing arguments by linking these with existing pre-agreements of 
argumentation could have been important for the victory of developmentalism. Could 
Cultural Revolution have been avoided had Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoxi not 
overplayed their hand in their opposition of Mao in the beginning of the 1960s (as 
Neuhauser 1967 claims)? Would Deng have managed to persuade his pragmatism 
already earlier had he managed to present the link of his developmentalist argument to 
the argumentative foundation of materialism already earlier (Deng 1982)? The idea 
during the Cultural Revolution that ideology determines correct action rather than the 
material experience and practice is difficult to reconcile with the materialist orientation 
of Mao’s thought. Also the fact that dying peasants during the Great Leap Forward were 
not seen as a proof of the bankruptcy of a system of economic management represents 
idealism, which again constitutes a contradiction with the materialist foundation of 
Marxism and Mao’s thought. All this we do not know as it is likely that the origin of 
developmentalism in China was partly dependent on individual decisions and strategies. 
Yet the origin of developmentalism as a legitimate orientation can be established from 
the above history of the progress of the developmentalist discourse in its context of 
material and social realities.   
China’s Adoption of the Non-Interference Principle  
Class-based thinking of world politics and the doctrine of proletarian internationalism
92
 
and peoples’ warfare were commonly accepted pre-agreements of Chinese political 
argumentation since the revolution. The basic idea of proletarian internationalism is the 
realization that capitalism is global and thus revolution of the working class also needs 
to be global. As a result recognition of states as the building block of international 
relations constitutes a social structure that does not serve the interest of the proletariat. 
                                                          
92 The idea is from Marx, but the source most often used for the doctrine in China, in addition to later quotations from 
Mao, is Lenin’s work the State and Revolution (1918, Chapter V: “The Economic Basis of the Withering Away of the 
State). 
Instead, class loyalty that expresses itself, for example in the support of proletarian 
revolutions in peoples’ warfare – i.e. human intensive warfare based on determination 
and revolutionary spirit rather than material capacity – elsewhere, is rational for the 
Chinese proletariat. “In theory China supported all wars against imperialism and all 
kinds of oppression in the third world” (van Ness 1971: 82). 
At the same time, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence was also 
commonly accepted doctrine, developed by Zhou Enlai in the context of Sino-Indian 
relations in 1954.
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 The five principles are 1. mutual respect for sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, 2. mutual non-aggression, 3. non-interference in each other’s 
internal affairs, 4. equality and mutual benefit, and 5. peaceful coexistence. This 
doctrine articulated a distinction between what is domestic and what is international, 
and framed states, rather than classes, as the main actors of international relations. 
Interestingly, the five principles are almost identical to the inter-state stipulations of the 
ASEAN Way, as defined by the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation of 1976. The ASEAN 
Way went further only in expecting each country to take care of its economic problems 
in order not to push them as instability to the other countries in the region. However, 
together with the victory of developmentalism, the victory of the five principles over 
proletarian internationalism constituted the joining of China to the ASEAN Way (which 
perhaps should not be associated to ASEAN, only, given that the original diplomatic 
principles were introduced already in 1953 by Zhou Enlai).     
                                                          
93 Five principles were introduced by Zhou Enlai in a speech to the Indian delegation in the beginning of the 
negotiations (December 1953 – April 1954) on Tibet. They were later incorporate in the introduction of the 
agreement in 1954 (for the text, see for example, 
 http://www.claudearpi.net/maintenance/uploaded_pics/ThePancheelAgreement.pdf) 
It was clear that a class-based and a state-based doctrine are incompatible and 
contradictory. Equally clear was it that following the two doctrines generated very 
different outcomes both to East Asia’s peacefulness and China’s ability to foster 
economic growth in a conducive international environment. Due to the need to focus on 
development, and due to the need to have trade, technology and investments, it was 
natural that the supporters of developmentalist policies (pragmatists) were in general 
also supporters of the five principles while the supporters of revolutionary purity 
(radicals) were supporters of proletarian internationalism.  
Difficulties in the creation of a legitimate approach of non-interference 
In a country that has received its identity in a class-based revolution, it is not easy to 
ignore class structure in international relations and endorse an interpretation of world 
politics based on states, rather than classes. During the campaigns to purify China’s 
revolutionary spirit and identity this was exceptionally difficult. When purges of the 
capitalist roaders were shaking the leadership of the country it was challenging to 
acknowledge capitalist leaders in other countries. Furthermore, during the Cultural 
Revolution, China developed a “True Believer Culture”94 , where leaders competed 
against each other in radicalism, in order to secure their positions. Any compromises to 
this radicalism were felt risky and treacherous. The emergence and frequency of use of 
concepts like “capitulationism” (Hook, Yahuda and Wilson 1975a: 784), “diplomatic 
fighters” (as a positive expression of new diplomatic style, Bridgham 1968: 24), 
“protracted war as the only way to true independence”, and concepts that glorified 
unyielding sacrifice and militarism, such as Lin Baio’s concept of “spiritual atomic 
                                                          
94 This phenomenon has been first found and theorized by Eric Hoffer (2002/1952) in the context of Nazi Germany, 
but the phenomenon can be identified in much less extreme contexts, too.  
bomb” and his campaign “Everyone is a Soldier” (Lin Biao quoted in Halperin and 
Wilson Lewis 1965: 63) indicated a culture where compromise was suspect and struggle 
a proof of credibility. As a proof of the militarization of the debate Lin Biao said on 
September 2, 1965, that “the destruction, sacrifice and suffering” are guarantees that 
people do not risk “becoming willing slaves” (of imperialists). Thus sacrifice and 
suffering help bring “security for whole nations, whole countries and even the whole of 
mankind”. (Lin Biao 1965: 62)  
Prosperity, at the same time, was seen as “sugar-coated bullet”, dangerous to the 
revolutionary spirit of people (Jian Qing, quoted by Bridgham 1968: 10). Nuclear 
weapons were presented as symbols of national pride (“A triumph of Mao Tse-tung’s 
thought”, Chieh-fang-chiin Pao, NCNA, June 19, 1967, in SCMP, No. 3965, p. 13, 
quoted in Pollack 1972: 248).  
Students, again, competed against each other in Maoist purity and radicalism 
simply to secure their future in a setting where experienced, patriotic and competent 
officials lost their position due to “errors in political line”. Students, who did not belong 
to the “four red groups” (veterans who had participated in the Long March, peasants, 
landless laborers and members of the PLA) needed to show some exceptional 
revolutionary credentials to succeed in their careers.
95
 While militant terminology 
sedimented revolutionary norms into the thinking on international relations, standard 
peace terminology got a negative connotation. Peace negotiation between the US and 
Vietnam was dubbed defeatism and capitulationism, while the process was seen as 
“peace talks fraud” (“Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation”, The China Quarterly, 
                                                          
95 Correspondence with Kim Beng Phar, a scholar of Cultural Revolution, October 2012. 
no 29, (Jan. – Mar., 1967): 193). All these concepts participated in the conversion of 
competition in radicalism into radical doctrine and norms of international relations. 
In addition to domestic rationales that made little sense in the international  
setting,  respect for sovereignty, non-interference and the Five Principles in China was 
made difficult by matters of symmetry and reciprocity. Until October 25, 1971 China 
was not generally recognized as a state in the United Nations, due to its domestic 
political system, and this made it difficult for China to legitimize in the Chinese 
diplomatic debate to recognize the sovereignty of those countries that did not recognize 
its own sovereignty. According to van Ness (1971: 612), China’s recognition of 
country’s sovereignty and respect for non-interference principle was often conditional to 
its recognition of the PRC as the representative of the Chinese seat in the UN. China’s 
transformation into a country that sees world politics as inter-state, rather than inter-
class relations was greatly boosted by the country’s acceptance to the UN.  
In some other cases it was difficult for Chinese leadership not to be partial with 
regard to domestic struggles in other countries as only some of the domestic forces in 
those countries supported the recognition China’s right to exist as a player in the 
international arena.
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 However, the most used rationale for not respecting country’s 
sovereignty and right for non-interference in Chinese foreign policy debate was related 
to the suspicion of illegitimate representation of the people by the political elite. This 
difficulty meant that until 1974 China felt great difficulties in respecting the sovereignty 
of its neighboring East Asian countries. Until then China supported “national liberation” 
                                                          
96 This dilemma was discussed in late 1972 in conjunction with New Zealand, where the election winner, Labour 
Party supported diplomatic relations with China, while the new political opposition did not recognize Peoples’ 
Republic of China (Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation, The China Quarterly no 53 (Jan. – Mar., 1973): 202). 
against colonialist rule and against regimes it saw as puppets of imperialist powers. 
This, of course, contributed to the escalation of regional intra-state conflicts about 
governance as well as creating great strains to inter-state relations between China and its 
neighbors.  
In most other countries, although China might have refused to recognize the 
legitimacy of the government, the Five Principles operated in creating at least some 
kind of prudence towards interference in domestic affairs as China often did not define 
its support to a specific group, but acknowledged the right of a country itself to define 
its own rightful representation. This inhibited China’s military support to most other 
countries (van Ness 1971). Yet even though not sending troops to most other countries, 
China showed its support to specific groups during the radical period of the Cultural 
Revolution by sending military supplies and training to Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, 
Indonesian Communist Party, Philippine Communist Party, Malay Communist Party, 
and many other rebel groups. Furthermore, political support and encouragement to 
specific groups was given also in the form of symbolic political recognition. In the 
national day reception in Beijing, Prince Sihanouk (opponent of Lon Nol’s government) 
was given the most prestigious place, while two Burmese Communist Party 
representatives held the second and third most prestigious places, followed by a 
representative of the (South) Vietnamese Communist Party and then Indonesian and 
Swedish Communist Party leaders (Hook and Yahuda 1975). The fact that all these 
opposition figures took a more prominent place than the first representative of a 
government, shows how far China had drifted from its five principles. It also shows that 
meddling in its neighbors’ domestic politics was not limited to the condemnation of 
illegitimate leaders, but also to supporting specific opposition figures as the “real 
representatives” of the people and the nation. Michael Yahuda (1968: 109) shows an 
indication of this collapse of Chinese inter-national politics by pointing to a document 
where Chinese leadership lists its friends and is unable to list more than two 
governments, Albania and North Vietnam, and then referring to oppositional groups in 
all other countries of importance to China. At the time, China was in active political 
dispute with 32 countries, including all of its strategically important neighbors (at the 
time even Sihanouk’s Cambodia, and North Korea; see, “Quarterly Chronicle and 
Documentation”, The China Quarterly, no 29, 1967: 221).  
In South Vietnam, where the US role in the national administration was clearer 
than elsewhere, Chinese difficulty to stick to its principles of non-interference was more 
difficult than elsewhere. “Lin Piao, in a message to Tran Nam Trung, head of the 
Military Council of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front, on the previous day, 
had also emphasized the protracted war and said that China will resolutely support you 
to fight on till complete victory . . .” (“Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation”, The 
China Quarterly, no 34, 1968: 194). South Vietnamese government was not seen a 
representative of the people (but the US) and thus sovereignty was challenged internally 
in the country.  
In Cambodia, China was accused of subversion even during the government of 
China’s friend Prince Norodom Sihanouk. According to Sihanouk in 1966, China used 
friendship associations for subversion (“Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation”, The 
China Quarterly, no 29, 1967: 224). Later he also claimed that the Cambodian armed 
forces had captured several shipments of arms aimed at the Red Khmer subversives 
(“Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation”, The China Quarterly, no  34, 1968: 191). 
During the Pro-American rule of Lon Nol in 1970-1975, China called Prince Sihanouk’s 
exile government (Prince Sihanouk was actually in exile in China after Lon Nol’s coup 
on March 18, 1970 until the victory of Khmer Rouge in 1975) the Royal Government of 
National Unity (RGNUC), while the government of Lon Nol was called “the Lon Nol 
clique” by the People’s Daily commentator article on October 12, 1974 (quoted in 
“Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation”, The China Quarterly no 57, 1974: 213). Lon 
Nol was seen as a puppet of American imperialism and hegemonism. Both in Vietnam 
and in Cambodia, Chinese challenge to the sovereignty of pro-US regime was military 
in nature, and it defined the group that China supported and saw as the rightful leader of 
the country.  
During the Cultural revolution, China also called for the overthrow of the Ne 
Win Government in Burma: “A message from the Central Committee of the CCP to the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Burma, dated March 28, (1968), said: It 
is the firm belief of the Communist Party of China that, having integrated all-
conquering Marxism-Leninism with the conditions of Burma, the Communist Party of 
Burma will surely be able to lead the various nationalities of Burma to defeat U.S. 
imperialism and its agent in Burma – the reactionary Ne Win clique – as well as the 
accomplice of U.S. imperialism, Soviet modern revisionism, and carry the revolutionary 
armed struggle to final victory” (Peking Review 1968, no. 14’; see also Mao 1968). 
Again, the narrative of US imperialism planting its puppets to developing countries led 
to the conclusion where the leaders of Burma were not representatives of the country, 
worthy China’s recognition, but a clique. 
In the Philippines cooperation between local communists and the Communist 
Party of China predates the victory of the CCP of China. It involves assistance in terms 
of troops inside the Philippines (Joffe 1965), which, however, were sent for intelligence 
and training purposes in support of the so-called Huk-insurgency (van der Kroeff 1967: 
115, 120). This interference was seen legitimate because the Philippines, despite formal 
independence, “remains a slave of the American imperialists”. Again, therefore, Pro-US 
leadership was not seen as representative of the Philippine people. As a proof of this 
revolutionary leaders of China pointed to the "parity" clause in the Philippine 
constitution which gives equal economic rights to U.S. citizens in the country, and to 
the military bases agreement which permits a 99-year lease to U.S. military installations 
(van Der Kroeff 1967: 122). 
In Indonesia, Chinese support to revolution was first appreciated by the radical 
leadership of President Sukarno. Despite subversive support of the Indonesian 
Communist Party, China somehow appreciated the Indonesian leadership that it 
considered nationalist, revolutionary, anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist. However, 
after the ousting of Sukarno, in a right wing military operation in October 1965, state-
to-state relations became difficult. Indonesia accused China of supporting a Communist 
coup attempt, while China no longer recognized the legitimacy of the new military 
government as the new leaders had started their “flirt with their masters, the US 
imperialists” (People’s Daily editorial of October 8, 1968, quoted in “Quarterly 
Chronicle and Documentation”, The China Quarterly no. 29, 1967: 196–7). Chinese 
disrespect of Suharto’s government was also due to rightist orientation of the 
government and because of the genocidal nature of its transition of power (van der 
Kroeff 1968). Due to the rejection of the recognition from the official government, it 
was easier for China then to use the names of the rebel organizations that indicate 
recognition of their representation of Indonesian people. In Northwestern Kalimantan, 
Chinese official parlance, for example used the name North Kalimantan People’s Forces 
for the communist rebels (“North Kalimantan People’s Forces. Setting Up Base Areas” 
Peking Review, 11(44), Nov. 1: 28).   
In Malaya and especially in Malaysia Chinese encouragement and training and 
arms support of rebels continued for a long period of time. The narrative that gave 
legitimacy for the activity was related to the colonial and then neo-colonial nature of 
Malaysia and Malaya (“Malayan National Liberation Army Persevering in Guerrilla 
War” 1968). Instead of calling Malaysia’s first leader, Tunku Abdul Rahman prime 
minister, People’s Daily (April 15, 1965) called his elected government “the Rahman 
Gang”, and considered him to be a servant of the British imperialism rather that the 
people of Malaysia.  
People’s Daily did not recognize the legitimacy of the Thai leaders either, as it 
called the student riots for the dismissal of Field Marshal Thanom “justified” on 
October 18, 1974,: “[T]he just demands of the Thai students and people have not been 
realised. The contradictions between the Thai people and the ruling circles remain very 
acute.”(Cited in “Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation”, The China Quarterly no 57, 
1974: 219). Thailand’s government was not seen legitimate as it, too, was seen as 
serving the US imperialism as “a bridgehead of U.S. aggression against Indo-China” 
(New China News Agency, December 14, 1965; quoted in “Quarterly Chronicle and 
Documentation”, The China Quarterly no 25, January–March 1966: 250), but also as it 
was an important component in the American strategy of encirclement of China. 
China’s critique against the Thai government explicates the dilemma for a radical 
government in relation to respect for sovereignty. Communist and united-front-
opposition movements, such as “Thailand Independence Movement” and the “Thailand 
Patriotic Front”, were seen more representative of the people than the government and 
thus, people’s sovereignty was respected more by interference (in support of these 
movements) than by cooperating with the government in a way that facilitates its 
repression of the people.  
In sum, it seems clear that while China’s disrespect for the sovereignty and the 
principle of non-interference was largely related to its own doctrines of proletarian 
internationalism, it was also escalated by the Western-bloc and, later, by the Soviet 
interference in the domestic affairs of China and its neighbors. If China did not 
manipulate countries that were used as springboards of hegemonic influence on China, 
it could not safeguard its own independence. Similarly, if it respected the legitimacy of 
rulers that were not representative of their people, it could not respect the sovereignty of 
the people of those countries. Thus the US and the Soviet influence in China’s domestic 
affairs constituted the legitimacy of Chinese influence in domestic policies of other 
countries, while the Chinese influence in domestic affairs of these countries constituted 
the legitimacy of US and Soviet manipulation and interference in domestic policies of 
China’s neighbors in East Asia.  
While Chinese subversion could be justified in China by reference to the class-
based concepts of world politics, and by referring to the lack of representativeness of 
leaders Chinese communists considered as puppets of US imperialism, there was 
another source of Chinese disrespect of sovereignty of its East Asian neighbors. This 
source was ethnic loyalty, which fitted badly to any of the ideological sources of 
Chinese foreign policy, but which nevertheless was an important source of ideational 
guidance to Chinese approach to world politics.  
In Indonesia (after the fall of Sukarno) and in Burma (during Ne Win’s rule), 
critique of the government was perhaps primarily related to the government’s treatment 
of ethnic Chinese. In both countries this theme grew out of a dispute over China’s 
support, in terms of propaganda, weaponry and training of local communist parties, 
which, in both cases, were dominated by ethnic Chinese. While the Chinese position in 
these disputes was difficult to justify by using the radical or the pragmatist doctrine, 
populist sentiments on both sides drove the conflict and officials just allowed or 
supported popular expressions of discontent. Both in Indonesia and in Burma popular 
anger was directed against the Chinese Embassy, and against ethnic Chinese, while the 
counter-reaction by China was mostly targeted against embassies.
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 While Chinese 
ethnic foreign policy was strongest towards Burma and Indonesia, it is clear that ethnic 
sentiments played an important role also in the Chinese disputes with Malaysia 
(National Chinese News Agency, May 20, 1969) regarding to the May 13 1969 race 
riots in Malaysia, in the Philippines with regards to the fight against the Huklahab 
movement (van der Kroeff 1967) and Vietnam whose treatment of the Chinese was 
mentioned as one of the reasons for the Chinese punitive strike against Vietnam in 1979 
(Tretiak 1979, 740-741).  
Sources of legitimacy for the respect for non-interference norm and sovereignty 
Ideologically the doctrine of the Proletarian Internationalism had its appeal, both as a 
reaction to the decade of humiliation (the commonly perceived problem), and as a 
                                                          
97  A good source of Chinese perceptions of the conflict about ethnic Chinese can be found in “Hooliganism 
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can be found in “Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation”, The China Quarterly, no. 31, 1967: 217–219 and no. 34, 
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solution to humiliation that was in line with the experiences of the Chinese revolution 
(the commonly perceived solution to the problem). However, once the Communist party 
had emerged as a part of international politics, the social structures of inter-state 
relations emerged as a “reality” for the Chinese. According to Storey (2011), the 
establishment of Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, SEATO, created a power 
political need for a countering bloc. Without such a bloc, China would have been 
swallowed by American imperialism. For an international bloc however, China needed 
to appeal to states rather than insurgencies, and thus it needed to recognize the existence 
and legitimacy of at least some state actors in world politics. This way China’s anti-
hegemonism became one of the first sources that generated the Chinese respect for 
sovereignty of its East Asian neighbors.  
The Five Principles and the movement of the non-aligned nations could be seen 
as a reaction to (or a coalition strategy in) this social reality of international power 
politics. China needed to declare its respect for states that were represented by 
governments that China saw imperfect as representatives of their people. As a result 
Zhou Enlai developed the Five Principles, which were quickly applied to China’s 
relations to India (Agreement between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic 
of China 1954) and Burma (Badgley 1967). This strategy was naturally first extended to 
potentially revolutionary, anti-imperialist developing countries that were not directly 
dependent on an alliance with the United States (and later also the Soviet Union), but in 
the 1960s, the strategy included also good relations with “independent” capitalist 
developed countries (the second intermediate zone), such as Japan
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 and France
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. 
                                                          
98 A good documentation of the negotiations with Japan about amity and cooperation can be found in Hook, Wilson 
and Yahuda 1976. 
People’s Daily defined the extent of this strategy of appeasement of the global counter-
imperialist bloc as follows: “We insist on peaceful co-existence with countries having 
different social systems on the basis of the Five Principles and strive for the relaxation 
of international tension. This is what we have done towards Asian, African and Latin 
American countries, as well as towards countries in the second intermediate zone.” 
(People’s Daily, October 1, 1973, quoted in “Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation”, 
The China Quarterly, no 53: 199)  
Another counter-hegemonic concession that China made to its class-based 
interpretation of world politics was related to the logic of reciprocity. It was described 
above, that China refused to respect the sovereignty of many of those countries that did 
not respect Chinese sovereignty. This worked the other way around, too. China was 
naturally more inclined to respect the sovereignty of those countries that recognized the 
communist government as the Chinese representative in the UN (van Ness 1971).  
Through the logic of reciprocity China was lured to recognize the dominant 
interpretation of world politics as politics among states as China itself, needed 
recognition in order to function as an actor in world politics. However, this reciprocity 
worked only once the domestic situation was stabilized to the advantage of the 
pragmatists, who felt the need for China to interact in world affairs. For the radicals the 
main danger to Chinese values came from the inside of the country (from the watering 
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down of revolutionary spirit). The danger from imperialists and hegemonic powers, too, 
was dictated from the internal power structure of these nations. Nothing that China did 
to appease them or to deter them could really affect this danger (Lieberthal 1977). Thus 
for the radicals there was no need for reciprocity in word politics, and this is why the 
fact that China’s inter-state relations were more or less suspended for the most radical 
years of Cultural Revolution did not really matter for the radicals. In this way the 
expansion of the respect for the principle of non-interference and for sovereignty of 
China’s East Asian neighbors had to wait until the pragmatists were in power.  
 Finally, the respect for sovereignty and the Five Principles was generated by the 
need to develop and acquire technology. Foreign trade was controlled partly by states 
that could block such trade with countries that, for example, continued to arm and train 
rebels and interfere in their domestic affairs. For trade agreements China needed to 
exercise some prudence towards regimes of countries it wanted to trade with. This need 
was naturally closely related to the Chinese domestic battle by developmentalist 
pragmatists against the radicals. It was only developmentalists that perceived the need 
to trade, while the radical interpretation of Chinese self-sufficiency was often quite 
isolationist when it came to international economy. This way, the push that the need of 
trade gave to the Five Principles required developmentalist thinking of Deng Xiaoping, 
Zhou Enlai and others. It needed an interpretation of Deng according to which “[s]elf-
reliance in no way means ‘self-seclusion’ and rejection of foreign aid. We have always 
considered it beneficial and necessary for the development of the national economy that 
countries should carry on economic and technical exchanges on the basis of respect for 
state sovereignty, equality and mutual benefit, and the exchange of needed goods to 
make up for each other’s deficiencies” (Deng quoted in Hook and Yahuda 1974: 644).  
However, in addition to developmentalist priorities the need for technology also 
came from the military leaders (both regional and central commands) who understood 
the role of technology in the defense of China against Soviet Union and its allies; later 
in the 1970s the danger of Soviet allies became to mean Vietnam especially (Domes 
1977). Each of China’s conflicts with external powers – the border war with India in 
1962, the border conflict with the Soviet Union and the war with Vietnam in 1979 – 
functioned as a reality check showing China that with people’s war only, without 
appropriate war technology, China could not defend itself against future external 
threats.  
Due to strategic push, developmentalist needs and the resistance of hegemonism 
China finally moved from class-based world politics to state-based international 
relations in the 1970s. This transition was, at first, fragile and plagued with relapses. 
The individuals driving this transition were the same that were supporting 
developmentalism, and for them, the Five Principles was not just a compromise made 
for the potentially anti-hegemonic Third World and the “second intermediate zone”, but 
for all countries. This was made very clear by Deng Xiaoping already in 1974 in his 
speech on Foreign policy: “We hold that in both political and economic relations, 
countries should base themselves on the Five Principles of mutual respect for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each 
other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. We are 
opposed to the establishment of hegemony and spheres of influence by any country in 
any part of the world in violation of these principles. We hold that the affairs of each 
country should be managed by its own people.” (Peking Review, Special supplement to 
No. 15, April 12, 1974) 
From Revolutionary Victory to Face Saving and Dignity for All  
While the transition from radical to developmentalist and from proletarian 
internationalism to respect of sovereignty were both very dramatic 
transitions in China’s approach and while these transformations had a 
tremendous indirect effect on regional peace, China’s explicit approach to 
conflict prevention changed in a more modest manner. In theory, the 
revolutionary narrative, the defeat of the oppressor and the victory of the 
oppressed, is very pronounced (Kraus 1977), while in developmentalist 
rhetoric mutual gains have greater prominence. The identity and the 
purpose of the state was defined fundamentally differently during the 
radical period of the Cultural Revolution than during the developmentalist 
period. According to Mao, “[t]he kind of state we need today is a 
dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes over the counter-revolutionaries 
and traitors.” (Kraus 1977: 338–9). The great narrative that generated this 
identity was the narrative of the utter destruction of the oppressor in the 
glorious revolution of 1946-9. The great narrative of the post-1979 
developmentalist China was one where the ultra-leftist radicalism of the 
1960s and the 1970s (that sidelined the leaders of the developmentalist 
China) held real, material prosperity of the proletariat hostage of ideological 
dogma and power battle. This narrative gives rise to a state that has a much 
less confrontational identity and purpose. The purpose of politics and state 
institutions was to serve as an instrument of material prosperity of people 
(Deng 1982) and as such the state was not as prone to seeking to defeat its 
enemies and resolving conflicts by aiming at total victories.
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The main great change towards the direction of face saving from an approach 
focused on victories is the transformation from populist diplomacy to prudent, secretive 
diplomacy. Quite like in Indonesia and many other East Asian countries in the 1960s, 
the Cultural Revolution meant the primacy of the masses as a conflict approach.  Partly 
this was related to the aim of Mao to sideline the critics of his Great Leap Forward by 
relying on his support among the masses (Dittmer 1978). However, the mass-foundation 
of politics also had an ideological root in Mao’s teachings as the Chinese Commuinist 
Party’s Central Committee’s Decision Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution (1966) documents.  
The mass-based foundation of politics of Cultural Revolution was probably the 
main reason for the extremely confrontational victory-orientation of Chinese politics in 
the 1960s and 1970s. Populist diplomacy of the masses and the Red Guard 
organizations were often motivated by domestic power concerns rather than by a 
consistent foreign policy line, and as such they were difficult to relate to any rational, 
consequentialist logic of conflict prevention. Red Guard harassed most foreign 
diplomats and often demanded diplomats of demonstrative practices that were blatantly 
in contradiction with China’s international commitments to the laws of diplomacy, and 
policies of non-interference. A driver of the Mongolian Embassy was forced to have 
Mao’s pictures in his car, and as he resisted his car was burned. This lead to a populist, 
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popular reaction in Ulan Batar, which again was retaliated by Chinese masses against 
Mongolian diplomats in Beijing (“Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation”, The China 
Quarterly, no. 29, 1967: 226). Several other embassies were also raided and some 
burned in the mass-based conflict approach, often related to disputes over insults against 
the Chinese leaders or over the position of ethnic Chinese.  It is quite clear that much of 
the mass action can only be understood as demonstrations of loyalty towards Mao, and 
China. Yet all these acts also had negative consequences to China’s conflict prevention 
(Klein 1968). This populist popular diplomacy did not end before 1969 as China had 
severed almost all its international contacts which only eased in 1969 (“Quarterly 
Chronicle and Documentation” The China Quarterly, no 39 (Jul. – Sept. 1969): 144–
168).  
In addition to Red Guard diplomacy, media diplomacy during the radical period 
emphasized more or less total crushing of enemies as an approach to conflicts. Disputes 
with foreign countries just like with domestic enemies were in the focus of political 
commentaries and the tone was often very confrontational. Conflicts could only be 
solved by totally defeating the enemies of China and opponents of the proletarian 
dictatorship.   
 While populist diplomacy and confrontational propaganda had been part of the 
Chinese approach since the revolution, Cultural Revolution brought this approach to the 
extreme. This created the problem that helped China move to the other direction as 
consequences of the victory-seeking confrontational diplomacy had ended up in a 
situation where Chinese contacts in the world were, with only a few exceptions, non-
state actors with very little relevance for China’s international interests. China was 
pushed to traditional negotiation both after the Sino–Soviet clashes in 1969 and Sino–
Vietnamese war in 1979. In neither case, Chinese own revolutionary or 
developmentalist approach dictated the approach to the conflict resolution. Nor did 
negotiation produce any real results either. Thus, clearly, one should not consider the 
transition of China’s approach to terminate conflict prevention as something extreme. 
Yet, some movement can be detected. Once China realized that it wanted to create 
better state-to-state relations to its neighbors due to trade or strategic considerations it 
had to tackle the question of how to resolve the disputes of the past. While media 
attacks against international opponents continued, change seemed to start on the official 
level, and the engines of change were individuals who were associated with 
developmentalist attitude and greater respect for the sovereignty of China’s East Asian 
neighbors, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaping. In 1971, change had begun by a move 
towards a more personalistic, quiet diplomacy with a greater focus on mutual benefits 
rather than relative victories: “At the formal level relations continued to improve 
gradually and disagreement continued to be more piano than a year ago” (“Quarterly 
Chronicle and Documentation, The China Quarterly, no. 45 (Jan. – Mar., 1971): 214). 
Furthermore, the relationship orientation of dispute termination was clear in the quickly 
increasing frequency of international contacts between China and the leadership of its 
regional neighbors.  
In 1971 the issue of the position of ethnic Chinese was for the first time 
approached as a matter of negotiation instead of seeing it simply as a confrontation that 
proved the need to defeat rightist governments. In Burma the Chinese government took 
care of the losses suffered by Chinese nationals during the riots of 1967, while at the 
same time China negotiated a more permanent settlement for the position of ethnic 
Chinese in Burma (“Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation”, The China Quarterly, 
no. 48 (Oct. – Dec., 1971): 804). Later, in 1975, China negotiated in all silence issues 
related to the rights of ethnic Chinese with Thailand (Hook, Wilson and Yahuda1975c: 
600), and in 1979 with Indonesia (Hook, Wilson and Yahuda1979b: 190). 
Quite like in Southeast Asia after the Malaysian confrontation, also in China, 
peace-building started with relations rather than with conflicting issues, and it was 
aimed at focusing popular attention to things that unite rather than things that divide. 
Original in the Chinese approach was the mobilization of cultural relations at the outset 
of dispute settlement. Chinese ping-pong diplomacy as an ice breaker for international 
relations is well known, but less known is the Chinese approach towards the Philippines 
with an excuse of introducing basket-ball tournaments between teams from each nation. 
With basket ball teams followed top diplomats, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping at helm 
for secret confidential personal buildup of relations (Peking Review, no. 13/1974). 
While the Chinese media was kept uninformed or they were disallowed to publicize the 
issue, documentation from Southeast Asian sources could verify that already at the very 
end of 1973, personal commitments were in all silence given by the two leading 
Chinese pragmatists, Deng and Zhou, on the ending of support to the communist forces 
in several of the regional states: “According to Indonesia’s foreign minister, ‘China 
would neither support nor encourage any Communist rebellion in Indonesia’." Both the 
Malaysian and Thai Governments were said to have received similar assurances from 
Chou En-lai.” (“Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation”, The China Quarterly, no 58 
(Apr. – Jun., 1974): 421). Later such concessions could also be publicized in the 
Chinese media as the military support to the communist parties of neighboring countries 
was attributed to Lin Biao, who had already been discredited in the Chinese debate 
(Hook, Wilson and Yahuda1975b: 600). The ending of Chinese support to neighboring 
communist insurgents was also legitimized by endorsement by the Philippine 
Communist Party saying that the normalization of relations between the Philippines and 
China was good for anti-hegemonism, and as such not bad for the revolution in the 
Philippines either. Both the Philippine and the Chinese Communist Parties agreed also 
that revolution could not be imported (ibid.). In Thailand, the promise of not supporting 
communists was made by Mao himself, referring to the need of good state-to-state 
relations due to the common threat of regional hegemonism of North Vietnam (Hook, 
Wilson and Yahuda1975a: 811). After the bankruptcy of populist diplomacy that 
focused on divisive issues and aimed at defeating of enemies it was natural that the new 
Chinese approach tried to avoid dwelling on divisive issues and relying on 
confrontational public rhetoric for dispute termination.   
Soon at the initiation of personalistic secret diplomacy media policy on disputes 
and divisive issues became more controlled. When Thailand’s Deputy Foreign Minister 
Chatichai Choonhavan visited China for trade negotiations Chinese media did not 
criticize the Thai system, but told about trade only (Hook, Wilson and Yahuda1975b: 
381). Also in 1975, when China and the Philippines negotiated a deal on trade and 
mutual recognition, the dispute regarding to territorial claims in the Spratly Islands were 
totally shunned from the discussion and the media (Hook, Wilson and Yahuda1975c: 
599). When Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping visited Burma in January 1978 to discuss 
relations of the two countries no public reference was made to the issue of Chinese 
support to the Burmese Communist Party even though this must have been one of the 
topics of negotiation (The Times, January 27, 1978). Despite restraint, publicity in 
divisive issues did not disappear altogether in China, and in this sense Chinese conflict 
termination approach is not identical with that of most ASEAN states. People’s Daily 
has never entirely stopped its aggressive publicity against nations that challenge China’s 
territorial claims and the rhetoric of victory over adversaries has never fully 
disappeared. Yet, publicity has not returned to the same populist form that it was in 
during the Cultural Revolution; nor has China longed for international military victories 
as it did in India in 1962, and in fact, according to the Uppsala data, it has not achieved 
a single one after 1979 either. Furthermore, its approach to internal conflicts has been 
developmentalist: instead of defeating rebellions as it did in Tibet in 1950 and in 1959, 
and with the Nationalists in the civil war of 1947–49, but instead, it aimed at ending 
discontent by offering development in rebellious regions. Thus even if the 
transformation might  have been more modest that in some of the ASEAN countries, it 
can still be concluded that China’s approach to conflict termination did change, mostly 
as a result of the experiences of misery during the Cultural Revolution, and this change 
had the very same direction as in ASEAN countries in the late 1960s.  
  
Chapter 8 
Will The Long Peace Survive? How Could It Be Made Broader, Positive and More 
Sustainable? 
Will the Long Peace of East Asia Last? 
It is not realistic for just one chapter to fully answer the question of whether peace will 
prevail in the disputed East Asian maritime areas, where the formula of the East Asian 
peace has not much relevance. However, it is useful to briefly look at the challenges that 
the East Asian formula for peace faces in the maritime areas and elsewhere in the 
foreseeable future.  
There are at least two ways of assessing whether or not the East Asian peace will 
survive the next few decades. One is to look backwards to see the relapses of peace 
before the Long Peace of East Asia, and the other is to look at foreseeable new 
challenges to the East Asian approach.  
One can follow the East Asian developments to see how peaceful periods have 
broken down, and then estimate whether similar conditions and contradictions are 
emerging with the current peaceful period. The analysis of the collapse of the short 
peace of 1955–1963 would be the first task in such a strategy.  
Secondly, since we now have an analysis of the components of the current peace 
approach, we will be able to see how these components relate to the foreseeable changes 
in societies and the international structure to see if the components are sustainable. It 
seems that at least two current megatrends with a difficult relationship to the pillars of 
the long peace of East Asia can be identified. On the one hand, societies in East Asia are 
getting more democratic and this seems to create pressures at least towards the secretive 
and personalistic nature of East Asian conflict prevention. Secondly, and less obviously, 
that East Asian developmentalist orientation can be threatened by the fact that 
prosperity has continued for a long time, and this has been predicted to imply a change 
in popular opinions (Inglehart and Wenzel 2009). People who have not seen poverty 
tend to be more oriented to self-expression values than survival values like economic 
development. However the East Asian/ASEAN Way of conflict prevention is essentially 
based on the valuation of economic development.  
Will the Long Peace of East Asia Fall as did the Short Peace of East Asia? 
The short peace of East Asia can be characterized by a sudden relative pause in external 
interference after France had left Indochina, after the US had dropped its role as the 
administrator of the post-World War II settlement and before it had sent extensive 
military presence to Southeast Asian conflict areas. It was the time when the 
revolutionary China needed some breathing space after its revolution and the war in 
Korea, before a new revolutionary period and the transformation of Chinese economy 
from feudal to communist. It was also the time when many of East Asian nations were 
adopting some principles of non-interference of the Non-Aligned Movement (China’s 
Five Principles is the most famous of these principles). Furthermore, the Geneva 
Conference protocol in 1954 introduced some norms not only with regards to the ending 
of colonialism in Indochina, but also with regards to the external military presence in 
the region.
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 In this sense, despite the emergence of SEATO in 1954, and the several 
US-military alliances already before that, the short peace was characterized as a period 
of relative military non-interference. Chapter 2 has shown how all of this changed in the 
1960s once proxy war of powers external to the region and once Chinese proletarian 
internationalism penetrated the domestic disputes of East Asian nations.  
The short peace was also characterized by the thinking according to which 
domestic conflict was best contained by means of “winning the hearts and minds” of 
potential rebel constituencies. In addition to psychological operations amongst the 
diehard rebel fighters this meant an effort to isolate rebels from their constituencies by 
showing that the legal non-communist government served the economic interests of 
impoverished people better than the rebel armies (Lansdate 1972). This meant the need 
to emphasize poverty reduction and development. This was increasingly the strategy in 
the Malayan Emergency as the Malayan officials won more power vis-à-vis the British 
colonialists (Mahathir 2011). At the same time, China needed a breeding space for its 
own development after the Korean War (Hearden 2012: 54). Instead of pushing 
revolution, China was pushing for patience in South Vietnam, and wanted to help 
compromise in the Geneva Conference. The worries related to global power politics, 
and especially the fear of SEATO motivated a charm offensive among the governments 
of Southeast Asia (Storey 2011: 4). Thus development was given some space, even 
                                                          
101 According to Article 4 of the “the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam” did this by “prohibiting 
the introduction into Viet Nam of foreign troops and military personnel as well as of all kinds of arms and 
munitions.” The Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference 1954.  
 
though developmental priorities never became a commonly accepted norm that 
countries would have needed to convince each other.  
The lack of regional developmental norm made it possible for countries to 
neglect their development whenever domestic power struggle required that. In China 
this happened after the failure of the Great Leap Forward, while in Indonesia, Sukarno 
needed more revolutionary credibility to compensate for his lack of skills in economic 
management. This lack of regional commitment to development was the main 
difference of the short peace compared to the long peace of East Asia. After the Cultural 
Revolution that pushed domestic dissatisfaction into diversionary warfare
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 and 
exportation of communist rebellion into the neighboring countries, and after the lessons 
of Malaysian Confrontation, it was possible for regional states to agree that all countries 
address the roots of their domestic problems themselves rather than allow them to spill 
over national borders to other countries. All this was missing during the short peace. 
The economic trouble and following radicalization of China and Indonesia was allowed 
to happen without regional protest. Similarly, the authoritarian neglect of popular 
welfare in South Vietnam was allowed to be framed as an issue of global power politics 
without seeing it as a threat to regional stability. Thus the lack of a regional norm of 
developmentalism meant that domestic changes in Southeast Asia (Indonesia), 
Indochina (South Vietnam) and in East Asia (China) managed to create a situation that 
together with the interventionist policy of the US escalated from a domestic conflict into 
international warfare.  
                                                          
102 Warfare that diverts domestic dissatisfaction to the government into an external enemy; see Wright 1965. 
If the reason for the collapse of a peace regime relatively similar to the long 
peace in the beginning of the 1960s was the absence of a regional norm of 
developmentalism and non-interference and these pillars of peace were based a national 
commitment, the collapse of the short peace does not predict the failure of the long 
peace. The national commitment to development and non-interference was strengthened 
in the long peace by regional norms and institutions that make development orientation 
a responsibility of states towards each other. Thus the foundations of long peace are 
more solid than those of the short peace.  
At the same time the way in which the short peace collapsed should alert us to 
developments that threaten the pillars of peace in a manner similar to the experiences of 
the collapse of the short peace of East Asia. Whenever international disputes are being 
dealt with by mobilizing popular protests against other countries we should be worried 
when eggs and paint start flying against the embassies of other territorial disputants 
(Johnson and Shanker 2012), when officers stage protests in a disputed maritime areas 
(“Aquino stops Panatag protest”, Manila Times online, May 19, 2012) or when parties 
to disputes start requesting demonstrative military support from super powers against 
their adversaries (“US should not cross the line to intervene in maritime disputes”, 
People’s Daily Online, July 30, 2012).  
Are Democracy and Prosperity Threats to the Long Peace? 
Democratization has made it difficult for governments to play down issues that divide 
and focus on issues that unite. Without control over the media, governments cannot 
make sure that the populistic media does not blow disputes out of proportion. Also 
prudence in conflict termination could be more difficult in a democratic regime where 
public speech cannot be controlled and where democratic regimes need popular support 
that victorious conflicts could bring.
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 Democratization in East Asia had already been 
associated with greater number of demonstrations and non-violent dissidence (Svensson 
and Lindgren 2011). However, development towards democracy might have its positive 
impacts on peace to compensate for the weakening elements of the East Asian formula 
for peace. Some studies suggest that democracies are generally more peaceful than 
autocracies (Rummel 1995), while others emphasize the democratic dyads: democracies 
are at least more pacific towards each other (Müller and Wolff 2004). The impact on 
violence of the association between democratization and demonstrations could be offset 
by the fact that democracies are more resilient to non-violent popular discontent: 
demonstrations have not escalated into violence as often in democracies as in 
autocracies (Davenport 2007; Gurr 2000). This could be because of the fact that 
democratic institutions make governments more responsive to peoples’ preferences 
against war (Lake 1992). It seems therefore, that democratic transition will threaten the 
East Asian peace formula, but not necessarily peace as such.  
A look at the tendencies shows instantly that East Asia is not getting more 
belligerent than before. Thailand has become more warlike after its democratization in 
the 1990s, while Indonesia experienced a seven-year period of increased violence after 
the collapse of Suharto. Elsewhere, democratization has not had negative effects. 
However, if one looks at the relationship between democracy and conflict in East Asia 
systematically and takes into account also the long-term effects
104
 it is possible to see 
that after the Second World War democracy has been relatively strongly linked to 
                                                          
103 Democracies tend to win their wars or participate in wars they win (Stam 1996).  
104 On these, see Kivimäki 2012d. The following conclusions are from that study. They measure democracy by using 
Polity IV data from 2012 (Eckstein 1975).  
peacefulness. Thus while democracy undermines some of the pillars of the East Asian 
approach to peace it simultaneously creates new ones. If one takes Polity IV data’s 
value zero as the cutoff point between democratic and non-democratic countries, one 
can see that autocracies have experienced 20 times as high levels of annual casualties as 
democracies (Kivimäki 2012d).
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 However, the difference between democracies and 
autocracies has become much smaller once the long peace of East Asia started 
(Kivimäki 2012d). The long peace has been largely constituted by the pacification of 
autocracies close to the level of peacefulness of democracies. This has been largely due 
to the fact that non-interference norm has made it difficult for countries to escalate 
domestic conflicts into international wars even if the different concepts of democracy 
could have legitimized the interference. The pattern before 1979 was that autocracies 
tended to have problems with their domestic order and then other autocracies or 
democracies interfered in the domestic conflict over governance and made small 
conflicts into big wars. When the interference ended, small conflicts about governance 
remained small. While democracy has made non-interference more difficult it has also 
reduced the number of small conflicts that could escalate through interference. Thus, 
democratization has made one of the pillars of peace in East Asia more difficult, while 
at the same time it has added another pillar to support peace.  
                                                          
105 If one measures belligerence by battle deaths per population the effect of democracy is even more pronounced as 
autocracies have about 30 times as many fatalities per population as democracies. However, if we take a less 
demanding coding rule and consider Polity2 value 0 as democracy, autocracies have no longer more than about five 
times as many battle deaths per population than democracies. There are methodological issues related to the Polity2 
value 0 which the present book will not go into; these have been dealt with in Kivimäki 2012d. However, what is 
clear is that democracies tend to be more peaceful than autocracies in East Asia. Calculations on battle deaths per 
population in democracies and autocracies are based on the PRIO-data (version 3.0) on battle deaths, UNDP data on 
population and Polity IV data (version 2012) on polities. 
Prosperity tends to direct the attention of people from survival values to self-
expression values (Inglehart and Wenzel 2009). This could mean on the one hand that 
people and states would be less committed to development, which, after all, is a survival 
value, and that popular self-expression can take ultra-nationalist, racist, or radical 
political forms (while it could just as well take individualistic, artistic or any other non-
destructive forms). If developmental concerns no longer deter people from destructive 
self-expression and if the new urgency of self-expression makes this possible, while the 
new democracy makes such self-expression possible, this could lead to protests that 
highlight rather than hide differences and divisions (Kivimäki 2012e). Isak Svensson 
and Mathilda Lindgren (2011) have shown that this has already happened to some 
extent. The long peace of East Asia has been increasingly plagued by non-violent 
protests and uprisings. Table 8.1 shows the linkage of this to the process of East Asia 
becoming more prosperous.  
Table 8.1: Challenge of Democracy and wealth to the ASEAN norms  
 Reached 
2000 
USD/annum 
Existence of 
a generation 
of young 
men with no 
experience of 
poverty  
Democratization Open 
demonstration 
of political 
differences by 
means of 
demonstrations 
Singapore 1974 Yes No  No/Yes  
Malaysia 1983 Yes Yes Yes 
Brunei 1973 Yes No No 
Burma/Myanmar 
(not yet 
developmentalist) 
– No  No No  
 Clearly, East Asian prosperity is moving it towards the pattern of populist 
politics that ruined the short peace of East Asia. However, quite as democracy, 
prosperity is generally also associated to peace, even if in East Asia it does threaten 
some of the foundations of the East Asian approach to stability. Wealth and living 
standard elevate the threshold of violence (Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Lipset 1959) and 
economic growth (Przeworski and Limongi 1997) is almost as solidly associated with 
peace. Authoritarian violence is not so common in prosperous countries either (Mitchell 
and McGormick 1988) while also the association between military coups and poverty is 
strong (Londregan and Poole 1990).  
With the exception of Thailand (and Indonesia until 2005), East Asian prosperity 
has not brought more conflict, even if the frequency of popular protests has increased. 
Despite the fact that divisions are now expressed more openly, and that popular 
participation in the expression of these divisions has increased, commitment to 
Laos – No No No  
Vietnam – No No  No  
Philippines – No  Yes Yes 
Indonesia Reaching 
now 
No Yes Yes 
Cambodia – No No No 
Thailand 1993 Yes Yes Yes 
South Korea 1983 Yes Yes No 
North Korea – No No No 
Japan In the 1960s Yes Yes No 
Mongolia  2005 No No No 
development has not declined. Figure 8.1 shows the average level of developmentalism, 
as operationalized in Chapter 4, among East Asian countries.  
 
 
Graph 8.1: Average commitment to development among East Asian countries 
 
Quite clearly, developmentalism has increased rather than decreased, even if the 
positive development slowed down in the 1990s as countries became more democratic. 
If one looks at the association between developmentalism, development and peace, one 
can notice an increasing interdependence (Kivimäki 2012e). While in the beginning of 
the long peace of East Asia, development, and commitment to development was often 
seen as an alternative to democratic foundation of the legitimacy of the regime, this has 
changed during the past decades.  The legitimacy of a government is more now related 
to its democratic credentials than before, but it is also increasingly dependent on a 
government’s ability to deliver development. Instead of being alternatives, democratic 
and developmental legitimacies have become complementary. Development and 
democracy are no longer optional sources of legitimacy of governments; instead, they 
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belong to the same package of “modernity”. The state apparatus is expected to act in a 
modern fashion, and this means efficiency in economic management as well as 
openness to popular participation. The purpose of the state apparatus is no longer 
simply to deliver development, but to offer modernity with opportunities both for self-
expression and development. In Tibet, Papua, Southern Thailand, Mindanao and Aceh 
the failure of efforts to simply appease rebels by promises of development is  a 
reflection of the limits of developmentalism as a conflict prevention instrument 
(Kivimäki 2012e). This way democracy and prosperity will perhaps challenge the old 
ASEAN Way and the old East Asian approach to peace. But they do not challenge 
peace as such. 
Way Ahead 
The long peace of East Asia does not suffer from all the same problems as the short 
peace did. Thus it does not need to collapse as the short peace did. The new challenges 
to the East Asian approach to peace do not threaten peace itself either. However, 
changes in East Asian societies do challenge the old approach and this means that new 
elements are needed to guarantee peace in East Asia. Furthermore, the long peace of 
East Asia is a negative peace, an absence of wars, rather than a genuine positive peace.  
Despite the fact that it is possible to identify the formula that has worked before, 
one should not simply defend the old formula. In a dynamic setting part of the old 
formula has been certain flexibility that has allowed East Asian conflict prevention 
adjust to the need of the time. Furthermore, flexibility is needed in order to adjust to the 
different requirements that different regional disputes pose to conflict prevention.  
Separatist conflicts have remained a major problem for Southeast Asian intra-
state peace, while territorial disputes have continued to plague interstate relations. 
While developmental concerns have limited both challenges, and while non-interference 
has made separatist conflicts smaller, it is clear that non-interference and 
developmentalism have not fully answered the puzzles posed by separatist and 
territorial disputes. On the one hand, non-interference principle only prevents other 
states from helping separatist rebels against East Asian governments, but it has not 
removed the fundamental problem. Since both in territorial disputes and in separatism 
the dispute itself is about sovereignty, the full respect for each other’s sovereignty does 
not fully apply to these conflicts.  
Similarly, while developmental concerns prevent countries and rebel groups 
from focusing only on relative gains, development is problematic in separatist conflicts 
as it directs the separatist society towards the center. Papuan fighters, for example, 
resent Indonesian development because it is seen as making Papuans Asians and 
Indonesians, while their preferred identity is Papuan and Melanesian. In territorial 
disputes of today, developmentalism does not only emphasize interdependence and 
mutual gains. Especially disputes about maritime territories are often about energy 
resources that are the bottle neck of national economies of many East Asian countries, 
especially China. Thus these disputes also point to problems of zero sum nature: if 
China, for example, gets the ownership of the energy resources of the Scarborough 
Shoal, the Philippines will not be able to get them. Thus developmentalism does not 
work to the benefit of common good but instead, if focuses the attention to a conflict of 
interest.  
Due to the changes that challenge the ASEAN Way and due to issue areas under 
dispute where the East Asian approach to conflict prevention does not seem to work, 
there is a need to see how the existing peace formula can be developed.  
On the one hand, it has been suggested that the threshold of violence should be 
elevated to prevent conflicts on trivial issues. While common interests related to 
development go a long way, war should simply be made unimaginable by creating a 
security community (not just a no-war community) (Acharya 2001) that would make the 
idea of conflict between Vietnam and China or Dayaks and the Madurese of West 
Kalimantan as ridiculous an idea as a war between Beijing and Wuhan.  
In addition to elevating the threshold of violence, it has been suggested that East 
Asia should develop ways to resolve, not just avoid, disputes and divisions (Rüland 
2000). While East Asian communication has institutionalized from the beginning of the 
1990s, ability to resolve conflicts has not developed (Svensson and Lindgren 2011).  
At least three approaches can be identified in the East Asian debate for the 
development of a security community and for the establishment of institutions that 
could resolve conflicts. One is the approach that I call new developmentalism. This 
approach aims at innovating ways of mobilizing developmentalist thinking in order to 
play down conflicts and dispel securitized militaristic thinking by focusing and 
prioritizing issues where potential conflicting parties have common interests. This can 
be done until disputes are ripe for resolution. The idea of joint development and 
regional cooperation in the disputed maritime territories strongly advocated by China is 
an example of this. The idea with this proposal is “shelving disputes and going in for 
joint development (PRC Foreign Ministry 2000a)”. Deng Xiaoping defined the Chinese 
model of regional cooperation and joint development in a way that leaves the problem 
of sovereignty for the next generations to solve while using the present to concentrate 
on joint development (Lo 1989: 167). This approach was explicated later in Chinese 
Prime Minister Li Peng’s declaration: “China is ready to join efforts with Southeast 
Asian countries to develop the Spratly Islands, while putting aside for the time being the 
question of sovereignty.”(Cited in Guoxing 1990: 1) In other words, the strategy is 
based on restraint, delinking and freezing of issues that divide (the dispute on 
sovereignty) from the necessary cooperation and focusing on the common interest of 
development. The same definition was adopted in the ASEAN declaration of 1992 on 
the peaceful settlement of the territorial disputes as well as in the ASEAN and China 
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea from 4 November 2002.  
The widely supported broader framing of security and the focusing on non-
traditional and human security is another example of new developmentalism. However, 
in this strategy the creation of a developmentalist security community is articulated 
more explicitly. Speech and practice of cooperation for non-traditional security and joint 
development and regional cooperation participate in the social construction of a reality 
of a special type of a security community (Caballero-Anthony and Emmers 2006). In 
this approach public speech links cooperation with peace and makes war less thinkable. 
The approach can be seen in this context as an articulation of a reality where priorities 
of cooperation are more important than the zero-sum-priorities of the militaries 
(Caballero-Anthony 2006). While aiming at remedying the weakness of a security 
community in East Asia, this approach explicitly rejects the challenge of dispute 
resolution, however.  
Second approach to complementing the East Asian formula for peace is 
something I call the legalist approach. It aims at introducing legal discourse as an 
alternative to militaristic security speech to disputes thereby building a social reality 
that frames interaction differently. The approach of the eminent Southeast Asian, 
especially Singaporean persons (ASEAN Expert and Eminent Persons Group, EEP) in 
the creation of the ASEAN Charter represent this strategy. The main objective of this 
strategy is to challenge military solutions by offering an alternative, more civilized ways 
of dispute resolution. With legalistic stipulations on dispute resolution the legalistic 
approach attempts to articulate social realities, where disputes about the founding 
principles of relations between East Asian nations (and perhaps between ethnic groups 
inside East Asian nations as well) appear as matter of legal interpretation rather than 
issues of security. The effort is to desecuritize (move the issue area away from the realm 
of security) disputes within East Asia. The security community that this approach aims 
at building is “marketed” as one for civilized people. 106  Furthermore it is being 
legitimized as a solution to a problem that persisted before (militarization of disputes) 
and as a strategy that is associated to the success of more recent regional peace. 
According to the main drafter of the ASEAN Charter, Dr. Walter Woon: “All the 
members of ASEAN have had historical experience of gunboat diplomacy by external 
powers. It is not an experience that anyone would care to repeat in the 21st century.” 
(Woon 2009: 70).  
                                                          
106 When Walter Woon (2009), one of the main architects of the ASEAN Charter, explains Articles 26 and 27 on 
dispute settlement, legalistic dispute settlement is associated several times to the commonly desired identity of 
ASEAN as a civilized community.   
In addition to “selling” the legalistic approach as a better approach to interaction 
and as a way of interaction that corresponds to the civilized identity of East Asians, the 
intention of this strategy is also to institutionalize it, first in Southeast Asia, and perhaps 
later in the entire East Asia. The ASEAN dispute settlement in the ASEAN Charter is 
becoming legally regulated once domestic legislation is changed to conform with the 
stipulations of the ASEAN Charter and once the exact operationalization of the ASEAN 
dispute-settlement mechanism has been found. In addition to being institutionalized 
within domestic legislation Article 25 of the ASEAN Charter allows ASEAN to create a 
court should that prove to be necessary in future (Woon 2009: 72).  
Second step in the institutionalization of the legalization approach is related to 
professional cultures. When interaction in disputed issues becomes more regulated 
legally, disputes will be increasingly discussed by lawyers. Even though the drafting of 
the ASEAN Charter, for example, involved a strong political oversight of regional 
foreign ministries and heads of states
107
, in reality drafting was overwhelmingly 
conducted by people from the legal profession (Chan Wah Teck 2010; Ong Keng Yong 
2009: 112). This makes the discourse on disputes legalistic further emphasizing the role 
of lawyers rather than politicians, let alone soldiers. If this is the case, legalistic 
approach takes over dispute resolution and conflicts become more technocratic, legal 
conflicts rather than destructive militarized conflicts.  Yet, due to the lack of tradition in 
legalism especially in East Asia’s international relations, and due to the strict 
interpretations of sovereignty, legalistic strategy will take a long time to root in East 
Asia. The experiences of Thai–Cambodian border disputes even after the signing of the 
                                                          
107 Articles 4 and 12, Terms of Reference 2007. High Level Task Force on the Drafting of the ASEAN Charter 
(HLTF).  Available at, Http://Www.Aseansec.Org/Hltf-Tor.Pdf  (Accessed: March 28, 2012). 
ASEAN Charter clearly show the limits of commitment to de-securitized, legalized 
interstate relations in East Asia. The fact that ASEAN has had only limited success in 
socializing China into its legalism is another proof of the fact that legalism is still fragile 
and not yet very consequential.  
The third strategy is the Malaysian and perhaps Indonesian way of moving 
towards conflict resolution by innovating moderate ways that restrain the contradictions 
of the existing approaches and the societal changes. This approach could be called the 
moderation approach. Without compromising military non-interference or the focus on 
things that unite, in this approach East Asian countries can help each other settle 
conflicts that the conflicting party itself cannot credibly moderate (Najib 2012). This 
moderate paradigm to conflict prevention aims at introducing conflict resolution to the 
long peace of East Asia in a way that minimally disturbs the old formula for peace. This 
is more realistic than the legalistic approach, which assumes that states would be willing 
to subject their sovereignty to regional legalistic resolution.  At the same time it 
addresses the problem of lacking procedures for dispute resolution in East Asia better 
than the new developmentalist approach which just pushes resolution to the future.  
While offering help to conflicting parties in conflict resolution the moderation 
approach absolutely rejects powerful persuasion, military threats and partisan 
interference, while also aiming at tackling the disputes in a prudent way striving for 
solutions dignified for all conflicting parties, without making disputes a cause of 
populistic mass action (Husain 2007). Help from outside is always something that the 
conflicting parties have to invite themselves as has been the case in Aceh, in the 
Cambodian conflict (Wiryono 2007), the conflict between the government of the 
Philippines and Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Moro National Liberation Front 
(Najib 2011) – and temporarily in Southern Thailand – but not in Preah Vihear conflict, 
in Papua, Myanmar, or in Southern Thailand for most of the time. With a moderate 
ideology of avoiding extreme positions, the strategy of moderation is based on good 
services in conflicts by outsiders who do not want to seek to cease control over the 
conflict from the conflicting parties, so that these would be less hesitant to seek external 
help for conflict resolution (Najib 2011). The main challenges to the strategy of 
moderation are the disputes where the conflicting parties do not want external help. 
Furthermore, “moderation” in the Malaysian foreign-policy discourse is defined in an 
open manner in order to allow international participation to the definition of the 
concept. Thus the concept is not yet ready to serve as a foundation of a security 
community or East Asian security identity, even if the practices of moderation have 
already offered some concrete assistance to the main problem of the long peace of East 
Asia, namely the lack of dispute resolution.  
 
 
  
 Chapter 9  
What Can The East Asian Experience Offer to Theories of International Relations, 
Peace and Conflicts?  
The Exception of the Long Peace of East Asia: A Challenge to the Theory of Peace 
and War 
East Asia has experienced a peace that has not been generally acknowledged. Yet the 
phenomenon has been drastic and 95% of annual battle deaths in this vast region have 
disappeared. What is important, too, is that the conditions surrounding this radical 
change do not remind of conditions that we have normally associated with long periods 
of peace. For the development of the theory of conflict and international relations, it is 
important to incorporate experiences and lessons from different parts of the world. So 
far, the experiences of the West, and the history of Europe have dominated the buildup 
of the theory of peace and conflict. This is why it is important to sum up how this study 
of the long peace of East Asia has enriched the theory.  
Before looking at what kind of dilemmas and falsifying information the study of 
East Asia has brought to the theory of peace and conflicts, it is also important, however, 
to look at the limits of this study, too. My main claims/assertions of this book have been 
that  
1. East Asia has become pacific by focusing on development and other 
uniting matters and in so doing it has created a social reality that is less 
paranoid, less militaristic, and more cooperative. Countries with the 
lowest of the three levels of commitment to development (no 
commitment) have over 300 times as many battle deaths per year per 
population as countries with the highest level of commitment to 
development.
108
  
2. If conflicts occur, East Asia’s commitment to the respect of sovereignty 
and the norm of military non-interference has prevented them from 
escalating. Domestic conflicts that escalate into international level due to 
external military interference by combat troops cause majority of East 
Asian battle deaths. On average 97–98% of battle deaths in such conflicts 
take place only once external interference has started. The fact that after 
1979 there has been a commonly accepted rule of keeping domestic 
issues domestic has prevented the vicious circle of escalation. External 
powers have not had the need, or the justification for their interference as 
their potential enemies have not interfered either. 
3. If disputes still arise and conflicts begin and escalate, East Asian 
countries have tried to terminate them by playing them down, by 
avoiding publicity around them and by dealing with the economic 
grievances that give rise to the disputes. This approach can be contrasted 
by the highly public, confrontational post-World War II approach, in 
which the aim was to mobilize to end the disputes victoriously.     
4. The foundation of the legitimacy of developmentalism, non-
interventionism, and prudence in conflict termination is not in some 
exogenous conditions. Instead, it is generated in a historical process 
                                                          
108 Countries with intermediate level of commitment have over 20 times as many battle deaths per population as 
countries with the highest level of commitment to development. Calculated from Table 4.3. 
where common history of ASEAN and Chinese relations with East Asia, 
created a common perception of the diagnosis of conflict. It is born out 
of a historical process where collective memory of the failures and the 
successes of conflict prevention efforts created a trust on a common 
conflict prevention approach: the one that respect development, non-
interference and face saving. Thus the emergence of the long peace of 
East Asia is historically specific, and cannot be generalized by studying 
objective, material conditions independent of common perceptions and 
common interpretations. This does not mean that East Asian experience 
would not have relevance for other regions in the world. It means just 
that generalizations should not be attempted to be drawn from the 
material conditions, but rather from the lived experience and socially 
constructed realities of East Asia.  
   
The experience of the long peace of East Asia has contributed many important 
specifications to the existing theory of peace, conflicts and international relations. It has 
challenged many central axioms of the existing theory. It is clear from the experience of 
East Asia that:  
1. Hegemonic power, US leadership and especially military presence of 
superpowers have not been beneficial for peace in the region. On the 
contrary, as Chapter 3 showed, they have been counter-productive and 
destructive. This casts a doubt on the theories of anarchy that emphasize 
the need for global leadership as a remedy for the perils of anarchy.  
2. Peace and war are not necessarily derived from global structures of 
power. Even if it is clear that East Asian countries have had to reorient 
their external relations, and even if it is clear that their global bargaining 
was affected by the transformation of the world from a bipolar into a 
unipolar form, the crucial developments that affected peace and warfare 
in the region were national and regional, rather than global. This casts 
doubt on many of the structural realist applications of the analysis of 
East Asian security. It is clear that Indochinese pacification was crucially 
affected by the ending of the Cold War, and this did affect the number of 
battle deaths in East Asia. But the pacification of China and ASEAN 
took place much earlier than the global changes and these changes had a 
dominant impact on peace and war in the region.   
3. The European Union approach of lowering borders and pooling of 
sovereignty is not a universal recipe for peace. The lowering of state 
borders meant military interference in domestic conflicts and this, again, 
meant greater capacity for warfare and more intensive conflicts. Thus the 
elevating of borders in East Asia with a consensus about the respect of 
sovereignty and the norm of military non-interference was more of a 
recipe than the pooling of sovereignty in regional organizations and the 
lowering of borders.   
4. Peace does not have to be created by resolving of conflicts and disputes. 
The way to peace that this book has been focused on is not based on 
concentrating on the disputes at all. Conflicts in East Asia have not been 
terminated in peace negotiations. Instead, the East Asian experience 
suggests that the misery of war can also be minimized by focusing on the 
prevention of conflict escalation and by creating a reality of harmony in 
practices that focus on things that unite rather than divide.   
5. Peace and war cannot always be explained by referring to causal 
relations from exogenous conditions to peace or war. This study suggests 
that the best way of making sense of the long peace of East Asia is to be 
open up towards the non-causal processes of the constitution of the 
processes of peace and war. Instead of the removal of exogenous 
conditions that cause war, peace was generated by approaches and 
epistemic orientations that constructed peaceful social realities and 
prevented the vicious cycle of escalatory moves.   
While these challenges to the theory of peace and war have been derived from the 
experience of the long peace of East Asia, it is clear that more general theoretical work 
has to be done to tackle the challenges that this study has posed to the theory of peace 
and war. This task cannot be completed in the concluding chapter of this book.  
Exceptions to the Pattern of the Long Peace of East Asia 
In addition to seeing East Asian peace as an interesting exception of several global 
patterns, scholars of peace and war have to realize that East Asia, too, has its 
exceptions. While East Asia in general became more peaceful around 1979, this was not 
the case for all countries. Furthermore, while the components of peaceful approach, the 
ASEAN Way, tend to be common to East Asian countries in general, some countries 
have become more developmentalist than others, and some countries respect 
sovereignty more, while some are still more obsessed by victorious termination of 
conflicts than others. Developmentalism, non-interference and the new approach to 
conflict termination have also developed at slightly different times in different parts of 
East Asia. In this sense the ASEAN Way as an approach of East Asia after 1979 is not 
something every member has applied (only) after 1979 (and never before 1980), but 
instead the “ASEAN Way” and the “long peace of East Asia” can be defined in terms of 
Wittgenstein’s concept of family resemblance.109  
However, there are systematic exceptions to the generalization “ASEAN Way 
generated the long peace of East Asia that started after 1979” that need more attention. 
What has so far not been sufficiently noticed in the literature on East Asian peace is the 
fact that although the decline in the number of battle deaths has been drastic, the 
belligerence of the pre-1980 period has not been consistent. As mentioned in previous 
chapters (2 and 7) there was also a short peace within the belligerent period from 1955 
until 1963. This period had some similarities with the long peace of East Asia after 
1979. It was marked, especially in the Philippines and in South Vietnam (Nahel 2005; 
Lansdale 1972), but also in Thailand and Indonesia (Jones 1973), by an American 
encouragement to developmentalist thinking and state identity. Furthermore, as the 
short peace started with the withdrawal of France from the region and with the Chinese 
declaration of the Five Principles, the element of exceptionally low levels of external 
interference was there, too.  
                                                          
109 The concept of family resemblance is from Wittgenstein (1953/2001) and refers to conceptual categories that 
cannot be strictly defined by exceptionless criteria. Instead these categories are characterized by family resemblance, 
where most of the qualities relevant for the definition are common for the references of the concept, but where none 
of them are without any exceptions.  
The short peace of the 1950s in East Asia needs to be fully studied in order to 
solve the puzzle of East Asian peace. Was this short period of peace built on similar 
foundations as the post-1979 East Asian peace? If it was, why did the peace not last? 
Could the weaknesses of the East Asian short peace haunt the East Asian longer peace 
period, too? This needs to be investigated. While the research agenda of East Asian 
peace is a healthy distraction from the global research agenda, the research agenda on 
East Asian peace itself has to be open to recognize the healthy exceptions of the East 
Asian peace. Only by recognizing the importance of exceptions can we build realistic 
models about the generalities of peace and war.  
Furthermore, what has not received sufficient attention is the fact that the post-
1979 period has not been equally peaceful in all East Asian countries. The failure of the 
Philippines deserves further investigation. Why is this country an exception to the 
rule?
110
 Are there some conditions or policies of the Philippines that fundamentally 
differ from the rest of East Asia? Is this country with strong historical reliance on the 
US different from the peaceful East Asian countries that try to avoid external powers in 
the region? Or is the Philippine regime’s reliance on economic development as a source 
of regime legitimacy weaker than such a reliance of other East Asian countries? Perhaps 
the Western-minded political culture with greater emphasis on democratic rights makes 
the Philippines less exposed to the developmentalist modes of peaceful East Asian 
interaction? All these alternative explanations need to be explored in a separate study.  
                                                          
110 The exception of the Philippines does not look as great if one looks at the number of battle deaths per population 
rather than just the number of battle deaths. While the latter way of looking shows increase of conflict, the former 
way shows a modest decline. While it is true that the country has experienced more conflict fatalities during the long 
peace of East Asia than before that period, the increase in the number of battle deaths is not as great as the increase of 
the number of population. 
There have also been exceptions to the East Asian peace approach. 
Burma/Myanmar, the Philippines and North Korea have not been very developmentalist 
even after 1979, while the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, have not really been totally 
in favor of the same norm of non-interference when they accept foreign troops on their 
soil. The pacification of Japan and South Korea also took place much earlier than the 
birth of the non-interference norm in East Asia and the processes of pacification, 
especially in Japan, were intrusive. Thus these processes did not really belong to the 
same family of peaceful development as did the pacification of Southeast Asia (except 
the Philippines) and China.   
Finally, as the main element of the peaceful approach in East Asia after 1979 has 
been the respect for military non-interference, and respect for the sovereignty of fellow 
East Asian countries, it seems that certain disputes of the region have remained outside 
the peace regime. Escalation of territorial disputes, especially the ones in maritime areas 
cannot be avoided by respecting the sovereignty of one’s adversaries. On the contrary, 
the issue of sovereignty is what is at stake in these conflicts.  Furthermore, while 
economic development has been the motivation that has prevented the onset of disputes 
in East Asia, developmental priorities have not always been constructive to peace in 
disputes about maritime territories. While the disputants do need each other for trade, 
the developmental issue in the disputed seas has been energy resources that are of a 
zero-sum nature: the more one’s adversary gets of these resources, the less is left for 
oneself. Yet, while the countries are not bound to the positive interdependence by their 
economic relations in this specific issue, they are in general considerations on trade 
relations, for example, must affect decisions on how much to push one’s adversaries in 
territorial disputes. This way the question of disputed maritime territories is at least 
partly outside the East Asian peace regime. While the record of East Asian interstate 
relations has been weakest in issues of disputed territories (both last wars and last 
interstate conflicts during the peaceful period, have been on disputed territories. Thus it 
seems natural to assume that the long peace of East Asia is most fragile in these issues.  
Conclusions 
The purpose of this book has been to make sense of the sudden transformation of East 
Asia from the world’s most belligerent to one of world’s most peaceful regions. I have 
shown the association between three socially constructed realities: 1. Developmentalist 
approach, identity and role of states, 2. The norm of non-interference, and 3. Prudent, 
face-saving attitude to conflict termination, with the decline in the onset of conflicts, 
near disappearance of their escalation to wars, and disappearance of violence into 
inaction. These associations have been revealed by means of statistical analysis. Only 
numbers could reveal the general tendencies, the systematic regularities and the big 
picture of peace and war in East Asia. At the same time, the use of qualitative historical 
process tracing and interpretative methods has been necessary for the revelation of the 
nature of these associations and regularities.  
The present study has not found exogenous causal relationships between 
objective material conditions and peace. Thus it has not produced knowledge for simple 
“social engineering” of material conditions for the purpose of conflict prevention. Yet 
the findings of this study have produced pragmatic understanding. Since it seems that 
the regularities of the long peace of East Asia are largely generated by knowledge, 
understanding and social practices rather than material conditions, it has been necessary 
for this study to remain sensitive also to the evidence on non-material constitution of 
peaceful realities.  
While discoveries on causal regularities would have been easy to generalize and 
carry to other regions as lessons for peace, the understanding of East Asian socially 
created realities will also be useful for other regions. It reveals what was possible in the 
generation of conditions conducive for peace, even if these conditions are not causally 
determined. Yet lessons of reasons for success (and failure) of various approaches to 
interaction might not be possible to carry to other regions simply by emulating the East 
Asian approaches elsewhere. The meaning and social function of different elements of 
approaches to politics is influenced by region-specific and culture-specific common 
historical experiences of problems and their remedies. Thus the same strategy (say 
lowering borders as was done in post-World War II Europe) might have a different 
effect in a different geographic and historical context. However, in addition to the 
falsifying learning (for example, that the European integration strategy for peace does 
not necessarily work elsewhere), the logic of social construction of peaceful realties of 
East Asia has positive general features that can be used as lessons outside the East 
Asian context. The problems of interventionist peace strategies, for example, that the 
East Asian case reveals so well, are likely to plague interventionist peace enforcement 
elsewhere, too. The misery of Iraq during the past decade could have been avoided if 
the lessons of belligerence in post-World War II East Asia (Vietnam War for example) 
and the recipes for peace in East Asia after 1979 had been studies more thoroughly.  
Similarly, the logic of output democracy or developmentalism – i.e. a conviction 
that the welfare of citizens is a central task of states and regional political institutions – 
can be a lesson that could be carried to other regions too. Understanding of the 
importance of developmentalism for peace could sophisticate our understanding of the 
theory of democratic peace, and sensitivize us to the more economic dimensions of 
democracy in our explanation of conditions for peace.  
Finally, and most importantly, the investigation of this study has revealed many 
processes of inter-dependence in the creation of the conditions of peace and war. It 
seems, on the basis of the experiences of East Asia, that it would be one of the great 
tasks for peace research to abandon the single-minded obsession for exogenous causal 
relationships between objective conditions and peace, and start developing models, in 
which conflicts and peace are being analyzed as processes, where the action of one 
conflicting party constitutes the legitimate counter-action of the other conflicting party. 
Instead of looking at the consequences of the conditions that one’s actions created for 
the other (say deterrence), we should be studying what our action constitutes in a 
structure where our and our adversary’s actions are just parts of the same interactive 
process. To me the most valuable lesson that this study and the experience of East Asia 
have delivered has been the realization that tackling these vicious cycles of escalation, 
and promoting inter-active processes of de-escalation is very important for peace 
research. Developing tools for the analysis and understanding of the mutual creation of 
legitimacy for violent action by adversaries (and the mutual creation of legitimacy of 
de-escalatory actions), is one of the main tasks for peace research – a task that the 
current causal models of peace and war are entirely incapable of tackling.  
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